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Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the
1998 Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act: Does the Government's
Reach Now Exceed its Grasp?
H. Lowell Brown*

On November 10, 1998, President Clinton signed the
International Antibribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998.' This
law amended the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)2 first
adopted in 1977' and last amended in 1988.' By amending the
FCPA, Congress effectuated the principles of the Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business
Transactions (OECD Convention), adopted by the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on
December 17, 1997 and approved unanimously by the U.S. Senate
on July 31, 1998.'
The OECD Convention was the culmination of over a decade
of effort by the United States government and others to build an
international consensus for the criminalization of transnational
bribery.6 The Convention established the following: (1) bribery of
a foreign official as a criminal offense; (2) requirements for
* © H. Lowell Brown 2001.

2

Pub. L. No. 105-366, § 1, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998).
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78dd-1 to 78dd-3, 78ff (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).

3 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 102-04, 91 Stat.
1494 (1977). President Carter signed the FCPA into law on December 19, 1977. 13
WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 1909 (Dec. 20, 1977).
4 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107 et seq. (1988). Attempts were made unsuccessfully to amend the FCPA in 1980,
1981, 1983 and 1985. See Adam Freemantle & Sherman Katz, The Foreign Corrupt
Payments Act Amendments of 1988, 23 INT'L LAW. 755, 759 (1989).

5 Arg.-Braz.-Bulg.-Chile-Slovak
Republic-Organization
for
Economic
Cooperation and Development: Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998)
[hereinafter Convention].
6 See H. Lowell Brown, The ExtraterritorialReach of the U.S. Government's
Campaign Against InternationalBribery, 22 HASTINGS INT'L L.J. 407 (1999).
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corporate accounting and for internal corporate financial controls;
and (3) a basis for mutual assistance among the signatories for the
investigation and prosecution of offenses arising from the bribery
of foreign officials.7 The Convention required, among other things,
that signatory countries adopt implementing legislation to conform
their domestic laws to the provisions of the Convention, as a
prerequisite to ratification. The 1998 amendments to the FCPA
accomplished this implementation by the United States, and
following the deposit of instruments of ratification by Canada,
Finland, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, and the United
Kingdom, as well as by the United States, the OECD Convention
entered into force on February 15, 1999.8
The 1998 amendments to the FCPA expanded the Act's
substantive scope of the FCPA and extended the jurisdictional
reach of the government's enforcement powers. This article
analyzes the 1998 amendments. Part I of the article provides a
historical overview of the FCPA.9 Part II of the article discusses
the OECD Convention.'" Part III analyzes the United States' 1998
Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act." Part IV of the
article analyzes the applicability of the FCPA extraterritorially.' 2
Part V concludes that while the amendments' importance in
conjunction with the OECD Convention largely remains to be
seen, it is clear that the enlargement of the extraterritorial effect of
the Act's antibribery provisions may prove to be the most
significant and challenging foray by the United States into the
regulation of international business, certainly since the FCPA was
originally enacted.' 3

I

Convention, supra note 5, 37 I.L.M. at 1.
OECD Convention on CombatingBribery to Enter into Force on 15 February
1999, OECD, at http://www.oecd.org/media/release/nw98-124a.htm (Dec. 17, 1998).
8

9 See infra notes 14-58 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 59-164 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 165-210 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 211-377 and accompanying text.
3 See infra Part

V.
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I. An Overview of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
The FCPA was enacted in 1977 in response to the revelation of
widespread bribery of foreign government officials by U.S.
companies doing business overseas. Investigations by the
Watergate Special Prosecutor" and by the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) disclosed the existence of overseas "slush
funds" that were used to finance illegal contributions to the Nixon
re-election campaign and other domestic political campaigns and
to fund bribes paid to foreign officials.'5 The SEC brought
14

As then SEC Commissioner Philip A. Lomis, Jr. commented:

[The involvement of the SEC in the problem of illicit payments] may be said to
have grown out of the investigations made by the Watergate Special
Prosecutor's office of illegal, and therefore undisclosed, corporate campaign
contributions in the 1972 elections. Our staff, observing these proceedings,
recognized that the activities disclosed for the first time involved questions of
possible significance to the pubii''.iiivestofsandtAatithis might have a bearing
upon our responsibilities. Accordingly, the Special Prosecutor's Office referred
to us information obtained in various of its investigations.
The Activities of American Multinational CorporationsAbroad, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on InternationalEcon. Policy of the Comm. on InternationalRelations, U.S.
House of Representatives, 94th Cong. 36 (1975); see also ForeignPayments Disclosure:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 1 (1976) [hereinafter Foreign Payments
Disclosure] (remarks of Chairman John M. Murphy).
While investigating certain contributions to the former presidential campaign,
the Watergate Special Prosecutor uncovered a number of corporate political
slush funds. These funds had been concealed from normal corporate accounting
controls. Since such activities involved matters of possible significance to
public investors, the Securities and Exchange Commission initiated its own
investigation. Their investigation revealed that a number of U.S. corporations,
in connection with their overseas operations, had used such secret slush funds
for questionable or illegal foreign payments.
Id.
15 "Congress was aware of the investigation by the Special Watergate Prosecutor
concerning illegal campaign contributions by U.S. companies, which often had been
financed through off-shore entities and accounts, that had resulted in criminal
prosecutions of twenty-two corporations and twenty-one individuals. See Abuses of
Corporate Power, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Prioritiesin Government of the
Joint Economic Comm., 94th Cong. 91 (1976) [hereinafter Abuses]; GEORGE C.

GREANIAS & DUANE WINDSOR, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES AcT: ANATOMY OF A

STATUTE, 17-19 (1982); Charles R. McManis, Questionable Corporate Payments
Abroad: An Antitrust Approach, 86 YALE L.J. 215 (1976).
Congress also heard a substantial amount of testimony concerning the overseas
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enforcement proceedings against major public corporations.' 6
practices of many of the country's largest corporations. For example, D.J. Houghton,
Chairman of Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, testified in hearings held by the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, and by the Subcommittee on
Multinational Corporations of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. In the course
of his testimony, Houghton acknowledged that between 1970 and 1975, 15% of the
commissions paid to foreign agents had been paid, in turn, to foreign government
officials. Houghton estimated this amount to have been $22 million. Houghton also
testified that in excess of $100 million had been paid to an agent in Saudi Arabia, Adnan
Khashoggi, and that at least $400,000 had been paid to a Saudi official using funds from
Swiss and Liechtenstein entities. See Lockheed Bribery HearingsBefore the Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. 349-53 (1975). Thomas V. Jones,
Chairman of Northrop Corporation, and Richard W. Millar, a member of Northrop's
board of directors, also testified before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations
and acknowledged that $450,000 had been paid to two Saudi Air Force officers through
Khashoggi. Millar also testified that approximately $476,000 in payments to a foreign
consultant had been used to make unlawful contributions to the 1972 Nixon re-election
campaign. Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on MultinationalCorporationsof the Comm. on ForeignRelations,
94th Cong. 110-13, 180-83 (1975).
Executives from several major oil companies testified as well. B.R. Dorsey,
Chairman of Gulf Oil Corporation, testified that between 1960 and 1973 approximately
$10.3 million of corporate funds had been used to make political contributions of which
approximately $5 million had been expended overseas. Id. at 5-12. Archie L. Monroe,
Controller of Exxon Corporation, testified that between 1963 and 1972 Exxon's Italian
subsidiary, ESSO Italiana, had made political contributions to campaigns in Italy totaling
$46-49 million. Id. at 241-59. Everett S. Checket, Executive Vice President of Mobil Oil
Corporation, also testified that Mobil's Italian subsidiary made payments in Italy totaling
approximately $2,130,000 between 1970-73. Id. at 316-23. The report of the internal
review of Gulf Oil's overseas payments conducted by John J. McCloy was subsequently
published in JOHN MCCLOY ET AL., THE GREAT OIL SPILL: THE INSIDE REPORT-GULF
OIL'S BRIBERY AND POLITICAL CHICANERY (1976).
16 See Mary Jane Dundas & Barbara Crutchfied George, HistoricalAnalysis of the
Accounting Standards of the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 10 MEMPHIS ST. L. REv.
499-500 (1980); see, e.g., SEC v. Boeing Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] 1976 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) I 95,442, 99,233 (D.D.C. 1976); SEC v. Lockheed Aircraft Co.,
404 F. Supp. 651 (D.D.C. 1975). Congress heard extensive testimony from the SEC
concerning the SEC's inquiry into overseas corrupt payments. SEC Chairman Roderick
M. Hills testified before the Joint Economic Committee that the SEC had reason to
believe that United Brands had made "questionable payments" of $1.25 million to
officials of a Central American country and $750,000 to officials of two European
countries. Abuses, supra note 15, at 4-6. Hills further testified that enforcement actions
had been brought against General Refactories alleging that approximately $400,000 had
been paid to European government officials; against Phillips Petroleum Company
alleging that $2.8 million which had been paid to two European companies had been
returned to the United States to fund illegal campaign contributions; against Gulf Oil
Corporation, alleging that $4.5 million paid to a foreign subsidiary had been used to
make illegal campaign contributions in the United States; against Northrop Corporation
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Additionally, the SEC instituted a voluntary disclosure program
under which companies could self-report violations of U.S.
securities laws in the hope of avoiding SEC enforcement action.'7
alleging that $450,000 paid to a European consultant had been used to make illegal U.S.
campaign contributions; and against Ashland Oil Company alleging that $780,000 had
been diverted to a secret fund and had been used to make illegal campaign contributions
in the United States. Id. at 5-6.
17 See Abuses, supra note 15, at 16-18 (testimony of Roderick M. Hills, Chairman
of the SEC); see also GREANis & WINDSOR, supra note 15, at 75-78; NEIL H. JACOBY ET
AL., BRIBERY AND EXTORTION INWORLD BUSINESS 46-58 (1977); Wallace Timmeny, An
Overview of the FCPA, 9 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 235, 236-37 (1982); John
Sweeny, The SEC Interpretive and Enforcement ProgramUnderthe FCPA, 9 SYRACUSE
J. INT'L L. & COM. 273, 275 (1982); Note, Disclosure of Payments to Foreign
Government Officials Under the Securities Acts, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1848, 1851-52
(1976). The Honorable Stanley Sporkin was Director of the SEC Division of
Enforcement at the time of the inquiry into questionable overseas payments. Judge
Sporkin recalled that the Division of Enforcement and the Division of Corporation
Finance were directed by the Commission to review the findings of the SEC's formal
investigation of overseas payments. Judge Sporkin noted that the "SEC was literally
overrun with these cases, and its meager resources were tapped to the utmost." Stanley
Sporkin, The Worldwide Banning of Schmiergeld: A Look at the Foreign Corrupt
PracticesAct on its Twentieth Birthday, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 269, 272-73 (1998).
Accordingly, a "creative solution became absolutely necessary." Id. at 272. As Judge
Sporkin explained:
The solution that we developed was inspired by the spirit of the federal
securities laws. The securities laws have long been a model for appropriate
government regulation. They are largely statutes that mandate transparency.
Full and fair disclosure is the general concept underpinning these laws. As part
of its administration of the federal securities laws, the SEC relies heavily on
voluntary private sector compliance. Thus, instead of requiring government
auditors to examine the financial reports of public corporations, that
responsibility has been delegated to the nation's Certified Public Accountants.
With these concepts in mind, [Allan Levenson, Director of the Division of
Corporate Finance,] with some input from me and then-Commissioner Pollack,
came up with the idea of a voluntary disclosure program. A corporation with an
illicit payment problem could, in effect, go to a corporate "confessional." It
would be required to publicly disclose the questionable payments it had made.
In addition, it would have to agree to commission an independent internal
investigation to determine the full nature and extent of its worldwide bribery
and other similar questionable activities. It was contemplated that the results
would be turned over to the SEC and made public.
As the last part of the program, the corporation would have to assure the
Commission that appropriate steps had been taken to insure that such activities
did not recur. Because we did not know whether the so-called private
investigation would have the requisite integrity and objectivity, the Commission
reserved the right to bring formal action. The corporate community was
informally assured, but not promised, that if all went well, no Commission
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The SEC's voluntary disclosure program resulted in more than
400 companies disclosing overseas payments in excess of $300
million.'" In light of these revelations, Congress attempted to
eliminate the problems of foreign bribery by U.S. individuals and
entities in two distinct, although related, ways.
A. The Anti-Bribery Provisions
First, the FCPA made foreign bribery illegal. The FCPA
prohibits the payment or offer of payment,'9 either directly or
indirectly through a third party,"0 of money or "anything of
action would be brought against a voluntarily complying corporation.
Id.
"S COMM.

ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE,

UNLAWFUL CORPORATE

PAYMENTS AcT OF 1977, H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 4 (1977).

More than 400 companies have admitted making questionable or illegal
payments. The companies, most of them voluntarily, have reported paying out
well in excess of $300 million. in corporate funds to foreign government
officials, politicians and political parties. These corporations included some of
the largest and most widely held public companies in the United States; over
117 of them rank in the top Fortune 500 industries.
Id.; see also S. REP. No. 95-114, at 3 (1977) ("Recent investigations by the SEC have
revealed corrupt foreign payments by over 300 U.S. companies involving hundreds of
millions of dollars."); Timmeny, supra note 17, at 237.
19A corrupt payment need not actually be made to a foreign official to constitute a
violation. Instead, the FCPA also prohibits the "offer[,] ...promise to pay, or

authorization of the giving of anything of value" to foreign officials. §§ 78dd- 1(a), -2(a),
-3(a).
20 The FCPA prohibits both payments made directly to foreign officials and
payments made indirectly to third parties "while knowing that all or a portion of such
money or thing of value will be offered, given or promised, directly or indirectly, to any
foreign official, to any foreign political party, or official thereof, or to any candidate for
foreign political office." §§ 78dd-l(a)(3), -2(a)(3), -3(a)(3) (West Supp. 1977). As
originally enacted in 1977, the FCPA prohibited payments to third parties if there was
"reason to know" that all or a portion of the payment would be given, offered or
promised to a foreign official. §§ 78dd-1 (a)(3), -2(a)(3). The "reason to know" standard
was subject to the criticism that it was so ambiguous that negligent payments could fall
within its scope. See Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act Joint
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Finance and Monetary Policy and the Subcomm. on
Securities of the Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong. 45-46, 85-

86, 96-98 (statement of Malcolm Baldridge, Sec'y of Commerce; testimony of Calman J.
Cohen, Emergency Comm. for Am. Trade; testimony of Allen B. Green, Am. Bar Ass'n
Public Contract Law Section); Foreign Corrupt Practices Act-Oversight Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection,and Financeof the
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. at 243, 278, 356 (1982); H.R. REP. No.
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value,""1 to an official of a foreign government or political party,
or a candidate for political office,2 with corrupt intent, 3 in order to
97-166 (testimony of William E. Brock, U.S. Trade Representative; statement of

Sherman E. Ungar, Department of Commerce; statement of John T. Subak, Rohm and
Haas Company); Barbara Crutchfield George et al., On the Threshold of the Adoption of
Global Antibribery Legislation: A Critical Analysis of Current Domestic and
International Efforts Toward the Reduction of Business Corruption, 32 VAND. J.

TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 20-21 (1999); Lisa Harriman Randall, Multilateralizationof the
Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 6 MINN.J. GLOBAL TRADE 657'(1997); Robert S. Levy,
The Antibribery Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: Are They
Really As Valuable As We Think They Are?, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 71, 79-80 (1985); Mark
A. Bader & Bill Shaw, Amendment of the Foreign CorruptPracticesAct, 15 INT'L L. &

POL. 627, 631 (1983); Ruth Aurora Witherspoon, Multinational CorporationsGovernmentalRegulation of Business Ethics Under the Foreign CorruptPracticesAct of
1977: An Analysis, 87 DICK. L. REv. 531, 562 (1983); GREANIAS & WINDSOR, supra

note 15, at 96-97; Allen B. Green & David A. Churchill, Antibribery Problems Under
the Foreign CorruptPracticesAct, 5 MIDDLE E. EXEC. REP. 19 (1982); John M. Fedders,
The Reason To Know Standard-A Troublesome Ambiguity in the Foreign Corrupt
PracticesAct, 4 MIDDLE E. EXEC. REP. 2 (1981).
21 The payment, offer, gift or authorization of the giving of "anything of value" is
prohibited by the FCPA. 78dd-I(a), -2(a), -3(a). Although corrupt payments typically
involve cash or a cash equivalent, the term "anything of value" is not so limited. Instead,
as used in the domestic bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994), the term "anything of
value" is construed broadly to include both tangible and intangible objects. United States
v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Picquet, 963 F.2d 54,
55 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Griard, 601 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1979). See H.

Lowell Brown, The Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct Redux: The Anti-Bribery Provisions
of the Foreign CorruptPracticesAct, 12 INT'L TAX & Bus. L. 260, 273-75 (1994). Thus,

the term "anything of value" has been construed as including, for example, charitable
donations in Lamb v. PhillipMorris,Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990); travel expenses
in United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1991); and transportation of voters
who supported the ruling party in United States v. Kenny International Corp., (D.D.C.
1979), 2 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REP. 649 (BNA 1997).
22 The term "foreign official" is defined in the FCPA as "any officer or employee
of a foreign government or any department, agency or instrumentality thereof." §§ 78ddl(f)(1), -2(h)(2), -3(f)(2)(A). As originally enacted in 1977, the FCPA definition of
"foreign official" did not include "employees whose duties were primarily ministerial or
clerical." S. REP. No. 95-831, at 12 (1977). The 1988 amendments to the FCPA removed
this limitation and the U.S. Department of Justice has suggested that the elimination of
the exclusion of ministerial or clerical employees from the reach of the FCPA was
consistent with the focus of the 1988 amendments on the purpose of the payment rather
than the duties or the position of the person receiving the payment. U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ANTIBRIBERY PROVISIONS

5 (1992),

availableat http://www.usdoj.gov:80/criminal/fraud/test/dojdocb.htm (last visited Nov.
20, 2000). Also like the term "public official" in the domestic bribery statute, "foreign
official" has been construed broadly. See, e.g., United States v. Young & Rubicam, Inc.,
741 F. Supp. 334 (D. Conn. 1990) (treating consultant to the Jamaica tourist board with
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obtain or retain business. 2' Not all payments to foreign officials are
prohibited however. Instead, payments that are solely intended "to
expedite or secure the performance of a routine governmental
action by a foreign official, political party, or party officer" are
exempt from the anti-bribery prohibition.25 Such payments are
often referred to as "facilitating payments" or "grease payments. 26
close ties to the Prime Minister of Jamaica as a "foreign official" under the FCPA); see
also Brown, supra note 21, at 275-79. As discussed infra in Part III, the 1998
amendments further expanded the definition of "foreign official" to include officers and
employees of a public international organization consistent with the provisions of the
OECD Convention.
23 The legislative history, both in 1977 and 1988, reflects Congress' intent that the
use of the term "corruptly" be analogous to the use of the same term in the domestic
bribery statute. See S. REP. No. 95-114, at 10; H.R. REP. No. 95-40, at 7-8; H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 100-576, at 918 (1988). Accordingly, proof of the requisite corrupt intent
requires a showing that the payment was made or offered with the intent of influencing
an official act. See Liebo, 923 F.2d at 1312; United States v. Johnson, 621 F.2d 1073,
1076 (10th Cir. 1980).
The government must show that the money was knowingly offered to an official
with the intent and expectation that, in exchange for the money, some act of a
public official would be influenced. The money must be given with more than
some generalized hope or expectation of ultimate benefit on the part of the
donor .... The money must be offered, in other words, with the intent and
design to influence official action in exchange for the donation.
Id.; see Brown, supra note 21, at 264-69.
24 §§ 78dd-l(a), -2(a), -3(a).
25

§§ 78dd-l(b), -2(b), -3(b).

26 Although not specifically referred to in the 1977 Act, the legislative history
strongly suggests that the anti-bribery provisions were not intended to apply to so-called
"grease payments." See H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 8 (1977); S. REp. No. 95-114, at 10

(1977). The exception for "grease payments" or "facilitating payments" was made
explicit in the 1988 amendments, which the House-Senate conference made clear were
payments made to expedite routine governmental actions. The conference also made it
clear that the exception applied only to payments in connection with "ordinarily and
commonly performed actions with respect to permits or licenses," and not to payments in
connection with "those governmental approvals involving an exercise of discretion by a
government official where the actions are the functional equivalent of obtaining or
retaining business." H.R. CONE. REP. No. 100-576, at 921. Accordingly,
"routine governmental action" is defined in the FCPA as being "ordinarily and
commonly performed ... in connection with: (i) obtaining permits, licenses or
other official documents to qualify a person to do business in a foreign country;
(ii) processing governmental papers; (iii) providing police protection, mail pickup and delivery, or scheduling inspections associated with contract performance
or inspections related to the transit of goods across country; (iv) providing
phone service, power and water supply, loading and unloading cargo, or
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Other payments are exempt from the anti-bribery provisions as
well. Proof that a payment to a foreign official was lawful under
the written laws of the foreign country could constitute an
affirmative defense to an alleged violation of the FCPA.27
Similarly, the FCPA recognizes an affirmative defense for
reasonable and bona fide promotional expenses."
protecting perishable products or commodities from deterioration; or (v) actions
of similar nature.
§§ 78dd-l(f)(3)(A), -2(h)(4)(A), -3(f)(4)(A); see also Brown, supra note 21, at 279-80.
27 Thus, the FCPA provides that it is an affirmative defense that "the payment, gift,
offer or promise of anything of value that was made, was lawful under the written laws
and regulations of the foreign official's, political party's, party official's, or candidate's
§§ 78dd-1(c)(1), -2(c)(1), -3(c)(1). The House-Senate conference on the
country ....
1988 Amendments made it clear, however, that simply showing that the absence of
written law in the foreign country would not be sufficient to make out the defense. "The
conferees wish to make clear that the absence of written laws in a foreign official's
country would not itself be sufficient to satisfy this defense. In interpreting what is
'lawful under the written laws and regulations,' the conferees intend that the normal
rules of legal construction would apply." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-576, at 921-22.
Additionally, commentators note that the laws of virtually every country prohibit bribery
of public officials. See Philip M. Nicholas, Regulating TransnationalBribery in Times of
Globalizationand Fragmentation,24 YALE J. INT'L L. 257, 272 (1999).
28 The FCPA provides an affirmative defense to liability:
The payment, gift, offer or promise of anything of value that was made, was a reasonable
and bona fide expenditure such as travel and lodging expenses, incurred by or on behalf
of a foreign official, party, party official, or candidate and was directly related to:
(a) the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or services; or
(b) the execution or performance of a contract with a foreign government or
agency thereof.
§§ 78dd-l(c)(2), -2(c)(2), and -3(c)(2). The 1988 Conference cautioned, however, that
the defense would not be available if the otherwise permissible payment were made
corruptly in return for an official act. As the conferees explained, "[i]f a payment or gift
is corruptly made, in return for an official act or omission, then it cannot be a bona fide,
good faith payment, and this defense would not be available." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100576, at 922. It should be noted that a similar exception for "nominal" payments or gifts
that were a "courtesy, a token of regard or esteem in return for hospitality" was rejected
in 1988. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-576, at 923-24.
In a recent civil enforcement action, United States v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 99 Civ.
12566 NG (D. Mass. 1999), the DOJ took the position that payment of first-class air
travel and other expenses, such as food and lodging, for an Egyptian government official
and his family to visit the United States was prohibited by the FCPA because the purpose
of the visit was to induce the official to use his influence concerning the award of United
States Agency for International Development (U.S.A.I.D.) contracts to Metcalf & Eddy,
Inc. Without admitting or denying the allegations, Metcalf & Eddy consented to the
entry of a final judgment of permanent injunction.
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B. The Accounting and FinancialControls Provisions
The other prong of Congress' response to international bribery
was the establishment of accounting and financial controls
requirements for companies whose stock is registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.9 These requirements represent a
significant expansion of the SEC's regulatory authority.30 Their
adoption was heralded as a "new era" in federal jurisdiction
because the accounting and financial controls requirements
represented the first time in which standards for corporate
governance had been imposed on public companies under federal
law.' Previously, federal securities laws had relied on disclosure
standards and prohibitions against the making of false entries in a
29 § 78a.

As was observed in SEC v. World-Wide Coin Inv., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 747
(N.D. Ga. 1983):
The FCPA... has important implications for the SEC, since the incorporation
of the accounting provisions into the federal securities laws confers on the SEC
new rule making and enforcement authority over the control and record-keeping
mechanisms of its registrants. The FCPA reflects a congressional determination
that the scope of the federal securities laws and the SEC's authority should be
expanded beyond the traditional ambit of disclosure requirements. The
consequence of adding these substantive requirements governing accounting
control to the federal securities laws will significantly augment the degree of
federal involvement in the internal management of public corporations.
30

Id.
31 Barbara Crutchfield George & Mary Jane Dundas, Responsibilitiesof Domestic
CorporateManagement Under the Foreign CorruptPracticesAct, 31 SYRACUSE L. REv.
865, 866-67 (1980) ("The internal accounting provisions of the FCPA have changed the
mandate of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) by giving that agency the
means for regulating the internal management of domestic corporations. Thus, the FCPA
heralds a new era."); see also Kathleen A. Lacey & Barbara Crutchfield George,
Expansion of SEC Authority into Internal Corporate Governance: The Accounting
Provisionsof the Foreign CorruptPracticesAct, 7 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 119, 120
(1998) ("These accounting sections significantly extended the authority of the Securities
Exchange Commission ... beyond traditional disclosure requirements of the 1933
Securities Act ... and the 1934 Securities Exchange Act .... The FCPA granted the
SEC authority over the entire financial management and reporting requirements of those
corporations subject to SEC regulation."); George J. Siedel, Corporate Governance
Under the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 21 Q. REv. ECON. & Bus. 43, 44 (1981)
("[T]he accounting provisions were referred to as the most significant intrusion into
corporate affairs since the 1930's, when federal securities legislation was originally
enacted.").
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company's books and records."
The accounting and financial controls provisions of the FCPA
apply to all corporations whose securities are registered with the
See § 78m(b)(2)(A). As the SEC explained in its May 12, 1976 report to the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs:
The almost universal characteristic of the cases reviewed to date by the
Commission has been the apparent frustration of our system of corporate
accountability which has been designed to assure that there is a proper
accounting of the use of corporate funds and that documents filed with the
Commission and circulated to shareholders do not omit or misrepresent material
facts. Millions of dollars of funds have been inaccurately recorded in corporate
books to facilitate the making of questionable payments. Such falsification of
records has been known to corporate employees and often to top management,
but often has been concealed from outside auditors and counsel and outside
directors. Accordingly, the primary thrust of our actions has been to restore the
efficiency of the system of corporate accountability and to encourage the boards
of directors to exercise their authority to deal with the issue.
32

Securities and Exchange Commission, Report on Questionable and Illegal Corporate
Payments and Practices, Submitted to the Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs of the United States Senate, 94th Cong., at 9 (1976).
For this reason, the enforcement actions brought by the SEC arising from the
questionable payments investigation, preceding the enactment of the FCPA, were
grounded on the financial disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws. The
Deputy Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement at the time of these actions noted:
In the early days when we were drafting some of the complaints in the first
cases, the seeds were planted for the FCPA as we know it. For example, the first
thing we did when we drafted our complaints in these cases was to seek an
injunction against the falsification of books and records. At that time there was
no requirement that companies maintain accurate books and records, but we
sought injunctions against false entries. That was the seed for Section
13(b)(2)(a) of the Exchange Act.
See, e.g., Timmeny, supra note 17, at 236. Other commentators have made similar
observations. See, e.g., John D. Reed, Corporate Self-Investigating Under the Foreign
Corrupt PracticesAct, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 803, 806 (1980) ("It is the obligation of the
SEC to ensure that investors are fully informed of material dealings of subject
corporations. It is therefore not surprising that the Commission viewed increasing
evidence of foreign bribery as a frustration of the system of corporate accountability.");
Steven M. Morgan, In Search of an InternationalSolution to Bribery: The Impact of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 on Corporate Behavior, 12 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 359, 361 n. ll (1979):
The SEC proceeded on the theory that misleading or suppressed disclosure of
improper or questionable expenditures could violate § 13(a) of the Exchange
Act. . . and the rules and regulations thereunder, all of which relate to the filing
of periodic and other reports with the SEC by registered companies. The SEC
then brought the injunctive action under § 21(d) of the Exchange Act.
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SEC. The provisions also apply to corporations required to file
reports with the SEC pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934." These corporations are referred to as "issuers."34 Under the
accounting provisions, issuers are required to "make and keep
books, records, and accounts, which in reasonable detail,
accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the
assets of the issuer." 5 In essence, issuers are required to keep their
books and records in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles. 6
The SEC proposed these requirements based on the
observation that corrupt and "questionable" payments had not
been recorded in the companies' books as such, but had been
disguised and mischaracterized in order to avoid detection. It was
the SEC Enforcement Director's view that if public corporations
33 The FCPA accounting provisions were enacted as a new Section 13A of the
Securities Exchange Act and apply to "every issuer which has a class of securities
registered pursuant to [15 U.S.C. § 781] and every issuer which is required to file reports
pursuant to [15 U.S.C. § 780] ....
§ 78m(b)(2).
34 An "issuer" is defined in the Securities Exchange Act as:

Any person who issues or proposes to issue any security; except that with
respect to certificates of deposits for securities, voting-trust certificates, or
collateral-trust certificates, or with respect to certificates of interest or shares in
an unincorporated investment trust not having a board of directors or of the
fixed, restricted management, or unit type, the term "issuer" means the person
or persons performing the acts and assuming the duties of depositor or manager
pursuant to the provisions of the trust or other agreement or instrument under
which such securities are issued; and except that with respect to equipment-trust
certificates or like securities, the term "issuer" means the person by whom the
equipment or property is, or is to be, used.
§ 78c(a)(8).
31 § 78m(b)(2)(A).
Congress intended that
36 By requiring that records be kept "accurately,"
corporations record transactions in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles. As explained in S. REP. No. 95-114, at 8 (1977), "[s]tandards of
reasonableness must apply. In this regard, the term 'accurately' does not mean exact
precision as measured by some abstract principle. Rather, it means an issuer's records
should reflect transactions in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles
or other applicable criteria." Id.
The House-Senate conference also noted that the amendment of the record-keeping
requirements of the Securities Exchange Act "makes clear that the issuer's records
should reflect transactions in conformity with accepted methods of recording economic
events and effectively prevent off-the-books slush funds and payments of bribes." H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 95-831, at 10 (1977).
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were required to keep accurate books and records subject to
scrutiny by auditors and others, those corporations would "think
twice" before accurately recording the payment of bribes on their
books.37

Accordingly, the standard for compliance with the FCPA
accounting provisions is not one of materiality, as are other
securities law disclosure requirements.38 Instead, the standard is
37 As Judge Sporkin recalled:

I analyzed the various cases the SEC had brought and came to the conclusion
that in no instance was an illicit payment recorded in the corporation's books
for what it was. The payments were carefully disguised. For example, a bribe to
a government official was often made through an agent. The books and records
would merely reflect an "agent's fee." The system of private sector enforcement
was thus being subverted. In many instances, the corporation's public
accountants were outright lied to or otherwise misled.
Most of all, I was amazed that there was no requirement that publicly traded
corporations maintain honest books and records. My research of the various
laws did reveal that such a "books and records" requirement was included in the
laws governing this nation's financial institutions. It occurred to me that if such
a requirement was good enough for this nation's brokerage and banking
institutions, why not for its industrial concerns?
I became convinced that what was necessary was a simple law that would
require corporations to keep accurate books and records. In my view, a
corporation would think twice before it recorded a bribe for what it was. Since
bribery is generally considered a crime, it would be virtually untenable for
someone to admit in writing that the corporation is engaging in such activities
on an ongoing basis. Bribery needs secrecy in order to flourish. Thus, I
theorized that requiring the disclosure of all bribes paid would, in effect,
foreclose that activity.
Sporkin, supra note 17, at 274.
38 The accounting provisions of the FCPA were modeled after the auditing
standards of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). See
Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act: Hearings on S. 708 Before
the Subcommittee on Securities and the Subcommittee on International Finance and
Monetary Policy, 97th Cong., 83-84 (1981). At the time Congress enacted the accounting
provisions, both the AICPA and the American Bar Association construed those
provisions as incorporating a standard of materiality. See L. Robert Primoff, The Foreign
Corrupt PracticesAct: Implicationsfor the PrivatePractitioner,9 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L.
& COM. 325, 328 (1982).
The SEC disagreed with this view. See Promotion of the Reliability of Financial
Information and Prevention of the Concealment of Questionable or Illegal Corporate
Payments and Practices, Exchange Act Release No. 34-15570, 44 Fed. Reg. 10,964 to
10,967 (Feb 23, 1979). As a former Chief Counsel to the SEC Division of Enforcement
stated:
Materiality is defined in terms of what a reasonable investor would consider
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one of reasonable accuracy.39
important, or "material," to the financial statements of an issuer. For a company
of any size, this means that you would need transactions of thousands, perhaps
tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars, before the record-keeping requirement
would be applicable. Transactions of a lesser amount... would not be subject
to the requirement that they be recorded accurately .... Section 320.8 of the
Statement on Accounting Standards No. 1 indicates that transactions should be
recorded at the amounts in which they occur, in the periods in which they occur,
and be classified in appropriate accounts. That is what an auditor expects to find
when he audits a company's books. However, if you use a materiality standard
to determine what goes into your accounting system-to define the transactions
a company is required to record accurately few, if any, transactions would be
subject to the record-keeping requirements. From that perspective, the argument
set forth [by the American Bar Association] simply does not make sense.
Frederick B. Wade, An Examination of the Provisions and Standards of the FCPA, 9
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 255, 263 (1982). In any event, the SEC considered illicit
payments to be material regardless of the amount of the bribe or the financial size of the
corporation. As Judge Sporkin noted:
The key issue was the application of the materiality standard. Not all corporate
information requires disclosure. Apart from information that is specifically
required to be disclosed, all other required disclosures must meet a materiality
standard ....
The SEC largely predicated its lawsuits on the theory that the illicit activities
of publicly traded corporations are material and must be disclosed to their
shareholders. There was no question that the theory was a good one, especially
inside the Commission. Outside the Commission, certain members of the
private bar held other views. They contended that if a corporation with a billion
dollars in assets paid bribes in the low millions, that conduct would not be
material. The SEC theory on materiality squarely stood up to their contentions.
The Commission's position on materiality was several-fold. In its view, an
activity that subjects a corporation to possible substantive criminal penalties
would be important to shareholders and thus would meet the.., materiality
standard. Moreover, to properly test materiality, one must look beyond the
amount of the bribe. According to the Commission, one must look to the
amount of business that the corporation would lose if it could no longer use
bribery to obtain that business. In effect, it was the amount of business that was
derived from the Schmiergeld that was particularly crucial to the materiality
issues.
Sporkin, supra note 17, at 275.
39 It has been noted in this regard that:
The [FCPA's] purpose is not to require business records and controls to
conform to some absolute ideal, but rather to assure that the records of a public
company "in reasonabledetail, accurately reflect" disbursements of its assets,
and that its internal accounting controls are "sufficient to provide reasonable
assurances" that the provision's objectives will be met. Reasonableness, rather
than materiality, is the test to be applied.
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In this connection, the SEC has identified factors to be
considered in evaluating whether the corporation's accounting
procedures achieve the objectives of the act. These factors are: (1)
the overall control environment;' ° (2) the translation of broad
accounting control objectives into specific objectives which are
applicable to the business, organizational, and other characteristics
of the company; (3) the specific control procedures and
environmental factors which should contribute to the achievement
of the specific control objectives; (4) whether control procedures
are functioning as intended; and (5) the benefits (i.e., reduction of
risk of failing to achieve objectives) and costs of additional or
alternative controls.'
In adopting the reasonableness standard, Congress recognized
the necessity of management's balancing of benefits and costs.42
The SEC recognized the necessity of flexibility in implementing
accounting controls as well. 3
Robert J. Fortin, Comment, Corporate Financial Records and Internal Accounting
Controls: What Does the SEC Expect of Audit Committee Members?, 9 N.C. J. INT'L L.
& COM. REG. 291, 311 (1984) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
40 In his remarks at a meeting of the AICPA, former SEC Chairman Harold M.
Williams noted that "the key to an adequate control environment is an approach on the
part of the board and top management which makes clear what is expected, and that
conformity to these expectations will be rewarded while breaches will be punished."
Williams' Remarks before the AICPA, Exchange Act Release No. 34-17500, 46 Fed.
Reg. 11,544, 11,545 (Feb. 9, 1981).
41 Statement of Management on Internal Accounting Control, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-15772, 414 Fed. Reg. 26,702, 26,705 (May 4, 1979).
42 For example, the report of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs stated:
The Committee recognizes that management must necessarily estimate and
evaluate the cost/benefit relationships of the . . . business, diversity of
operations, degree of centralization of financial and operating management,
amount of contact by top management with day-to-day operations, and
numerous other circumstances are factors which management must consider in
establishing and maintaining an internal accounting controls system.
S. REP. No. 95-114, at 8 (1977).
41 SEC Chairman Williams observed with regard to the reasonableness standard
that:
Reasonableness, as a standard, allows flexibility in responding to particular
facts and circumstances. Inherent in this concept is a toleration of deviations
from the absolute. One measure of the reasonableness of a system relates to
whether the expected benefits from improving it would be significantly greater
than the anticipated costs of doing so.
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Issuers are also required to have in place internal financial
controls providing "reasonable assurances" that:
transactions are executed in accordance with management's
general or specific authorization; (ii) transactions are recorded as
necessary (I) to permit preparation of financial statements in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any
other criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to maintain
accountability for assets; (iii) access to assets is permitted only
in accordance with management's general or specific
authorization; and (iv) the recorded accountability for assets is
compared with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and
appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences.44
In sum, the corporation's records and controls must provide "such
level of detail and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent
officials in the conduct of their own affairs. ' 5
Williams' Remarks before the AICPA, 46 Fed. Reg., supra note 40, at 11,546; see also
Lloyd H. Feller, An Examination of the Accounting Provisionsof the FCPA, 9 SYRACUSE
J. INT'L L. & COM. 245, 252 (1982) ("The Commission stated it recognized that the
concept of reasonableness tolerated certain deviations and encompassed cost-benefit
analysis. It indicated its willingness to be deferential, stating it would only bring actions
when there was knowing or reckless conduct.").
44 § 78m1(b)(2)(B). Adoption of a "prudent man" test with respect to the
reasonableness standard also implied flexibility in the approach, particularly as to a
balancing of cost and benefit. As the House-Senate conference on the 1988 amendments
explained:
The conference committee adopted the prudent man qualification in order to
clarify that the current standard does not connote an unrealistic degree of
exactitude or precision. The concept of reasonableness of necessity
contemplates the weighing of a number of relevant factors, including the costs
of compliance.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-576, at 917 (1977).
45 § 78m(b)(7). Congress added this definition of "reasonable assurance" and
"reasonable detail" in the 1988 amendments in order to clarify that the current standard
does not connote an unrealistic degree of exactitude or precision. The concept of
reasonableness of necessity contemplates the weighing of a number of relevant factors
including the cost of compliance." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-576, at 917; see also
Written Statement of Hon. John S.R. Shad, SEC Chairman, Before the Subcomm. on
Securities and the Subcomm. on Int'l Finance and Monetary Policy of the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs ConcerningS. 708, Foreign CorruptPracticesAct
Release, Joint Hearings on S.708 Before the Subcommittee on Securities and the
Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH), 82,882 at 84,341 (June 24, 1981). "The Commission believes the 'prudent
man' test eliminates issuers' concerns over de minimus inaccuracies and sets an
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The internal controls provisions of the FCPA were intended to
assure that management was adequately informed concerning the
company's assets and to ensure that those assets were treated as
management intended, thereby preventing the creation of off-thebooks "slush funds" or the disbursement of corporate funds as

bribes contrary to company policy and management's direction. 6
Thus, in contrast to the accounting system adopted by a
corporation to process and report transactions, the accounting and
controls provisions of the FCPA contemplate a broader array of
controls to guard against misappropriation of the corporation's
assets, in accordance with management's stewardship
obligations."7 Other "directives," such as the segregation of
appropriate minimum standard for publicly owned corporations." Id. Thus, as former
SEC Chairman Harold M. Williams stated with respect to the internal controls
provisions, "[iin essence, these objectives are that assets be safegfarded from
unauthorized use, the corporate transaction conform to managerial authorizations, and
that records are accurate." Williams' Remarks before the AICPA, 46 Fed. Reg., supra
note 40, at 11,545.
46 As former Deputy Enforcement Director Timmeny explained:
The internal control provisions.., are designed to deal with the problems of
off-the-books slush funds or company employees going beyond company policy
and using corporate assets to make payments... in a way the management
would not want them used. They were also designed to ensure that there are
controls on the company assets-that a company knows what assets it has and
that management is aware of what is going on within a company concerning its
assets.
Timmeny, supra note 17, at 240. The legislative history of the 1977 Act is to the same
effect:
The establishment and maintenance of a system of internal controls is an
important management obligation. A fundamental aspect of management's
stewardship responsibility is to provide shareholders with reasonable assurances
that the business is adequately controlled. Additionally, management has a
responsibility to furnish shareholders and potential investors with reliable
financial information on a timely basis. An adequate system of internal
accounting controls is necessary to management's discharge of these
obligations.
S. REP. No.95-114, at 8 (1977).
47 As observed in SEC v. World-Wide Coin Inv., Ltd.:
The internal controls requirement is primarily designed to give statutory content
to an aspect of management stewardship responsibility, that of providing
shareholders with reasonable assurances that the business is adequately
controlled ....Internal accounting control is generally speaking, only one
aspect of a company's total control system; in order to maintain accountability
for the disposition of its assets, a business must attempt to make it difficult for
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accounting functions and personnel, have also been inferred from
the accounting and control provisions. 8
The FCPA accounting and control provisions are rules of
general applicability to issuers that were adopted for the protection
of all investors. 9 For that reason, the finding of a violation does
its assets to be misappropriated. The internal accounting controls element of a
company's control system is that which is specifically designed to provide
reasonable, cost-effective safeguards against the unauthorized use or disposition
of company assets and reasonable assurances that financial records and accounts
are sufficiently reliable for purposes of external reporting. "Internal accounting
controls" must be distinguished from the accounting system typically found in a
company. Accounting systems process transactions and recognize, calculate,
classify, post, summarize and report transactions. Internal controls safeguard
assets and assure the reliability of financial records, one of their main jobs being
to prevent and detect errors and irregularities that arise in the accounting
systems of the company. Internal accounting controls are basic indicators of the
reliability of the financial statements and the accounting system and records
from which financial statements are prepared.
567 F. Supp. 724, 750-51 (1983).
48 Thus, in SEC v. World-Wide Coin Inv., Ltd., the court observed that in
conformity with the accounting and controls provisions:
Every company should have reliable personnel, which may require that some be
bonded, and all should be supervised. . . Account functions should be
segregated and procedures designed to prevent errors and irregularities. The
major functions of recordkeeping, custodianship, authorization, and operation
should be performed by different people to avoid the temptation for abuse of
these incompatible functions .... Reasonable assurances should be maintained
that transactions are executed as authorized.... Transactions should be properly
recorded in the firm's accounting records to facilitate control, which would also
require standardized procedures for making accounting entries. Exceptional
entries should be investigated regularly .... Access to assets of the company
should be limited to authorized personnel .... At reasonable intervals, there
should be a comparison of the accounting records with the actual inventory of
assets, which would usually involve the physical taking of inventory, the
counting of cash, and the reconciliation of accounting records with the actual
physical assets.
Id. at 750-51.
49 As SEC Chairman John S.R. Shad observed, "as the legislative history of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act makes clear, the accounting provisions were enacted in
part to facilitate the disclosure provisions of the federal securities laws and in part to
provide for greater accountability of corporate assets. They were not intended
exclusively to curb foreign bribery." Written Statement of Hon. John S. R. Shad, supra
note 45, at 84,333. The broad remedial purpose of the accounting and control provisions
was recognized by the court in SEC v. World-Wide Coin Inv., Ltd.:
The FCPA was enacted on the principle that accurate record keeping is an
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not require evidence of off-the-books "slush funds" or corrupt
overseas payments." Indeed, a corporation that conducts no
business overseas may nevertheless be liable for violation of the
FCPA accounting and controls provisions.'
essential ingredient in promoting management responsibility and is an
affirmative requirement for publicly held American corporations to strengthen
the accuracy of corporate books and records, which are the "bedrock elements
of our system of corporate disclosure and accountability." A motivating factor
in the enactment of the FCPA was a desire to protect the investor, as was the
purpose behind the enactment of the securities acts. It is apparent that investors
are entitled to rely on the implicit representations that corporations will account
for their funds properly and will not channel funds out of the corporation or
omit to include such funds in the accounting system so that there are no checks
possible on how much of the corporation's funds are being expended in the
manner management later claims.
567 F. Supp. at 750-55.
50 See United States v. Crop Growers Corp., 954 F. Supp. 335 (D.D.C. 1997); see
also Christopher F. Corr & Judd Lawler, Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don't? The
OECD Convention and the Globalization of Anti-Bribery Measures, 32 VAND. J.

L. 1249, 1265 (1999). Nevertheless, application of the accounting and
controls provision in cases that do not involve overseas corrupt payments has been
TRANSNAT'L

criticized. See, e.g., Robert B. von Mehren, Introduction to the Foreign Corrupt
PracticesAct of 1977-Law, Proceduresand Practices, 10 PLI INST. ON SEC. REG. 65,

69 (1979) ("I find it deplorable that our legislative process should have produced
legislation considered largely as legislation dealing with foreign payments but, upon
passage, turns out to have perhaps its most critical impact upon internal corporate
governance"); John W. Bagby, Comment, Enforcement of Accounting Standards in the

Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 21 AM. Bus. L.J. 213, 231-32 (1983) ("The SEC has
used FCPA accounting provisions in a manner which is arguably inconsistent with the
legislative purpose of preventing foreign corrupt payments. This clearly provides the
strongest argument for removal of the record-keeping requirements from the FCPA.")
(emphasis in original).
51In this regard, Professor Kathleen Brickey has observed:
Even though the record keeping and control provisions [of the FCPA] are
intended to work in tandem with the foreign bribery provisions to deter
corporate bribery, liability for violating the accounting provisions is not
contingent upon the establishment of a nexus between the inadequacy of the
recording system and maintenance of off book accounts to finance unlawful
foreign payments. For while Congress hoped that the combined effect of the
antibribery provisions and the accounting provisions would be deterrence, the
structure of the statute does not inextricably intertwine liability under each.
Indeed, the record keeping and accounting requirements . . .apply to

domestic corporations that conduct no business abroad and conduct no business
with foreign entities here in the United States.
2 KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY § 9:20 (2d ed. 1992); see
also Morgan, supra note 32, at 369 ("It is a significant development that issuers are now
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Additionally, no proof of intent, or "scienter," is required to
establish liability under the accounting and controls provisions. 52
Notwithstanding the absence of a scienter requirement, the SEC
has stated that only instances of knowing or reckless conduct will
be prosecuted. "
C. Penaltiesand Sanctions
Responsibility for enforcement of the FCPA is shared by the
SEC and the U.S. Department of Justice. The Department of
required to implement a system of internal accounting controls-it must be remembered
that this provision applies regardless of whether or not the company operates overseas.
Even without engaging in bribery, a company must be careful to comply."); Hubert
Lenczowski, Questionable Payments By Foreign Subsidiaries: The Extraterritorial
JurisdictionalEffect of the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct of 1977, 3 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 151, 158-59 (1979) (quoting Stabler, SEC's New Weapon: Foreign
Bribery Act Imposes Tough Rules on the Bookkeeping of All Public Firms, WALL ST. J.,
July 28, 1978, at 30, col.1) ("Under the new Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, it is
becoming clear, you don't have to be either operating in foreign lands or corrupt to be in
trouble.").
52 See SEC v. World-Wide Coin Inv., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. at 749; In re Gunn,
Exchange Act Release No. 36,051, [1995-1998 Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Releases] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74,207 at 63,029 (Aug. 3, 1995); In re Schaeffer,
Exchange Act Release No. 36,052 [1995-1998 Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Releases] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), 74,208 at 63,034 (Aug. 3, 1995); In re Szeker,
Exchange Act Release No. 35,483, [1991-1995 Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Releases] Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH), 74,139 at 63,596 (June 13, 1995); In re Haegelin,
Exchange Act Release No. 32,565, [1991-1995 Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Releases] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), 73,920 at 63,225 (July 1, 1993); In re Republic
Sav. Fin. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 31,497, [1991-1995 Accounting and
Auditing Enforcement Releases], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,891 at 63,170 (Nov. 23,
1992); In re Lexington Precision Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 31,220, [1991-1995
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH),
73,881, at 63,155 (Sept. 29, 1992); see also George & Dundas, supra note 31, at 88283.
53For example, the SEC has stated that:
Nothing in the Congressional objectives of the accounting provision requires
that inadvertent record keeping inaccuracies be treated as violations of the Act's
record keeping provisions. The Act's principal purpose is to reach knowing or
reckless misconduct ....

Neither its text and legislative history nor its purposes suggest that
occasional, inadvertent errors were the kind of problem that Congress sought to
remedy in passing the Act. No rational federal interest in punishing insignificant
mistakes has been articulated.
Williams' Remarks before the AICPA, Exchange Act Release No. 34-17500, 46 Fed.
Reg., supra note 40, at 11,544, 11,547.
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Justice has authority to prosecute criminal violations of the FCPA.
The SEC retained jurisdiction over "issuers" while the Department
of Justice was given jurisdiction to bring
'54 civil actions to enjoin
concerns.
domestic
"other
by
violations
The penalties for violation of the anti-bribery provisions of the
Act are substantial. Individuals who violate the Act are subject to
imprisonment for up to five years and may be fined up to
$100,000.55 Violators may also be subject to civil penalties of up to
$10,000 for each violation. 6 The Act prohibits the
indemnification, directly or indirectly, of a fine or penalty imposed
on an individual. 7 Corporations convicted of criminal violations of
the FCPA may be fined up to $2,000,000.58
I. The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions
From the time of enactment, the FCPA has been criticized for
placing U.S. firms at a competitive disadvantage internationally
because the United States was the only country to outlaw foreign
bribery. 9 Foreign corporations, even subsidiaries of U.S.
54 SEC jurisdiction over "issuers" is grounded in § 78u. The jurisdiction of the
Department of Justice over "domestic concerns" is provided under § 78dd-2(d).

Under § 78dd-2(h)(1), "domestic concern" is defined as:
(A) Any individual who is a citizen, national or resident of the United States;
and (B) any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business
trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal
place of business in the United States, or which is organized under the laws of a
State of the United States or a territory, possession, or commonwealth of the
United States.
11 §§ 78dd-2(g)(2), 78ff(c)(2).
56 §§ 78dd-2(g)(1)(B), 78ff(c)(1)(B).
57

15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(3), 78ff(c)(3).

58 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(1), 78ff(c)(1).
59 For example, in 1981 the Comptroller General reported to Congress that over
60% of the companies responding to a questionnaire concerning FCPA compliance felt
that they could not compete successfully against foreign competitors who paid bribes.
Aircraft and construction companies reported that they had lost overseas business as a
result of the FCPA's restrictions. The Comptroller General noted, however, that these
perceptions could neither be supported nor rejected on the basis of verifiable data.
Impact of Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct on U.S. Business, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH),
82,841 (1981). Another 1981 survey of 400 stockholders of
publicly held corporations and 400 certified public accountants also reflected the belief
that the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA would cause U.S. companies to lose
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companies organized under the laws of a foreign country, were
considered to be beyond the reach of the FCPA.60 Indeed, a
number of countries unofficially condoned bribery of foreign
officials. 6
As early as 1975, Congress was aware that the problem of
international bribery would have to be addressed internationally,
rather than simply by unilateral action, if reform were to be
achieved.62 Congress called on U.S. negotiators to seek the
business. Manuel A. Tipgos, Compliance With the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, FIN.
EXEC., at 4 (Aug. 1981); see also Howard L. Weisberg & Eric Reichenberg, The Price of
Ambiguity: More Than Three Years Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S.
Chamber of Commerce (1981); John Kimelman, The Lonely Boy Scout, FIN. WORLD,
Aug. 16, 1994, at 50. More recently, a 1996 study by the U.S. Department of Commerce
reported that between April 1994 and May 1995 there were approximately 100 cases in
which foreign bribes "undercut" efforts to win procurements valued at $45 billion. Kari
Lynn Diersen, Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 36 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 753, 764-65 n.88
(citing Joseph F. Savage, Jr., Bribery By Any Other Name is Giving Non-U.S. Firms
Advantage In Global Deals, 1998 J. CoM. 1IC, 3) (1999); Administration Highlights
Bribery As Trade Problem For U.S. Exporters, 12 INT'LTRADE REP. (BNA), 1711 (Oct.
18, 1995).
60 Dooley v. United Tech. Corp., 803 F. Supp. 428, 439 (D.D.C. 1992); see H.
Lowell Brown, Parent-SubsidiaryLiability Under the Foreign CorruptPracticesAct, 50
BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 29-30 (1998); Jennifer L. Miller, Note, Accountingfor Corporate
Misconduct Abroad: The Foreign CorruptPracticesAct of 1977, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
293, 303 (1979).
61 For example, in a May 1997 report to the OECD Ministerial Council, the OECD
Committee on Fiscal Affairs noted that bribes to foreign officials were tax deductible as
a business expense under the laws of Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany,
Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, and Switzerland.
Implementing the 1996 OECD Recommendation on Tax Deductibility of Bribes to
Foreign Officials: Report By the Committee on Fiscal Affairs to the OECD Council at
Ministerial Level, OECD (May 26-27, 1997) (on file with author). On April 28, 1998,
the Committee on Fiscal Affairs reported that Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands,
and Portugal had adopted or were in the process of adopting legislation that would deny
tax deductibility to foreign bribes. In addition, Australia, Belgium, Luxembourg, New
Zealand, Sweden, and Switzerland were considering similar legislation. See Update on
the Implementation of the OECD Recommendation on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to
Foreign Public Officials: Report by the Committee on FiscalAffairs (CFA) to the OECD
Council at the Ministerial Level, OECD, at http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/
tax.htm (Apr. 28, 1998). Bribery of foreign government officials is a pervasive problem
in international business. A recent survey by the World Bank of 3,600 companies in 69
countries disclosed that bribes had been paid by 40% of the companies. J. Lee Johnson,
A Global Economy and the Foreign CorruptPracticesAct: Some Facts Worth Knowing,
63 Mo. L. REV. 979, 979 (1998).
62 See Foreign Payments Disclosure, supra note 14, at 43.
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adoption of international codes of conduct prohibiting corrupt
payments to foreign officials.63 Congress directed the Special
Representative for Trade Negotiations to "initiate at once
negotiations within the framework of the current multilateral trade
negotiations in Geneva."' However, participants received the
United States' proposal at the GATT negotiations with "polite
On November 12, 1975, the Senate adopted Resolution 265 which called on all
U.S. negotiators to seek the adoption of codes of conduct by "all appropriate
international forums," eliminating "bribery, kickbacks, unethical political contributions,
and other such disreputable activities." S. Res. 265, 94th Cong. (1975). Congress also
had the benefit of others' views on the importance of a multinational response to foreign
bribery. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York stated in a report on
questionable payments prepared in 1977 as follows:
It is clear that the problem of questionable foreign payments is an international
problem. As such, any solution attempted unilaterally 'through legislative
actions by one state is necessarily incomplete and may also be
unwise .... United States business cannot be taken out of the bribery syndrome
so long as it remains a "way of life" for competing firms not subject to United
States jurisdiction.
The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Report on Questionable Foreign
63

Payments by Corporations:The Problem and Approaches to a.Solution, 34 (Mar. 14,

1977) [hereinafter New York City Bar Assoc. Rep.]. A task force organized by the Ford
Administration under the chairmanship of Secretary of Commerce Elliot L. Richardson
made a similar observation:
It is the view of the President and the task force that the ultimate legal basis for
adequately addressing the questionable payments problem must be an
international treaty along the lines proposed by the United States. A treaty is
required to make the "criminalization" of foreign bribery fully enforceablefor, in the absence of foreign cooperation, it would be extremely difficult, and in
many cases impossible, for U.S. law enforcement officials and potential
defendants to be assured of access to relevant evidence. A treaty is also required
to treat the actions of foreign as well as domestic parties to a questionable
transaction. And a treaty is required to assure that all nations, and the competing
firms of differing nations, are treated on the same basis.
Foreign Payments Disclosure, supra note 14, at 40, 46. (report of the Richardson Task

Force). Other commentators also emphasized the need for multilateral action. See, e.g.,
Morgan, supra note 32, at 385:
Actions by the United States government, acting alone, will not be fully
effective in dealing with bribery until those efforts are matched by similar
action by other nations. Critics of the FCPA assert that if only United States
corporations are prohibited from bribing foreign officials, then United States
corporations are likely to lose their competitive position vis-it-vis foreign
corporations whose governments take a more benign view toward the payment
of corporate funds to foreign officials..
64 See Foreign Payments Disclosure, supra note 14, at 43.
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silence."65 When negotiations concluded in 1979, public corruption
was not among the trade practices that were addressed.66
U.S. efforts in other international organizations met with
somewhat greater success. The permanent council of the
Organization of American States (OAS) adopted a resolution in
July 10, 1975 that condemned "in the most emphatic terms any act
of bribery, illegal payment or offer of payment by any
transnational enterprise; any demand for acceptance of improper
payments by any public or private person, as well as any act
contrary to ethics and legal procedures .... ,67 Although the OAS
resolution called on members to conform their laws to the
prohibition against international bribery, the resolution provided
no mechanism for enforcement.68
On December 15, 1975, the United Nations General Assembly
adopted Resolution 3514 entitled "Measures Against Corrupt
Practices of Transnational and Other Corporations, Their
Intermediaries and Others Involved," condemning corrupt
business practices including bribery.69 The resolution directed the
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to include international
bribery in the program work of the United Nations Commission on
Transnational Corporations." The United States proposed that
65

Id.

66 Seymour Rubin, International Aspects of the Control of Illicit Payments, 9
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 315, 317-18 (1982); New York City Bar Assoc. Rep.,
supra note 63, at 39. The efficacy of the GATT negotiations as a forum for a
multinational prohibition against foreign bribery was questioned in the Association's
report:

It is... open to question whether the fact that GATT is concerned with trade,
but not with investment, impairs its suitability as a forum. Although the
negotiators at the multinational trade negotiations are engaged in an attempt to
establish fair rules of government procurement policies, the problem of
questionable foreign payments applies to government actions affecting
investment as well as procurement. Furthermore, the effects of injecting these
sensitive issues into the already delicate negotiations relating to international
terms of concessions in other areas argue against use of GATT for this purpose.
Id. at 41.
67
68

New York City Bar Assoc. Rep., supra note 63, at 39.
Id.; Morgan, supra note 32, at 386.

69 Jennifer M. Hartman, Government By Thieves: Revealing the Monsters Behind
the Kleptocratic Masks, 24 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 157, 166 (1997).
70 Id.; Mark J. Murphy, InternationalBribery: An Example of An Unfair Trade
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ECOSOC adopt a code outlawing corrupt payments in
international trade.7' However, once again, the United States'
proposal was met with "deafening silence. 72 Although ECOSOC
subsequently established the Ad Hoc Inter-Governmental Working
Group on Corrupt Practices, the draft agreement proposed by the
Practice,21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 385, 393-94 (1995).
7' New York City Bar Assoc. Rep., supra note 63, at 38. According to the
Richardson Task Force, the United States' proposal included the following principles:
(i) It would apply to international trade and investment transactions with
governments, i.e., government procurement and other governmental actions
affecting the international trade and investment as may be agreed; (ii) It would
apply equally to those who offer to make improper payments and to those who
request or accept them; (iii) Importing governments would agree to establish
clear guidelines concerning the use of agents in connection with government
procurement and other covered transactions, and establish appropriate criminal
penalties for defined corrupt practices by enterprises and officials in their
territory; (iv) All governments would cooperate and exchange information to
help eradicate corrupt practices; (v) Uniform provisions would be agreed upon
for disclosure by enterprises, agents and officials of political contributions, gifts
and payments made in connection with covered transactions.
Foreign Payments Disclosure, supra note 14, at 44.
72 As Professor Seymour Rubin, who was the United States Representative to the
United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations explained:
At Lima, for example, there was nothing on the Commission's agenda which
indicated that the subject of illicit payments would be discussed. Instead, the
Commission was focusing on other aspects of the regulation or conduct of
transnational corporations. Nonetheless, I received instructions to present the
subject at four o'clock on a Friday afternoon, with the understanding that Mr.
Ingersoll, who was then Undersecretary of State, would make a presentation
before Senator Proxmire's committee at the same time. Surprisingly, I
succeeded in introducing the subject at that time.
The subject of illicit payments was brought up in that forum, at least
partially, because there had been a great deal of noise made in the United
Nations about the reprehensible conduct of certain corporations, which were
known to be bribing governments of developed and developing countries alike.
Iran was one of the chief proponents of this kind of activity. In Iran, under the
Shah, there was considerable activity which fell into the category of
reprehensible conduct. The Japanese cases were also receiving substantial
publicity. I was, therefore, not entirely prepared for the deafening silence which
greeted my own suggestion that the Commission on Transnational Corporations
take up this particular topic, especially since it was discussing a code of conduct
to instruct transnational corporations on the proper mode of conduct in the
international arena. Needless to say, I received support from only a few
members of the Commission.
Rubin, supra note 66, at 319-20.
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working group in 1979 was not adopted because the United States
was unable to obtain support from the industrialized countries of
Europe.73
When Congress amended the FCPA in 1988, it made its views
explicit concerning the necessity of an international response to
foreign bribery. Congress informed the President that it was the
"sense of Congress" that negotiations to that end should be
undertaken with the members of the OECD.7"
11

See Murphy, supra note 70, at 38. As Professor Rubin reported:

Interestingly, America's Western European allies have created the greatest
difficulties. Although the Western European countries usually side with the
United States in most matters, whether it be Restricted Business Practices or the
general conduct of transnational corporations, the United States has not been
able to obtain their support for a code of conduct on illicit payments in the U.N.
forum. Consequently, it is easy to understand why, in the area of illicit
payments, there is great difficulty in arriving at any agreed-upon code.
Rubin, supra note 66, at 321. Professor Rubin also noted that an impediment to
achieving consensus on international bribery was the disconnect between perceived and
actual standards of conduct on the part of the "moral allies" of the United States:
The problem in the United Nations stems partially from the fact that there exists
a difference in perception between what the conduct really is, or what the
standards of conduct really are, and what they are said to be. Specifically, this
situation occurs when a nation has a law opposed to bribery, as well as a law
permitting a tax deduction for a payment that is stated to have been made for the
purposes of a bribe and justified as being in the regular course of business. For
this reason, the United States has not been able to achieve any degree of
consensus with its moral allies in the United Nations.
Id. at 332.
74 Section 5003(d) of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1415, provided that:
It is the sense of the Congress that the President should pursue the negotiation
of an international agreement, among the members of the Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development, to govern persons from those
countries concerning acts prohibited with respect to issuers and domestic
concerns by the amendments made by this section.
§ 78dd.
It has been suggested that this provision of the 1988 amendments was intended to
emphasize the concern that U.S. companies not be put at a competitive disadvantage
with respect to other companies not subject to the FCPA. See Freemantle & Katz, supra
note 4, at 764:
It appears that the purpose of this requirement is to respond to the concern that
other nations do not hake the same standards Congress has enshrined in the
FCPA. If not, American corporations will continue to be at a competitive
disadvantage. Some commentators may suggest that, should such negotiations
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Thereafter, in 1990, the OECD Ministerial Council requested
the Committee on International Investment and Multinational
Enterprises (CIME) to study the feasibility of cooperative action
by member governments to prohibit corrupt payments." The
CIME issued its findings in 1992.6
Acting on the CIME study, the OECD Ministerial Council
adopted the Recommendation on Bribery in International Business
Transactions" which strongly encouraged member nations to "take
effective measures to deter, prevent, and combat the bribery of
foreign public officials in connection with international business
transactions."78 The Council urged member countries to take
"concrete and meaningful steps" with regard to their own domestic
laws to deter, prevent, and combat international bribery.79 These

fail, the bribery provisions of the FCPA may be completely eliminated from
U.S. law.
15 Implementing the 1997 OECD Recommendation on the Tax Deductibility of
Bribes to Foreign Public Officials: Report by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs to the
OECD Council at the Ministerial Level, OECD (May 26, 1997) (on file with author)
[hereinafter CIME Study]. Earlier, in June 1996, the OECD Ministerial Conference had
adopted a declaration of policy proposed by the Committee on International Investment
and Multinational Enterprises which had been established the previous year, prohibiting
the solicitation and payment of bribes. The declaration also prohibited political
contributions, unless such contributions were "legally permissible." Morgan, supra note
32, at 386. The policy further provided that multinational enterprises should "abstain
from any improper involvement in local political activities." Id. See also Foreign
Payments Disclosure, supra note 14, at 43. Compliance with the declaration of policy
was voluntary and no enforcement mechanism was established. See New York City Bar
Assoc. Rep., supra note 63, at 40.
76 See CIME Study, supra note 74.
77 Organization for

Economic Cooperation and Development: Council
Recommendation on Bribery in InternationalBusiness Transactions,C(94) 75/Final on
Bribery in International Business Transactions, 33 I.L.M. 1389 (1994).
78 Id. at 1390. The Ministerial Council recognized that "bribery is a wide spread
phenomenon in international business" and that "all countries share a responsibility to
combat bribery." Id. The Council also observed that all member countries had laws
prohibiting bribery of their own governmental officials, "while only a few member
countries have specific laws making the bribery of foreign officials a punishable
offense . " I.
Id. Accordingly, the Ministerial Council was "[c]onvinced that further
action is needed on both the national and international level to dissuade both enterprises
and public officials from resorting to bribery when negotiating international business
transactions and that an OECD initiative in this area could act as a catalyst for global
action." Id.
79 Id. at 1391.
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steps included revision of the criminal law, revision of civil and
administrative law, revision of the tax laws, and the establishment
of accounting and record-keeping requirements." The Council also
encouraged member countries to cooperate with each other in the
investigation and prosecution of foreign bribery, including
entering into and utilizing agreements to facilitate the sharing of
information and the extradition of persons accused of bribery
offenses."
The Council directed CIME to monitor implementation of the
recommendation and was invited to form a working group to assist
in that effort." The Council also directed CIME to report to the
Ministerial Council within three years.3
CIME issued its report on May 26, 1997.84 CIME noted that in
May 1996, the OECD Council had recognized the necessity of
criminalizing bribery in a coordinated manner and that "[a]n
important concern was to ensure that companies face substantially
80 Id. The recommendation provided as follows:

[E]ach Member country should examine the following areas and, in conformity
with its jurisdictional and other basic legal principles, take concrete and
meaningful steps to meet this goal. These steps may include: (i) criminal laws,
or their application, in respect of the bribery of foreign public officials; (ii) civil,
commercial, administrative laws and regulations so that bribery would be
illegal; (iii) tax legislation, regulations and practices, insofar as they may
indirectly favor bribery; (iv) company and business accounting requirements
and practices in order to secure adequate recording of relevant payments; (v)
banking, financial and other relevant provisions so that adequate records would
be kept and made available for inspection or investigation; and (vi) laws and
regulations relating to public subsidies, licenses, government procurement
contracts, or other public advantages so that advantages could be denied as a
sanctions for bribery in appropriate cases. Id.
81 Id. Member countries were encouraged to "make full use of existing agreements
and arrangements for mutual international legal assistance" and, if necessary, to enter
into such agreements. Id. Member countries were also encouraged to "ensure that their
national laws afford an adequate basis for this co-operation." Id.
82 Id. at 1392.
83

Id.

84 Review of the 1994 Recommendation on Bribery in International Business

Transactions, Including Proposals to Facilitate the Criminalization of Bribery of
Foreign Officials, OECD Committee on International Investment and Multinational
Enterprises (CIME) to the OECD Council at the Ministerial Level (May 26, 1997) (on
file with author).
85 Id. § III.
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similar rules and penalties for international bribery, no matter what
their own country of origin, and that the network of laws forged by
the combined effort will permit effective enforcement and mutual
legal assistance."86 Along with the report, CIME submitted a
Revised Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International
Business Transactions, which was adopted by the OECD
Ministerial Council. 7
The Revised Recommendation set forth "concrete and
meaningful steps" to be taken regarding the revision of criminal
laws, tax laws, accounting requirements and practices, banking
laws, rules for public contracting, civil laws, administrative
regulations, and international cooperation in law enforcement. 88
With certain technical amendments, the OECD adopted the
Recommendation as a convention on December 18, 1997.89
The OECD Convention can fairly be viewed as a sweeping
change in the way the industrialized countries of Europe regarded
international bribery.9" For the first time, signatories to the
Convention were called upon to criminalize the bribery of foreign
public officials and to adopt "effective, proportionate and
dissuasive" sanctions for those who engage in international
86

Id. § IIIA.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: Revised
Recommendation on Combating Bribery in InternationalBusiness Transactions, C(97)
123/Final on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions, May 29, 1997,
36 I.L.M. 1016 [hereinafter Combating Bribery].
88 Id. § II, at 1019.
87

89 Convention, supra note 5, 37 I.L.M. at 1.
90 The actions and comments of other multinational organizations such as the
Organization of American States, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the
European Union, the World Trade Organization, the International Chamber of
Commerce, and the G-7 have reflected this change in attitude toward international
bribery. Brown, supra note 6, at 511-20; George et al., supra note 20, at 28-34; Helmut
Sohmen, CriticalImportanceof ControllingBribery, 33 INT'L LAW. 863,864-66 (1999);
Bruce Zagaris & Shaila Lakhani Ohri, The Emergence of an InternationalEnforcement
Regime on TransnationalCorruption in the Americas, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 53,
76-89 (1999); A. Timothy Martin, Corruption and Improper Payments: Global Trends
and Applicable Laws, 36 ALBERTA L. REv. 416, 432-38 (1998); Nora M. Rubin, Note, A
Convergence of 1996 and 1997 Global Efforts to Curb Corruption and Bribery in
International Business Transactions: The Legal Implications of the OECD
Recommendation and Conventionfor the United States, Germany, and Switzerland, 14
AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 257,275-83 (1998); Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Role of the World
Bank in Controlling Corruption, 29 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 93 (1997).
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bribery.'
Additionally, the OECD Convention established mechanisms
for monitoring compliance and for enforcement." To that end, in
addition to criminalizing bribery, signatory countries were to
adopt accounting and internal controls requirements allowing
greater visibility into corporate transactions and dispositions of
assets." Member countries were to aggressively assert both
territorial jurisdiction and nationality jurisdiction with respect to
international bribery.94 Signatory countries were also to take
appropriate action to facilitate the sharing of investigative and
prosecutive resources in cases of international bribery.95
A. Criminalizationof ForeignBribery
The signatories to the Convention agreed to enact legislation
establishing the bribery of a foreign official as a criminal offense.
Thus, the Convention provided:
[E]ach party shall take such measures as may be necessary to
establish that it is a criminal offense under its law for any person
intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or
other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a
foreign public official for that official or for a third party, in
order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the
performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain
business or other improper advantage in the conduct of
international business.96
As explained in the commentaries accompanying the
Convention, the prohibition against bribery was intended to apply
to the individual or entity97 offering the bribe (sometimes referred

92

Convention, supra note 5, art. 3, 37 I.L.M. at 5; see Brown, supra note 6, at 512.
Brown, supra note 6, at 513.

93

Id.

94

Id.

9'

95 Id.
96 Convention, supra note 5, art. 1, 37 I.L.M. at 4.
Article 2 of the Convention calls on signatories to "take such measures as may
be necessary, in accordance with its legal principles, to establish the liability of legal
persons for the bribery of a foreign public official." Id. at 4. However, the commentaries
clarify that if corporate criminal liability was not an established principle under the
existing law of the signatory, the Convention would not require establishment of
criminal responsibility. Id. at 9.
97
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to as "active bribery") rather than the acceptance of a bribe by a
foreign official (sometimes referred to as "passive bribery")."
However, the Convention did not require signatories to
employ the Convention's terms precisely in implementing
legislation.99 Instead, signatories could adopt their own approach to
fulfilling their obligations under the Convention, so long as
"conviction of a person for the offense does not require proof of
elements beyond those which would be required to be proved if
the offense were defined as in the Convention."" ° Thus, the
Convention sought "to assure a functional equivalence among the
measures taken by the Parties to sanction bribery of foreign public
officials, without requiring uniformity or changes in fundamental
principles of a Party's legal system."'0 '
Additionally, signatories to the Convention were to establish

98 Id. at 8. As the commentaries explain:
This Convention deals with what, in the law of some countries, is called "active
corruption" or "active bribery," meaning the offen[s]e committed by the person
who promises or gives the bribe, as contrasted with "passive bribery," the
offen[s]e committed by the official who receives the bribe. The Convention
does not utili[z]e the term "active bribery" simply to avoid it being misread by
the non-technical reader as implying that the briber has taken the initiative and
the recipient is the passive victim. In fact, in a number of situations, the
recipient will have induced or pressured the briber and will have been, in that
sense, the more active.
id. at 8.
99 Id.
100 Id. The commentaries state in this connection as follows:

Article I establishes a standard to be met by Parties, but does not require them
to utili[z]e its precise terms in defining the offen[s]e under their domestic laws.
A party may use various approaches to fulfill its obligations, provided that
conviction of a person for the offen[s]e does not require proof of elements
beyond those which would be required to be proved if the offen[s]e were
defined as in this paragraph. For example, a statute prohibiting the bribery of
agents generally which does not specifically address bribery of a foreign
official, and a statute specifically limited to this case, could both comply with
this Article. Similarly, a statute which defined the offense in terms of payments
"to induce a breach of the official's duty" could meet the standard provided that
it was understood that every public official had a duty to exercise judgement or
discretion impartially and this was an "autonomous" definition not requiring
proof of the law of the particular official's country.
Id. at 8.
101 Id.
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complicity in bribery as a criminal offense.' 2 Under the
Convention, complicity included "incitement, aiding and abetting,
01 3
or authorization of an act of bribery of a foreign public official."'
An attempt to bribe or a conspiracy to commit bribery was to be a
criminal offense "to the same extent as attempt and conspiracy to
bribe a public official" of the signatory nation."'o Further, the offer
or promise of a bribe proscribed by the Convention would be an
offense whether it was made on the offeror's own behalf or on
behalf of a third party.' 5

Like the U.S. FCPA, the Convention's prohibitions extend to
corrupt payments intended to improperly influence official
action.'0

6

Thus, corrupt payments "in order to obtain or retain

business"
improper
company
that the

are prohibited, as are payments to obtain any "other
advantage,"'0 7 which "refers to something to which the
concerned was not clearly entitled."'0 8 It is not a defense
company paying or offering the bribe was the best

102

Id. at 4.

Id. If incitement, aiding and abetting, or authorization are not discrete crimes
under the signatory's law, however, the Convention does not require their
criminalization where no prohibited bribery results. Id. at 9. The commentaries explain:
The offen[s]es set out in paragraph 2 are understood in terms of their normal
content in national legal systems. Accordingly, if authorization, incitement, or
one of the other listed acts, which does not lead to further action, is not itself
punishable under a Party's legal system, then the Party would not be required to
make it punishable with respect to bribery of a foreign public official.
103

Id.
Id. at 4.
105 Id. at 9. The Convention commentaries state that: "[t]he conduct described in
paragraph 1 [establishing the offense of bribery of a public official] is an offen[s]e
whether the offer or promise is made or the pecuniary or other advantage is given on that
person's behalf or on behalf of any other natural person or legal entity." Id.
106 Id. at 4. Influencing a foreign public official to act or to refrain from acting in
relation to the performance of a public function includes "any use of the public official's
position, whether or not within the official's authorized competence." Id. The
commentaries noted that an act of bribery under this provision would be one "[w]here an
executive of a company gives a bribe to a senior official of a government, in order that
this official use his office-though acting outside his competence-to make another
official award a contract to that company." Id. at 9.
107 Id. at 4.
"04

108 Id. at 8. The commentaries cite as an example of an "improper advantage," an

operating permit for a factory which fails to meet the statutory requirements." Id.
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qualified or otherwise could have been awarded the business.' °9
The definition of the term "foreign public official" was more
comprehensive in the Convention than in the FCPA. Like the
FCPA, the definition of "foreign public official" included "any
person holding a legislative, administrative or judicial office of a
foreign country, whether appointed or elected""' as well as "any
person exercising a public function for a foreign country,
including for a public agency or public enterprise."' However, the
9 Id. It is similarly not a defense that the advantage sought was de minimis, or that
the bribe was unsuccessful, or that the payment was in keeping with local custom, or that
the payment was deemed to be necessary. As stated in the commentaries, "[i]t is ... an
offen[s]e irrespective of, inter alia,the value of the advantage, its results, perceptions of
local custom, the tolerance of such payments by local authorities, or the alleged necessity
of the payment in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage." Id. at
9.
110 The Convention uses the term "foreign country" to include "all levels and
subdivisions of government, from national to local." Id. at 4. Additionally, as the
commentaries note, a foreign country "is not limited to states, but includes any
organi[z]ed foreign area or entity, such as an autonomous territory or separate customs
territory." Id. at 9.
" Id. at 4. The commentaries define "public function" as including "any activity in
the public interest, delegated by a foreign country, such as the performance of a task
delegated by it in connection with public procurement." Id. at 9. A "public agency" is
one "constituted under public law to carry out specific tasks in the public interest." Id. A
"public enterprise" is defined as:
[Any enterprise, regardless of its legal form, over which a government, or
governments, may, directly or indirectly, exercise a dominant influence. This is
deemed to be the case, inter alia, when the government or governments hold the
majority of the enterprise's subscribed capital, control the majority of votes
attaching to shares issued by the enterprise or can appoint a majority of the
members of the enterprise's administrative or managerial body or supervisory
board.
Id. An official of such a public enterprise is deemed to perform a public function and is
to be considered a foreign public official "unless the enterprise operates on a normal
commercial basis in the relevant market, i.e., on a basis which is substantially equivalent
to that of a private enterprise, without preferential subsidies or other privileges." Id.
Further, however, the commentaries note that a public function could be performed
by persons not denominated as officials but who nevertheless would be considered
public officials under the Convention by virtue of their performance of a public function.
Thus, the commentaries provide as follows:
In special circumstances, public authority may in fact be held by persons (e.g.,
political party officials in single party states) not formally designated as public
officials. Such persons, through their defacto performance of a public function,
may, under the legal principles of some countries, be considered to be foreign
public officials.
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Convention also included within the definition of "foreign public
official," officials or agents of "a public international
organi[z]ation.""' 2
Also, like the FCPA, the Convention recognized certain
transactions as being outside the purview of the bribery
prohibition."3 For example, obtaining an "advantage" that was
permitted or required under the written laws or regulations of the
country in which the payment was made and the advantage
obtained would not constitute a violation of the anti-bribery
provisions."' Similarly, modest "facilitation payments" would not
constitute prohibited payments. " 5
Finally, the Convention called upon signatories to treat the
bribery of foreign officials as a predicate offense under their
money laundering legislation, in the same way that bribery of a
domestic government official was treated as a predicate offense." 6

Id.
112 Id. at 4. A "public international organi[z]ation" was defined as including "any
international organi[z]ation formed by states, governments, or other public international
organi[z]ations, whatever the form of organization and scope of competence, including,
for example, a regional economic integration organization such as the European
Communities." Id. at 9.
''3 id. at 9.
"14 The commentaries state that "[iut is not an offense, however, if the advantage
was permitted or required by the written law or regulation of the foreign public officials'
country, including case law." Id. at 9.
"5 With regard to such "facilitation" payments, the commentaries explained:

Small "facilitation" payments do not constitute payments made "to obtain or
retain business or other improper advantage" within the meaning of paragraph 1
and, accordingly, are also not an offense. Such payments, which, in some
countries, are made to induce public officials to perform their functions, such as
issuing licenses or permits, are generally illegal in the foreign country
concerned. Other countries can and should address this corrosive phenomenon
by such means as support for programmes of good governance. However,
criminalisation by other countries does not seem a practical or effective
complementary action.
Id. at8.
116 Id. art. 7, at 5. The Convention states in regard to the applicability of moneylaundering legislation that "each party which has made bribery of its own public official
a predicate offense for the purpose of the application of its money laundering legislation
shall do so on the same terms for the bribery of a foreign public official, without regard
to the place where the bribery occurred." Id. In this regard, the commentaries emphasize
as follows:
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B. Accounting and Internal Controls Requirements
The OECD Convention also established requirements for the
implementation by corporations of accounting and internal
financial controls." 7 In substance, those requirements were
equivalent to the accounting and financial controls provisions of
the FCPA.
Like the FCPA, the Convention's requirements were aimed at
preventing corporations from establishing off-the-books sources of
funds with which to bribe foreign public officials." 8 Thus, the
Convention provided that:
[I]n order to combat bribery of foreign public officials
effectively, each party shall take such measures as may be
necessary, within the framework of its laws and regulations
regarding the maintenance of books and records, financial
statement disclosures, and accounting and auditing standards, to
prohibit the establishment of off-the-books accounts, the making
of off-the-books or inadequately identified transactions, the
recording of non-existent expenditures, the entry of liabilities
with incorrect identification of their object, as well as the use of
false documents, by companies subject to those laws and
regulations, for the purpose of bribing foreign public officials or
of hiding such bribery." 9
The Convention's accounting and internal controls
requirement grew out of the earlier OECD Recommendation
concerning bribery of foreign officials which contained specific
provisions regarding accounting and auditing requirements. 2 '
[reference to bribery of the signatories' own public officials was] intended
broadly, so that bribery of a foreign public official is to be made a predicate
offense for money laundering legislation on the same terms, when a party has
made either active or passive bribery of its own public official such an offense.
When a party has made only passive bribery of its own public officials a
predicate offense for money laundering purposes, this article requires that the
laundering of the bribe payment be subject to money laundering legislation.
Id at 10.
MiId. art. 8, at 5.
118

Id.

119 Id.
120

As the commentaries note:

Article 8 is related to section V of the 1997 OECD Recommendation, which all
Parties will have accepted and which is subject to follow-up in the OECD
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Commentators noted that an immediate effect of the Convention's
implementation would be that corporate financial disclosures
would have to take account of liabilities created by the Convention
and the consequences to the corporation resulting from criminal
conviction." ' The commentaries also noted that there were
"implications for the execution of professional responsibilities of
auditors regarding indications of bribery of foreign public
officials. ' '22
The 1997 OECD Recommendation established accounting and
auditing principles to which member countries were urged to
conform their laws.' 3 It recommended that member countries
prohibit off-book transactions and require companies to keep
accurate records of receipts and expenditures, and disclose in
financial statements
"the full range of material contingent
42'
liabilities. '
The 1997 Recommendation also proffered proposals
Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions. This
paragraph contains a series of recommendations concerning accounting
requirements, independent external audit and internal company controls the
implementation of which will be important to the overall effectiveness of the
fight against bribery in international business.
Id. at 10.
121 The commentaries note in this regard as follows:
[Olne immediate consequence of the implementation of this Convention by the
Parties will be that companies which are required to issue financial statements
disclosing their material contingent liabilities will need to take into account the
full potential liabilities under this Convention, in particular its Articles 3 and 8
[establishing sanctions], as well as other losses which might flow from
conviction of the company or its agents for bribery.
Id.
122

Id.

123

Combating Bribery, supra note 87, 36 I.L.M. at 1016, 1020-21.

124

The 1997 Recommendation provides in this regard that:

(i) Member countries should require companies to maintain adequate records of
the sums of money received and expended by the company, identifying the
matters in respect of which the receipt and expenditure takes place. Companies
should be prohibited from making off-the-books transactions or keeping off-thebooks accounts. (ii) Member countries should require companies to disclose in
their financial statements the full range of material contingent liabilities. (iii)
Member countries should adequately sanction accounting omissions,
falsifications and fraud.
Id. at 1020.
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concerning independent audits.' 25 One proposal recommended that
member countries review their own laws concerning independent
audits and, in conjunction with professional associations, establish
26
standards for the independence of external auditors.
Requirements for the disclosure of possible bribery to company
management were to be adopted, and member countries were
encouraged to consider requiring auditors to report possible acts of
bribery to government authorities.'
The Recommendation also set forth proposals concerning the
implementation of internal controls.' Member countries were to
encourage companies to adopt and implement internal controls
which included: standards of conduct for employees; management
statements concerning internal controls in annual reports; creation
of independent committees of the board of directors, such as an
audit committee to monitor the efficacy of internal controls; and
the establishment of mechanisms 2for
internal reporting of
9
misconduct without fear of retaliation.

125

Id.

126

Id.

127

The 1997 Recommendation provide as follows:

(i) Member countries should consider whether requirements to submit to
external audit are adequate. (ii) Member countries and professional associations
should maintain adequate standards to ensure the independence of external
auditors which permits them to provide an objective assessment of company
accounts, financial statements and internal controls. (iii) Member countries
should require the auditor who discovers indications of a possible illegal act of
bribery to report this discovery to management and, as appropriate, to corporate
monitoring bodies. (iv) Member countries should consider requiring the auditor
to report indications of a possible illegal act of bribery to competent authorities.
Id.
128
129

Id.
With respect to internal company controls, the Recommendation states that:

(i) Member countries should encourage the development and adoption of
adequate internal company controls, including standards of conduct. (ii)
Member countries should encourage company management to make statements
in their annual reports about their internal control mechanisms, including those
which contribute to preventing bribery. (iii) Member countries should
encourage the creation of monitoring bodies, independent of management, such
as audit committees of boards of directors or of supervisory boards. (iv)
Member countries should encourage companies to provide channels for
communication by, and protection for, persons not willing to violate
professional standards or ethics under instructions or pressure from hierarchical
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C. Sanctions
The Convention provides that signatories are to establish
sanctions for the bribery of foreign public officials. 3 ° Sanctions are
also to be imposed for "omissions and falsifications" in corporate
books and records in violation of the accounting and controls
provisions. 131
With respect to the bribery of foreign public officials, the
Convention requires signatories to adopt "effective, proportionate
and dissuasive criminal penalties."' 32 Such penalties are to be
comparable to the penalties imposed by the signatory for bribery
of domestic public officials.'33
In cases of bribery by natural persons, the penalty was to
include deprivation of liberty."' Countries in which legal persons
were not subject to criminal liability were to impose "effective,
superiors.
Id. at 1020-21.
130 Convention, supra note 5, 37 I.L.M. at 5.
131
132

Id.
In this regard, the Convention reiterates the view that the committee expressed in

the Recommendation:
The offense of bribery of foreign public officials should be
sanctioned/punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal
penalties, sufficient to secure effective mutual legal assistance and extradition,
comparable to those applicable to the bribers in cases of corruption of domestic
public officials.
Monetary or other civil, administrative or criminal penalties on any legal
person involved, should be provided, taking into account the amounts of the
bribe and of the profits derived from the transaction obtained through the bribe.
Forfeiture or confiscation of instrumentalities and of the bribe benefits and
the profits derived from the transactions obtained through the bribe should be
provided, or comparable fines or damages imposed.
Combating Bribery, supra note 87, 36 I.L.M. at 1024.
133 Convention, supra note 5, 37 I.L.M. at 5.
134 With regard to the sanctions to be imposed in cases of bribery of foreign public
officials, the Convention provides as follows:
The bribery of a foreign public official shall be punishable by effective,
proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties. The range of penalties shall be
comparable to that applicable to the bribery of the Party's own public officials
and shall, in the case of natural persons, include deprivation of liberty sufficient
to enable effective mutual legal assistance and extradition.
Id. art. 3, at 5.
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proportionate and dissuasive non-criminal sanctions, including
monetary sanctions.""'3 In any event, signatories were to ensure
that the bribe and the proceeds of the bribery,' 36 or "property the
value of which corresponds to that of such proceeds," would be
subject to seizure and confiscation'37 or that comparable monetary
sanctions were applicable.'38
With respect to the falsification of corporate books and
records, signatories were also to establish effective, proportionate
and dissuasive penalties. ' The Convention contemplated that
signatories would fashion appropriate civil and administrative
sanctions for violations. 4 ' These sanctions could include
suspension and debarment from participation in public programs
or public procurements, disqualification from engaging in
regulated activates and judicial dissolution.'
"I Id. The Convention states that "in the event that, under the legal system of a
Party, criminal responsibility is not applicable to legal persons, that Party shall ensure
that legal persons shall be subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive non-criminal
sanctions, including monetary sanctions, for bribery of foreign public officials." Id.
136 Id. As the commentaries explain, the "proceeds" of the bribery of a foreign
public official are considered to be "the profits or other benefits derived by the briber
from the transaction or other improper advantage obtained or retained through the
bribery." Id. at 9.
137 Id. As the commentaries note, "confiscation" included forfeiture and meant "the
permanent deprivation of property by order of a court or other competent authority." The
commentaries also state that the confiscation of proceeds that the Convention calls for is
not to prejudice any rights of recovery by victims of the bribery. Id.
138 Id. Thus, the Convention provides as follows:
Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to provide that the
bribe and the proceeds of the bribery of a foreign public official, or property the
value of which corresponds to that of such proceeds, are subject to seizure and
confiscation or that monetary sanctions of comparable effect are applicable.
Id. at5.
139 Id. With regard to the penalties for violating the accounting requirements, the

Convention provides that "each party shall provide effective, proportionate and
dissuasive civil, administrative or criminal penalties for such omissions and falsifications
in respect of books, records, accounts and financial statements of such companies." Id.
140 Id. With respect to the sanctions for bribery of foreign public officials, in
addition to the criminal and civil penalties described above, the Convention provides that
"each Party shall consider the imposition of additional civil or administrative sanctions
upon a person subject to sanctions for the bribery of a foreign public official." Id.
141 Id. As the commentaries explain:
Among the civil or administrative sanctions, other than non-criminal fines,

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

[Vol. 26

D. JurisdictionOver Offenses
Of the generally recognized theories of extraterritorial
jurisdiction over criminal offenses under international law,'42 the
predominant bases for the assertion of a state's prescriptive
jurisdiction are jurisdiction based on territoriality and jurisdiction
based on nationality.' 3 The OECD Convention called upon
signatories to assert both territorial and national forms of
jurisdiction.'"
Territorial jurisdiction over crime is predicated upon the place
where the offense is committed."5 Territoriality has been said to be
the most common basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction,' 6 and is
which might be imposed upon legal persons for an act of bribery of a foreign
public official are: exclusion from entitlement to public benefits or aid;
temporary or permanent disqualification from participation in public
procurement or from the practice of other commercial activities; placing under
judicial supervision; and a judicial winding-up order.
Id. at 9. The OECD previously recommended that member nations adopt laws and
regulations to exclude individuals and entities involved in domestic or foreign bribery
from participating in public procurements. Thus, in the 1997 Recommendation the
OECD stated as follows:
Member countries' laws and regulations should permit authorities to suspend
from competition for public contracts enterprises determined to have bribed
foreign public officials in contravention of the Member's national laws and, to
the extent a Member applies procurement sanctions to enterprises that are
determined to have bribed domestic public officials, such sanctions should be
applied equally in case[s] of bribery of foreign public officials.
CombatingBribery, supra note 87, 36 I.L.M. at 1021. In the 1997 Recommendation, the
OECD also called for anti-corruption requirements in aid-funded procurements.
"Member countries should require anti-corruption provisions in bilateral aid-funded
procurements, promote the proper implementation of anti-corruption provisions in
international development institutions and work closely with development partners to
combat corruption in all development co-operation efforts." Id.
142 The seminal study Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with
Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 445 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter Harvard
Research], identified these theories of jurisdiction; see also infra note 219 and
accompanying text.
143

Id.

Convention, supra note 5, art. 4, 37 I.L.M. 5.
Thus, for example, Section 402 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] provides that
"a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to ...conduct that, wholly or in
substantial part, takes place within its territory ....IId. § 402(l)(a).
146 For example, it was observed in the comments to Section 402 of the Restatement
"44

145
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recognized under U.S. law.'47

The OECD Convention directed each signatory to "take such
measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the
bribery of a foreign public official when the offense is committed
in whole or in part in its territory.""'8 The Convention
contemplated that the assertion of territorial jurisdiction would be
"interpreted broadly so that an extensive physical connection to
the bribery act is not required."'' 9
The OECD Convention also directed signatories to assert
nationality-based jurisdiction over persons engaging in the bribery
of foreign public officials.'50 Such jurisdiction is predicated on the
domicile, the residence, and the nationality or national character,
of the person committing the offense.'
Nationality-based
jurisdiction is considered a jurisdictional basis that is "discrete and
independent" from territorial jurisdiction, and although territorial
jurisdiction has been said to be the "normal" basis of jurisdiction
and nationality has been said to be the "exceptional" basis, the
that "[t]he territorial principle is by far the most common basis for the exercise of
jurisdiction to prescribe, and it has generally been free from controversy." Id. § 402 cmt.
C.
47 The territorial principle of jurisdiction has been described as "the primary
principle applied by U.S. courts." Ellen S. Podgor, Globalization and the Federal
Prosecution of White Collar Crime, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 325, 342 (1997); see also
Andrea F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitutional and
InternationalLaw, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 880, 883 (1989); Christopher L. Blakesley, United
States Jurisdiction Over ExtraterritorialCrime, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109,
1114-23 (1982); Rollin M. Perkins, The TerritorialPrinciple in Criminal Law, 22
HASTINGS L.J. 1155 (1971); see, e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268,
276 (1927); United States v. Pac. & Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87, 106
(1913).
148 Convention, supra note 5, art. 4, 37 I.L.M. at 5.
"49 Id. at 10; see also, Combating Bribery, supra note 87, 36 I.L.M. at 1023.
150 The OECD Convention provides in this regard that "[e]ach party which has
jurisdiction to prosecute its nationals for offenses committed abroad shall take such
measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction to do so in respect of the
bribery of a foreign public official, according to the same principles." Convention, supra
note 5, art. 4, 37 I.L.M. at 4.
'"' Section 402 of the Restatement provides that a state's prescriptive jurisdiction
extends to "the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as
within its territory ....
RESTATEMENT, supra note 145, § 402(2). The comments to
Section 402 note, however, that "[i]ntemational law has increasingly recognized the right
of a state to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of domicile or residence, rather than
nationality, especially in regard to 'private law' matters ....
Id. cmt. e.
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same conduct can provide grounds for the assertion of jurisdiction
by both the territorial state and by the state of nationality. 5 2 In
those instances in which two signatories have prosecutorial
jurisdiction over the same act of bribery, the Convention
counseled the two parties to consult, "with a view to determining
the most appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution." '53
E. Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition
The OECD Convention also provided for the facilitation of
mutual legal assistance in the investigation and prosecution of
international bribery cases, including the extradition of persons to
face foreign prosecution.54
The OECD had emphasized in the 1997 Recommendation the
need for international cooperation among signatories in
investigating and prosecuting persons involved in foreign
bribery.'55 The commentaries to the OECD Convention noted that
52 As the comments to the Restatement § 402 explain:

Territoriality and nationality are discrete and independent bases of jurisdiction;
the same conduct or activity may provide a basis for exercise of jurisdiction
both by the territorial state and by the state of nationality of the actor.
Territoriality is considered the normal, and nationality an exceptional, basis for
the exercise of jurisdiction.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 145, § 402 cmt. b. Thus, the commentaries to the OECD
Convention state with respect to nationality-based jurisdiction as follows:
Nationality jurisdiction is to be established according to the general principles
and conditions in the legal system of each Party. These principles deal with such
matters as dual criminality. However, the requirement of dual criminality should
be deemed to be met if the act is unlawful where it occurred, even if under a
different criminal statute.
Convention, supra note 5, 37 I.L.M. at 10.
M Id.at 5.
6, at 9.
155 In the 1997 Recommendation, the OECD stated that "effective mutual legal
assistance is critical to be able to investigate and obtain evidence in order to prosecute
cases of bribery of foreign public officials." Combating Bribery, supra note 87, 36
J.L.M. at 1024. In the 1997 Recommendation, the OECD further stated that "[c]ountries
should tailor their laws on mutual legal assistance to permit co-operation with countries
investigating cases of bribery of foreign public officials even including third countries
(country of the offeror; country where the act occurred) and countries applying different
types of criminalization legislation to reach such cases." Id. Therefore, the OECD
directed that "[m]eans should be explored and undertaken to improve the efficiency of
mutual legal assistance." Id. Accordingly, the OECD recommended that member
154 Id. art
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having accepted the 1997 Recommendation, signatories had
agreed "to explore and undertake means to improve the efficiency
of mutual legal assistance. ' 56
Accordingly, the Convention directed each signatory, "to the
fullest extent possible under its laws, relevant treaties and
arrangements," to "provide[] prompt and effective legal assistance
to another Party concerning offenses within the scope of this
Convention .... ".. To that end, the Convention also included
specific actions to remove obstacles to mutual assistance.'58
countries take the following actions:
(i) Consult and otherwise cooperate with appropriate authorities in other
countries in investigations and other legal proceedings concerning specific cases
of such bribery through such means as sharing of information (spontaneously or
upon request), provision of evidence and extradition; (ii) Make full use of
existing agreements and arrangements for mutual international legal assistance
and where necessary, enter into new agreements or arrangements for this
purpose; (iii) Ensure that their national laws afford an adequate basis for this
cooperation.
CombatingBribery, supra note 87, 36 I.L.M. at 1021.
156 Convention, supra note 5, 37 I.L.M. at 10. As the commentaries note, signatories
were encouraged to facilitate voluntary access to witnesses, even those in custody:
Parties should, upon request, facilitate or encourage the presence or availability
of persons, including persons in custody, who consent to assist in investigations
or participate in proceedings. Parties should take measures to be able, in
appropriate cases, to transfer temporarily such a person in custody to a Party
requesting it and to credit time in custody in the requesting party to the
transferred person's sentence in the requested party. The Parties wishing to use
this mechanism should also take measures to be able, as a requesting Party, to
keep a transferred person in custody and return this person without necessity of
extradition proceedings.
Id.
157

The Convention provides in this regard that:

Each Party shall, to the fullest extent possible under its laws and relevant
treaties and arrangements, provide prompt and effective legal assistance to
another Party for the purpose of criminal investigations and proceedings
brought by a Party concerning offenses within the scope of this Convention and
for non-criminal proceedings within the scope of this Convention brought by a
party against a legal person. The requested party shall inform the requesting
Party, without delay, of any additional information or documents needed to
support the request for assistance, and where requested, of the status and
outcome of the request for assistance.
Id. at6.
158 Id.
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First, in instances when a signatory conditioned mutual
assistance on the existence of dual criminality, the Convention
directed that dual criminality would be deemed to exist for
offenses within the scope of the Convention. ' Second, the
Convention dictated that signatories would not be denied mutual
assistance on grounds of bank secrecy in criminal offenses if such
offenses were within the scope of the Convention."'
Additionally, the Convention established bribery of foreign
public officials as an extraditable offense.'16 In instances when
there was no extradition treaty between signatories, the2
Convention was designated as the legal basis for extradition.'
Similarly, as in the case of mutual legal assistance, the Convention
stipulated that the requirement of dual criminality as a condition of
extradition was fulfilled for offenses within its scope of the
Convention. 63' Finally, the Convention obliged signatories that
declined extradition of their nationals to submit those individuals
to prosecution by their own authorities."
"I The 1997 Recommendation notes that "[a]doption of laws criminalising the
bribery of foreign public officials would remove obstacles to mutual legal assistance
created by dual criminality requirements." CombatingBribery, supranote 87, 36 I.L.M.
at 1024. Consistent with this, the OECD Convention states that "[w]here a Party makes
mutual legal assistance conditional upon the existence of dual criminality, dual
criminality shall be deemed to exist if the offense for which the assistance is sought is
within the scope of this Convention." Convention, supra note 5, 37 I.L.M. at 6.
160 The Convention states that "[a] Party shall not decline to render mutual legal
assistance for criminal matters within the scope of this Convention on the ground of bank
secrecy." Id. at 6
161 The Convention provides that "[b]ribery of a foreign public official shall be
deemed to be included as an extraditable offense under the laws of the Parties and the
extradition treaties between them." Id. art 10, at 6.
162 The Convention states that "[i]f a Party which makes extradition conditional on
the existence of an extradition from another Party with which it has no extradition treaty,
it may consider this Convention to be the legal basis for extradition in respect of the
offense of bribery of a foreign public official." Id.
163 Thus, under the Convention:
Extradition for bribery of a foreign public official is subject to the conditions set
out in the domestic law and applicable treaties and arrangements of each Party.
Where a Party makes extradition conditional upon the existence of dual
criminality, that condition shall be deemed to be fulfilled if the offense for
which extradition is sought is within the scope of Article 1 of this Convention.
Id.
164

The 1997 Recommendation provides that a member state which did not assert
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HI. The 1998 Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act
The U.S. State Department hailed the OECD Convention as "a
bold and historic step in the fight against international commercial
bribery."'65 At the signing ceremony in Paris on December 17,
1997, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright described the
Convention as "a victory for good government, fair competition

jurisdiction to prosecute based on nationality "should be prepared to extradite their
nationals in respect of the bribery of foreign public officials." CombatingBribery, supra
note 87, 36 I.L.M. at 1023. The Convention takes a somewhat different tack and
provided that states which declined to extradite their own nationals should undertake
their prosecutions themselves:
Each Party shall take any measures necessary to assure either that it can
extradite its nationals or that it can prosecute its nationals for the offense of
bribery of a foreign public official. A Party which declines a request to extradite
a person for bribery of a foreign official solely on the ground that the person is
its national shall submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution.
Id.; Convention, supra note 5, 37 I.L.M. at 6.
In both the Convention and the 1997 Recommendation, the OECD recognized and
underscored the criticality of the exercise of independent prosecutorial judgement
unaffected by national economic interest or political considerations or the identity of the
persons or entities involved. As the OECD stated in the 1997 Recommendation, "[i]n
view of the seriousness of the offense of bribery of foreign public officials, public
prosecutors should exercise their discretion independently, based on professional
motives. They should not be influenced by considerations of national economic interest,
fostering good political relations or the identity of the victim." CombatingBribery, supra
note 87, 36 I.L.M. at 1024. Thus, the Convention provides that:
Investigation and prosecution of the bribery of a foreign public official shall be
subject to the applicable rules and principles of each Party. They shall not be
influenced by considerations of national economic interest, the potential effect
upon relations with another State or the identity of the national or legal persons
involved.
Convention, supra note 5, art 5, 37 I.L.M. at 5. As the commentaries further explains:
Article 5 recognizes the fundamental nature of national regimes of prosecutorial
discretion. It recognizes as well that, in order to protect the independence of
prosecution, such discretion is to be exercised on the basis of professional
motives and is not to be subject to improper influence by concerns of a political
nature.
Id.
Press Statement, U.S. Dep't of State, OECD, Anti-Bribery Convention, at
http://www.dos.gov (Nov. 21, 1997).
165
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and open trade.' 66
On May 1, 1998, President Clinton transmitted the Convention
to the Senate with a view toward receiving its advice and
consent.' 67 The Senate unanimously approved the Convention on
July 31, 1998.6'
A. The Legislative History of the 1998 Amendments
As a prerequisite to the deposit of instruments of ratification,
the OECD Convention required signatory countries to adopt
legislation implementing the central provisions of the
Convention. '69 To that end, on May 4, 1998, the Clinton
Administration sent to the Congress its legislative proposals for
implementation of the Convention.'
In its transmission, the
Clinton Administration noted that there had long been a bipartisan
effort to achieve a multinational prohibition against international
bribery, which had culminated in the signing of the OECD
Convention.' The State Department echoed these sentiments and
166 Press Release, White House, Statement of Secretary of State Madeline K.
Albright at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Signing
Ceremony
of
the
Anti-Bribery
and
Corruption
Convention,
at
http://www.secretary.state.gov (Dec. 17, 1997). Not all commentators agree with this
view however. See, e.g., David Kennedy, The InternationalAnti-Corruption Campaign,
14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 455 (1999).
167 Press Release, White House, Statement of the President of the United States
(Nov. 10, 1998) (on file with the author).
168 See Nancy Zucker Boswell, Crackdown on Corruption, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 24,
1998, at S42.
169 Under the terms of the Convention, instruments of acceptance, approval, and
ratification were to be filed by signatories on or before December 31, 1998. Within that
time, the signatories were to have enacted legislation implementing the Convention and
conforming the signatories' domestic criminal law to the provisions of the Convention.
See Convention, supra note 5, art. 15, 37 I.L.M. at 7.
170 See Letters from Ann M. Harkins, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to the
Hon. Newt Gingrich and the Hon. Albert Gore, Jr., at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/
fraud/fcpa/tranlet.htm (May 4, 1998).
171 The administration's transmittal letter states:

Administrations of both parties have long urged our trading partners to
criminalize bribery of foreign public officials by their nationals, as the United
States did in 1977 in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (the "FCPA").
These bipartisan efforts finally succeeded when thirty-three countries signed the
OECD Convention in Paris in December of last year. The OECD Convention,
when fully implemented by both parties, will help create the level playing field
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urged rapid implementation of the Convention by the Congress."2
Both the Senate and the House held hearings concerning the
proposed legislation. Testifying before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on June 9, 1998, Stuart E. Eizenstat,
Undersecretary of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural
Affairs, and Fritz F. Heimann, Chairman of Transparency
International USA, stressed the adverse affect of international
bribery on the ability of U.S. companies to compete in world
business.' Before a subcommittee of the House Commerce
and transparent contracting long sought by American businesses as they
compete around the world for public contracts.
Harkins, supra note 170.
172 Calling the Convention "an historic agreement," the U.S. Department of State
urged Congress to enact the implementing legislation "as soon as possible":
This Convention strikes a major blow against bribery and corruption, will
bolster economic development and foster democracy, and will help level the
playing field for U.S. companies. U.S. firms have lost billions of dollars in
overseas business deals in which bribes played the decisive role in the awarding
of contracts.
The OECD Convention is the product of strong American leadership and
reflects a broad, bipartisan consensus on the need for effective international
action on foreign corrupt practices. Twenty years ago, a bipartisan effort in
Congress led to the adoption of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which
prohibits U.S. companies from bribing foreign officials. The Congress called in
the 1988 Trade Act for the U.S. government to launch an anti-bribery effort in
the OECD. The OECD Convention owes its conception to these actions ....
The Secretary urges the Senate to approve the Convention and both Houses
of Congress to pass implementing legislation as soon as possible. Continued
U.S. leadership will spur other governments to act. Rapid implementation of the
Convention will directly benefit our international interests and U.S. firms and
their employees.
Press Statement, James B. Foley, Deputy Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, OECD
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, at http://secretary
.state.gov/wwwfbriefings/statements/1998/ps980505.html (May 5, 1998).
173 In his testimony, Undersecretary Eizenstat stated:
Let me say, Mr. Chairman, this Convention is very much in our national
interest. Bribery damages economic development and hinders the growth of
democracy. It hurts U.S. exporters and suppliers-in every state and district in
the U.S.-and impedes international trade. The U.S. government is aware of
allegations of bribery by foreign firms in the last year affecting international
contracts worth $30 billion, which is not currently prohibited by criminal laws
in their home jurisdictions.
Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Stuart E. Eizenstat Under
Secretary of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs on the OECD
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Committee, both Paul V. Gerlach, Associate Director of the SEC
Division of Enforcement,' 4 and Andrew J. Pincus, General
Counsel of the Department of Commerce,'" similarly emphasized
the need to "level the playing field" for 7U.S.
companies competing
6
in the increasingly globalized economy.'

Convention on the Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Transactions,
(June 9, 1998), 1998 WL 304007 (F.D.C.H.). Mr. Heimann also observed as follows:
The U.S. Department of Commerce estimates that 139 international commercial
contracts valued at $64 billion may have involved bribery by foreign firms and
that U.S. firms lost 36 of those contracts valued at $11 billion .... In many
countries, including Germany and France, bribes continued to be treated as tax
deductible business expenses. Foreign governments not merely condoned, but
effectively subsidized foreign bribes. Notwithstanding the failure of other
countries to act, the U.S. Congress refused to repeal or water down the FCPA
and insisted on retaining the high moral ground. In the past five years the tide
has finally begun to turn. There is now widespread recognition that international
bribery should no longer be tolerated.
Testimony of Fritz F. Heimann, Chairman,TransparencyInternationalUSA Before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the OECD Convention on Combating the
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in InternationalBusiness Transactions, (June 5,
1998), 1998 WL 304024 (F.D.C.H.).
174 Associate Director Gerlach testified in this regard as follows:
The increasing globalization of the world's economy, along with the
establishment of capital markets in new environments, have contributed to U.S.
companies having increased business dealings and interests abroad. As this
trend continues, the risk of U.S. companies operating in situations where bribery
of foreign officials is a normal part of doing business increases. Accordingly, it
is important to enact, and to encourage other countries to enact, legislation that
will provide a more level playing field for U.S. companies in the international
marketplace.
Testimony of Paul V. Gerlach, Associate Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, Concerning H.R. 4353, The InternationalAntiBribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998 before the Subcommittee on Finance and
HazardousMaterials,Committee on Commerce, United States House of Representatives
(Sept. 10, 1998), 1998 WL 778822 (F.D.C.H.).
175 Testimony of Andrew J. Pincus, General Counsel of the Department of
Commerce, before the Subcommittee on Finance andHazardousMaterials of the House
Commerce Committee (Sept. 10, 1998), 1998 WL 778823 (F.D.C.H.):
The prevalence of bribery in international transactions has been costly for the
United States, for the countries whose officials demand or accept bribes, and
also for countries whose companies pay bribes. Bribery hurts U.S. exporters and
suppliers in every state and district in our country. In econemies in transition, it
hinders economic growth and the development of democracy.
176 See Gerlach, supra note 174; Pincus, supra note 175.
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On July 30, 1998, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs issued its report on the International AntiBribery Act of 1998.7" In its report, the Committee observed that:
Since the passage of FCPA, American businesses have operated
at a disadvantage relative to foreign competitors who have
continued to pay bribes without fear of penalty. Such bribery is
estimated to affect overseas procurements valued in the billions
of dollars each year. Indeed, some of our trading partners have
explicitly encouraged such bribes by permitting businesses to
claim them as tax-deductible business expenses. It is impossible
to calculate with certainty the losses suffered by U.S. businesses
due to bribery by our foreign competitors. The Commerce
Department has stated that it has learned of significant
allegations of bribery by foreign firms in approximately 180
international commercial contracts since mid-1994, contracts
that were valued at nearly $80 billion. This legislation, coupled
with implementation of the OECD Convention by our major
trading partners, will go a long way towards leveling
78 the playing
field for U.S. businesses in international contracts. 1
The October 8, 1998 report of the House Commerce Committee
was to the same effect. 179
On October 20, 1998, the House unanimously adopted the
International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act. 8 ' The Senate
also unanimously passed the legislation on October 21, 1998. '
The President signed the Act on November 10, 1998.182 Following
177 COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, & URBAN AFFAIRS, THE INTERNATIONAL ANTI-

1998, S. REP. No. 105-277, (1998).
S. REP. No. 105-277, at 2.

BRIBERY ACT OF
178

179 CoM. COMM., REPORT TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 4353, H.R. REP. No.105-802, at 10
(1998). The Committee noted that the legislation was "designed to level the playing field
for business worldwide by seeking to reduce foreign bribery generally .. " H.R. REP.
No.105-802, at 9.
i80 See 144 CONG. REC. HI 1670-72 (Oct. 20, 1998).
18l

See 144

112

In his statement at the time of signing the Act, the President noted that:

CONG.

REC. S 12973-74 (Oct. 21, 1998).

The United States has led the effort to curb international bribery. We have long
believed bribery is inconsistent with democratic values, such as good
governance and the rule of law. It is also contrary to basic principles of fair
competition and harmful to efforts to promote economic development. Since the
enactment in 1977 of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), U.S.
businesses have faced criminal penalties, if they engaged in business-related
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the deposit of instruments of ratification by Iceland, Japan,
Germany, the United States, Finland, the United Kingdom, and
Canada, the OECD Convention entered into force on February 15,
1999. 183
The 1998 amendments extended the reach of the FCPA both
substantively and jurisdictionally. Substantively, the 1998
amendments enlarged the proscribed purposes for corrupt
payments to include payments made in order to obtain an
"improper advantage" in obtaining or retaining business. 8 " The
amendments also enlarged the definition of persons considered to
be "foreign officials" to include persons employed by international
organizations.185 Jurisdictionally, the amendments extended the
assertion of nationality-based jurisdiction to reach acts committed
by U.S. nationals outside the United States.'86 The amendments
also extended U.S. territorial jurisdiction to reach violations of the
FCPA by foreign nationals, both individuals and entities, solely
predicated on an act in furtherance of the violation having been
bribery of foreign public officials. Foreign competitors, however, did not have
similar restrictions and could engage in this corrupt activity without fear of
penalty. Moreover, some of our major trading partners have subsidized such
activity by permitting tax deductions for bribes paid to foreign public officials.
As a result, U.S. companies have had to compete on an uneven playing field,
resulting in losses of international contracts estimated at $30 billion per year.
The OECD Convention-which represents the culmination of many years of
sustained diplomatic effort-is designed to change all that. Under the
Convention, our major competitors will be obligated to criminalize the bribery
of foreign public officials in intentional business transactions. The existing
signatories already account for a large percentage of international contracting,
but they also plan an active outreach program to encourage other nations to
become parties to this important instrument. The United States intends to work
diligently, through the monitoring process established under the OECD, to
ensure that the Convention is widely ratified and fully implemented. We will
continue our leadership in the international fight against corruption.
Id.
83 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery to Enter into Force on 15 February
1999, OECD, at http://www.oecd.org/media/release/nw98-124a.htm (Dec. 17, 1998).
Dates on which the countries deposited instruments of ratification are as follows: (1)
Iceland-August 17, 1998; (2) Japan-October 15, 1998; Germany-November 10,
1998; (3) the United States-December 8, 1998; (4) Finland-December 10, 1998; (5)
the United Kingdom-December 14, 1998; and 6) Canada-December 17, 1998. Id.
184 See infra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
115

See infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.

186 See infra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
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87

B. Substantive Amendments to the FCPA
In accordance with the provisions of the OECD Convention,
Congress amended the FCPA to include the prohibition against
corrupt payments for the purpose of obtaining an "improper
advantage" in obtaining and retaining business.' 8' Also in
accordance with the Convention, the amendments include
employees of international organizations within the definition of
"foreign official."'89

1. ObtainingAn Improper Advantage
The 1998 amendments conform the FCPA anti-bribery
provisions, pertaining to both "issuers" and "domestic concerns,"
to the OECD Convention's language concerning the purpose for
which the corrupt payment was made.'9 ° As noted, the Convention
prohibits corrupt payments to a foreign official "in order that the
official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of
official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other
improper advantage in the conduct of international business."' 9' As
explained in the commentaries, the term "improper advantage"
was intended to refer to "something to which the company was not
clearly entitled ... ""'
Accordingly, the scope of the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions
is broad enough to include corrupt payments for the purpose of
obtaining an "improper advantage."' 9 Thus, the FCPA now
provides that it is unlawful for issuers or domestic concerns to
offer or to pay a bribe to a foreign official:
for purposes of... (i) influencing any act or decision of such
foreign official in his official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign
official to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty
of such official, or (iii) securing any improper advantage.., in
187

See infra notes 200-07 and accompanying text.

'88

§ 78dd-l(a)(1)(A)(iii).

189

§ 78dd-1.

190 §§ 78dd-l(a)(1)(A)(iii), -l(f)(1)(A); Convention, supra note 5, 37 I.L.M. at 1.
191Convention, supra note 5, 37 I.L.M. at 4.
192 Id. at 9.
193

§§ 78dd-l(a)(1)(A), -2(a)(1).
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order to assist such [issuer or domestic concern] in obtaining or
retaining business
for or with, or directing business to any
,,194
person ....

2. Foreign Official
In accordance with the Convention, Congress enlarged the
FCPA definition of "foreign official" to include officers and
employees of public international organizations.'95 Accordingly,
the 1998 amendments to the FCPA define the term "foreign
official" as:
[A]ny officer or employee of a foreign government or any
department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public
international organization, or any person acting in an official
capacity for or on behalf of any such government or department,
agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public

§§ 78dd-l(a)(1)(A), -2(a)(1). While the OECD Convention made the obtaining
of an "improper advantage" a prohibited purpose of the corrupt payment along with
obtaining or retaining business, the 1998 amendments made the "improper advantage"
subservient to obtaining and retaining business. Thus, the FCPA now prohibits corrupt
payments: (1) to influence an official act or decision of the foreign official; (2) to induce
the foreign official to do an act, or omit doing an act, in violation of the foreign official's
lawful duty; (3) to induce the foreign official to use influence to affect a government act
or decision; or (4) to secure an improper advantage. Id. It has been suggested that this
juxtaposition of "improper advantage" in the 1998 amendments was intended to avoid
"tinkering with the 'obtain or retain business' element [of the FCPA], which has been
broadly interpreted by enforcement officials and the courts." Lucinda A. Low & Timothy
P. Trenkle, U.S. Antibribery Law Goes Global, Bus. L. TODAY, July-Aug. 1999, at 13,
20 (quoting remarks by Peter Clark, Deputy Chief of the Fraud Section, Criminal
Division, U.S. Department of Justice). As Low and Trenkle further observed:
194

By adding "any improper advantage" to the quidpro quo element [of an FCPA
violation] . . . a significant expansion of the law may have been achieved.
Before this amendment, a prosecutor had to show a breach of duty, misuse of
position or use of influence by an official; now, he or she apparently may only
have to show much less specific actions by the official or even merely the intent
by a payor to secure an improper advantage in its business. Thus, if "business"
already included enhanced profits, tax benefits, collection of revenues and
discretionary licenses, concessions and permits as well as government contracts,
"any improper advantage" could mean preferential bidding terms, preferential
access, or other preferential rights even in the preliminary stages of the pursuit
of business opportunity.
Id.
195

§§ 78dd-l(f), -2(h)(2)(A), -3(f)(2)(A).
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international organization.'

The FCPA now defines a "public international organization" as:
(i) [A]n organization that is designated by Executive order
pursuant to Section 288 of Title 22; or
(ii) [A]ny other international organization that is designated by
the President by Executive order for the purposes of this section,
effective as of the date of publication of such order in the
Federal Register.' 97
In this connection, an "international organization" under the
International Organizations Immunities Act is one:
in which the United States participates pursuant to any treaty or
under the authority of any Act of Congress authorizing such
participation, or making an appropriation for such participation,
and which shall have been designated by the President through
appropriate Executive Order as being entitled to enjoy the
privileges, exemptions, and immunities provided under the
Act.'98

Thus, an officer or employee of an international organization who
is entitled to the benefits of diplomatic immunity, or as such is
otherwise designated by Executive Order, will now be considered
a foreign official to whom corrupt payments are prohibited by the
FCPA.
C. JurisdictionalAmendments to the FCPA
The 1998 amendments also greatly extended the jurisdictional
reach of the FCPA by making violations of the Act by foreign
individuals and entities, in addition to actions by U.S. nationals
overseas, prosecutable in the United States.' 99 For this reason, the
jurisdictional amendments may prove to be the most significant.
1. JurisdictionOver Foreign PersonsBased on
Territoriality
At the time of both the original enactment of the FCPA in
1977 and the amendments in 1988, Congress refrained from
196

Id.

197

§§ 78dd-l(f)(1)(B), -2(h)(2)(B), -3(f)(2)(B).
§ 288 (1998).

198 22 U.S.C.
199 § 78dd-3.
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asserting jurisdiction over non-U.S. individuals and entities.
Despite having heard extensive testimony concerning the use of
off-shore subsidiaries to make questionable domestic and foreign
payments, and of the use of foreign agents and consultants as
intermediaries to make corrupt payments,"°0 Congress ultimately
decided not to include foreign nationals within the definition of a
domestic concern. In effect, unless a foreign national was an
"issuer" or there was some other basis for the United States to
assert jurisdiction, a foreign national was beyond the reach of the
Act.
As originally proposed by the House, the definition of
"domestic concern" included entities owned or controlled by U.S.
nationals; this definition extended to foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
companies."0 ' The Senate bill did not contain the same definition." 2
In conference, the House deferred to the Senate recognizing the
possible conflicts with principles of international law and comity
that could result from the assertion of U.S. jurisdiction over

See supra notes 15, 16, 18, and accompanying text.
H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 4 (1977). In order to address the use of foreign
subsidiaries in affecting overseas corrupt payments, the House bill included within the
definition of "domestic concern" as follows:
and entity (A) which is owned or controlled by individuals who are citizens or
nationals of the United States; (B) which has its principal place of business in
the United States; or (C) which is organized under the laws of a state of the
United States or any territory, possession or commonwealth of the United
States."
200

201

Id. The committee explained that:
By so defining domestic concern, the committee intends to reach not only all
U.S. companies other than those subject to SEC jurisdiction but also foreign
subsidiaries of any U.S. corporation. The committee found it appropriate to
extend the coverage of the bill to non-U.S. based subsidiaries because of the
extensive use of such entities as a conduit for questionable or improper foreign
payments authorized by their domestic parent.
Id. at 12.
202

S. REp. No. 95-114, supra note 18.

The term "domestic concern" is defined in the bill to mean an individual who is
a citizen or national of the United States as well as any corporation ...which is
owned or controlled by individuals who are citizens or nationals of the United
States and which has its principal place of business in the United States or any
territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States.
Id. (emphasis added).
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foreign nationals outside the territorial United States. 203
In contrast, because jurisdiction over issuers arose from the
registration of securities with the SEC, a sufficient territorial nexus
existed to assert jurisdiction over a foreign national. 24 Thus,
foreign corporations that traded securities on U.S. exchanges,
including those companies trading securities in the form of
American Depository Receipts (ADRs), 5 were subject to the
203

As the House-Senate Conference Committee explained:

The House receded to the Senate in the definition of "domestic concern" with
an amendment to make clear that any company having a principal place of
business in the United States would be subject to the bill.
In receding to the Senate, the conferees recognized the inherent
jurisdictional, enforcement, and diplomatic difficulties raised by the inclusion of
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies in the direct prohibitions of the bill.
However, the conferees intend to make clear that any issuer or domestic
concern which engages in bribery of foreign officials indirectly through any
other person or entity would itself be liable under the bill. The conferees
recognized that such jurisdictional, enforcement, and diplomatic difficulties
may not be present in the case of individuals who are U.S. citizens, nationals, or
residents. Therefore, individuals other than those specifically covered by the bill
(e.g., officers, directors, employees, agents, or stockholders acting on behalf of
an issuer or domestic concern) will be liable when they act in relation to the
affairs of any foreign subsidiary of an issuer or domestic concern if they are
citizens, nationals, or residents of the United States. In addition, the conferees
determined that foreign nationals or residents otherwise under the jurisdiction of
the United States would be covered by the bill in circumstances where an issuer
or domestic concern engaged in conduct proscribed by the bill.
JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, FOREIGN CORRUPT

H.R. REP. No. 95-831, at 13-14 (1977).
See infra note 339.
205 Issuers of foreign securities commonly gain access to U.S. capital markets
through the trading of ADRs. An ADR is a certificate issued by a depository in the
United States (i.e., a bank or a trust company) representing an ownership interest in
securities deposited with the financial institution and held overseas. The foreign
securities can be either debt or equity instruments. Once established, an ADR trades like
any other security, either over-the-counter or on an established exchange. ADRs offered
to the public require registration with the SEC pursuant to § 78e(a). Meritt B. Fox,
SecuritiesDisclosurein a GlobalizingMarket, Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L.
REv. 2498, 2608-17 (1997); see also Joseph Velli, American Depository Receipts: An
Overview, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 38 (1996); Jay D. Hansen, OtherInternationalIssues:
London Calling? A Comparison of London and U.S. Stock Exchange Listing
Requirementsfor Foreign Equity Securities, 6 DuKE J. COMP. & INTL L. 197, 208-209
(1995); Mark A. Saunders, American Depository Receipts: An Introduction to U.S.
Capital Markets for Foreign Companies, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 48 (1994); James L.
Cochrane, Are U.S. Regulatory Requirements for Foreign Firms Appropriate?, 17
PRACTICES CONFERENCE REPORT,
204
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FCPA, at least with regard to compliance with the accounting and
financial controls requirements. For example, the SEC recently
asserted jurisdiction in an enforcement action against an Italian
company, Montedison S.p.A., because Montedison's ADRs were
traded on U.S. exchanges. °6
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 58 (1994); Michael V. Hurley, International Debt and Equity
Markets: U.S. Participationin the Globalization Trend, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 701
(1994).
Trading in ADRs has been very significant in U.S. markets. For example, it was
reported that "[flrom January to August 1995, ADRs accounted for nine percent of the
volume on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) where all foreign stocks accounted
for 10.7 percent of volume. Of the 220 companies now listed on the Exchange, 161 are
in ADR format." GLOBAL INVESTMENT MAGAZINE, Dec. 1995, at 28. In May 1996, the
Securities Industry Association reported that U.S. investors had purchased $51.2 billion
in foreign equity securities in 1995. U.S. bought $98 billion inforeign securities in '95,
REUTERS FINANCIAL SERVICE, May 8, 1996. According to a 1996 report commissioned
by Citibank, approximately 1000 depository receipt programs had been established
between 1991 and 1996 and U.S. portfolio managers indicated their intent to increase
their holdings of ADRs. Growth Seen in U.S. Foreign Investment, FIN. TIMES OF
LONDON, Sept. 5, 1996, at 24.
206 SEC v. Montedison S.p.A., Civil Action No. 1:96CV02631 (H.H.G.) (D.D.C.
Nov. 21, 1996). The SEC contended that Montedison had materially misstated its
financial condition and the results of operations in reports filed with the SEC for the
years 1988-1993. It was alleged that Montedison had misrepresented the true nature of
two transactions: the "Exilar Loan" and the "Enimont Affair."
With regard to the "Exilar Loan," it was alleged that payments were made by
Montedison or its agents in the form of bearer bonds deposited by Montedison
subsidiaries in Swiss accounts for the benefit of unidentified third parties. In order to
account for these payments, a fictitious account receivable for $272 million was created
and then "loaned" to a wholly-owned Curacao subsidiary which, in turn, "loaned" the
same amount to a Virgin Island's company, Exilar International, S.A. This "loan" was
later classified as "uncollectable," and Montedison took a $272 million write-down.
Complaint, In[ 11-13.
With regard to the "Enimont Affair," Montedison entered into a joint venture with
ENI, the Italian state energy company. Montedison and ENI each owned 40% of the joint
venture and the remaining 20% was offered to the public. Montedison attempted to
purchase control of the joint venture through nominees, but the transactions were
overturned by a Milan court and Montedison's interest was put in the custody of a third
party. Complaint,
14-15.
Undeterred, Montedison embarked on a course to gain political support by paying
bribes. Under its scheme, Montedison purchased real estate at inflated prices from a
developer in Rome who used the proceeds to make corrupt payments on Montedison's
behalf. Montedison was ultimately unsuccessful in gaining control of the joint venture,
however. As a result of the transactions, Montedison overstated the value of the
properties on its books. Eventually, Montedison "wrote down" the value of the properties
by approximately $126,250,000 for the year ending December 31, 1993. The write-down
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The OECD Convention, however, called on signatory nations
to exercise fully their national and territorial jurisdiction in
prohibiting international bribery. In accordance with the
Convention's direction, the 1998 amendments added an entirely
new section to the FCPA, Section 104A, that made the anti-bribery
provisions of the FCPA applicable to non-U.S. nationals for
violations committed outside the United States if there was an act
in furtherance of the violation committed in the United States.0 7
was characterized as a "prior period adjustment." Complaint, U 16-19.
Among other violations, the SEC charged Montedison with having created false
books and records and with having failed to devise and maintain a system of internal
controls with respect to the disbursement of corporate funds. Jurisdiction was grounded
on the trading of Montedison ADRs on the NYSE. The SEC noted that during the period
between January 1993 and the filing of the complaint, 1 million ADRs (each
representing 10 shares of Montedison common stock) had been traded each month on the
NYSE. The compliant also noted that as of May 1, 1995, U.S. residents owned the
equivalent of 6.1% of Montedison's common stock. Complaint, q 7-8. Thus,
notwithstanding the fact that all of the conduct constituting the violations occurred in
Italy, U.S. jurisdiction was asserted over Montedison by virtue of Montedison having
offered registered securities in the U.S. and having filled periodic reports with the SEC.
207 The FCPA now provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person other than an issuer that is subject to section
30A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [§ 78dd-1] or a domestic concern
(as defined in section 104 of this Act [§ 78dd-2]), or for any officer, director,
employee, or agent of such person or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf
of such person, while in the territory of the United States, corruptly to make use
of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or to do any
act in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the
payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the
giving of anything of value to:
(1) any foreign official for purposes of
(A)(i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official
capacity, inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do any act in
violation of the lawful duty of such official . . . or (iii) securing any

improper advantage; or
(B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign
government or instrumentality thereof to effect or influence any act or
decision of such government or instrumentality,
in order to assist such person in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or
directing business to, any person;
(2) any foreign political party or official thereof or any candidate for foreign
political office for purposes of
(A)(i) influencing any act or decision of such party, official, or candidate in
its or his official capacity, (ii) inducing such party, official, or candidate to
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Thus, under this newly created section, either the use of the U.S.
mails or "any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce," or
the doing of any act in furtherance of a violation, will subject a
foreign national to prosecution in a U.S. court.
2. JurisdictionBased Upon Nationality
Conforming to the OECD Convention's mandates, the 1998
amendments also enlarged the anti-bribery provisions'
jurisdictional reach with respect to actions by U.S. nationals
outside of U.S. territory. The amended FCPA now makes it clear
that corrupt acts by "United States persons, 20 8 committed outside
do or omit to do an act in violation of the lawful duty of such party, official,
or candidate, or (iii) securing any improper advantage; or
(B) inducing such party, official, or candidate to use its or his influence
with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence
any act or decision of such government or instrumentality,
in order to assist such person in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or
directing business to, any person; or
(3) any person, while knowing that all or a portion of such money or thing of
value will be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign
official, to any foreign political party or official thereof, or to any candidate for
foreign political office, for purposes of
(A)(i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official, political
party, party official, or candidate in his or its official capacity, (ii) inducing
such foreign official, political party, party official, or candidate to do or
omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such foreign official,
political party, party official, or candidate, or (iii) securing any improper
advantage; or
(B) inducing such foreign official, political party, party official, or
candidate to use his or its influence with a foreign government or
instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such
government or instrumentality,
in order to assist such person in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or
directing business to, any person.
§ 78dd-3(a).
208 The term "United States person" is defined in the amended FCPA to mean:
[A] national of the United States (as defined in section 1101 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C. § 1101] or any corporation, partnership,
association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or
sole proprietorship organized under the laws of the United States or any State,
territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States, or any political
subdivision thereof.
§ 78 dd-l(g)(2), -2(i)(2).
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the United States, which are in furtherance of a violation of the
anti-bribery provisions, will be subject to U.S. jurisdiction.09
Significantly, assertion of this nationality-based jurisdiction does
not require use of the U.S. mails or instrumentalities of U.S.
interstate commerce, or indeed any nexus with the United States,
as a predicate." '
IV. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the FCPA
A longstanding presumption of American law is that acts of
Congress are to apply only domestically unless there is a clear
manifestation of a contrary congressional intent."' There is,
however, no constitutional limitation on Congress' legislative
reach, '12 and courts have not refrained from inferring the necessary
209 Thus, with respect to both "issuers" and "domestic concerns," the amended

FCPA makes it unlawful:
for any United States person to corruptly do any act outside the United States in
furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the
payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the
giving of anything of value [to a foreign official].
§§ 78dd-l(g)(1), -2(i)(1).
210 These extraterritorial prohibitions against a "United States person" apply"
"irrespective of whether such United States person makes use of the mails or any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce in furtherance of such offer, gift, payment,
promise or authorization." Id.
211 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) ("It is a long standing
principle of American law 'that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears,
is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.' . . . This
'canon of construction ... is a valid approach whereby unexpressed congressional intent
may be ascertained"') (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949));
accord Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993); see also N.Y.
Cent. R.R. Co. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29, 31-32 (1925); Sandberg v. McDonald, 248
U.S. 185, 195 (1918); Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909).
Accordingly, "to overcome the presumption and to apply the statute beyond the territory
of the United States, the [proponent] must show a clear expression of congressional
intent." United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 1002 (5th Cir. 1977); see generally
William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85 (1998).
212 See, e.g., United States v. Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d 1200, 1204 (9th Cir. 1991)
("Generally, there is no constitutional bar to the extraterritorial application of United
States penal laws."). As Chief Justice Marshall observed in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824), Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause "is the power to
regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power,
like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost
extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution."
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legislative intent when extraterritorial jurisdiction has been
necessary to effectuate the statutory purpose.1 In enacting the
Thus, Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld has noted:
The Constitution does not express any territorial limitation on the powers of
Congress. For example, the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations,
and to enact criminal laws necessary and proper to carry out the regulation of
commerce, might well include laws that apply outside as well as within the
territory of the United States, to aliens as well as to nationals ....
The Constitution also grants to Congress the power to define and punish
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law
of nations. In addition, Congress must have at least some of the powers inherent
in the international sovereignty of the United States, which being unenumerated,
have no express territorial limitation.
Lowenfeld, supra note 147, at 881. The absence of constitutional limitation on Congress'
jurisdiction was noted by Professor Lea Brilmayer as well:
In the international context.., the Constitution plays virtually no role at all.
The Supreme Court has never invalidated the extraterritorial application of
federal law on constitutional grounds. In fact, none of the Court's decisions on
extraterritorial application even seriously discuss the constitutional issues. The
most attention these decisions ever give to the issue is a back handed reference
to the Constitution at the outset of the discussion about congressional intent.
Lea Brilmayer, The ExtraterritorialApplication of American Law: A Methodological
and ConstitutionalAppraisal, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11, 24 (1987). Professor
Brilmayer has also suggested, however, that the extraterritorial effect of legislation is
nevertheless subject to the requirements of due process. Id. at 27-28; see also Bret A.
Sumner, Due Process and True Conflicts: The ConstitutionalLimits on Extraterritorial
Federal Legislationand the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity(Libertad)Act of
1996, 46 CATH. U. L. REv. 907, 908-09 (1997); Christopher J. Lord, Stapled Stock and
the I.R.C. Section 269B: Ill Conceived Charge in the Rules of International Tax
Jurisdiction, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 1066, 1067 (1986) ("Except for the due process
clause, which proscribes arbitrary taxation, no constitutional provision or international
law restricts the scope of United States tax jurisdiction.").
213 Thus, the Supreme Court observed in United States v. Bowman, as follows:
[some laws] are such that to limit their locus to the strictly territorial jurisdiction
would be greatly to curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute and leave
open a large immunity for frauds as easily committed by citizens on the high
seas and in foreign countries as at home. In such cases, Congress has not
thought it necessary to make specific provision in the law that the locus shall
include the high seas and foreign countries, but allows it to be inferred from the
nature of the offense.
260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922). For example, with regard to the extraterritorial application of the
federal securities laws, courts have noted that, "[w]hen Congress drafted the securities
laws, it did not consider the issue of extraterritorial applicability, [which requires] that
federal courts fill the void." MGC, Inc. v. Great W. Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170, 173
(5th Cir. 1990). The court in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,Inc. similarly observed, "[o]ur
conclusions rest on case law and commentary concerning the application of the securities
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FCPA, Congress plainly intended to reach foreign conduct.2 '
25
Nevertheless, as broad as its prescriptive jurisdiction may be, 1
Congress is presumed to legislate in accordance with "customary
international-law limits on jurisdiction to prescribe. ' 26 As a result,

laws and other statutes to situations with foreign elements and our best judgment as to
what Congress would have wished if these problems had occurred to it," a process which
has been characterized candidly as "largely a policy decision." 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d
Cir. 1975); Cont. Grain (Austl.) Pty., Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 421
(8th Cir. 1979).
214 It has been observed, in this regard, that "[wihere Congress explicitly enacts a
statute with the intent to control conduct outside its boarders, the decision to focus on
international activity is clear. In the white-collar area, several criminal statutes fall within
this realm. Perhaps the most noteworthy is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act." Podgor,
supra note 147, at 329. For this reason, the FCPA has been said to be sui generis because
the FCPA is "a domestic criminal law that applies extraterritorially to U.S. citizens and
companies to prohibit bribery of foreign officials in a foreign country." DONALD ZARIN,
DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1, 1-2 (1995).
215 There are three generally recognized categories of jurisdiction. As described in
the Restatement, these three categories of jurisdiction are:
(a) jurisdiction to prescribe, i.e., the authority of a state to make its law
applicable to persons or activities; (b) jurisdiction to adjudicate, i.e., the
authority of a state to subject particular persons or things to its judicial process;
and (c) jurisdiction to enforce, i.e., the authority of a state to use the resources
of government to induce or compel compliance with its law.
supra note 145, pt. IV, introductory note. As Justice Scalia recently
observed with regard to Congress' jurisdiction to prescribe:
RESTATEMENT,

There is ...a type of "jurisdiction" relevant to determining the extraterritorial
reach of a statute; it is known as "legislative jurisdiction". . . or "jurisdiction to
prescribe".... This refers to the "authority of a state to make its law applicable
to persons or activities," and is quite a separate matter from "jurisdiction to
adjudicate" .... Congress has broad power under Article 1, § 8 cl. 3, "[t]o
regulate commerce with foreign Nations," and this court has repeatedly upheld
its power to make laws applicable to persons or activities beyond our territorial
boundaries where United States interests are affected.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 813-14 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting). It has
been suggested that Congress may exercise extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction under
Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 of the Constitution, which authorizes Congress to "define
and punish... [o]ffenses against the Law of Nations," subject to the limitations imposed
by customary international law. See Zephyr Rain Teachout, Defining and Punishing
Abroad: ConstitutionalLimits on the ExtraterritorialReach of the Offenses Clause, 48
DuKEL.J. 1305 (1999).
216 HartfordFire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 815 (Scalia, J., dissenting). As Chief Justice
Marshall stated in Murray v. Schooner CHARMING BETSY, "[a]n act of Congress ought
never be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction
remains, and consequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect
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Congress has exercised this extraterritorial jurisdiction sparingly." 7
Of the five generally recognized bases of extraterritorial
prescriptive jurisdiction under international law," 8 the territorial
neutral commerce, further than is warranted by the law of nations as understood in this
country." 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 81 (1804); Lowenfeld, supra note 147, at 881-82:
It is arguable that the Constitution permits Congress to make acts committed
abroad crimes under United States law only to the extent permitted by
international law. It is arguable that, especially when Congress acts under its
power to define offenses against the law of nations, it cannot violate territorial
limitations imposed by that law.
For a discussion and critical analysis of the integration of "customary international law"
into U.S. federal common law, see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110
HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997).
217 For example, Professor Lowenfeld has observed that, "[w]hatever the answers
that an uncertain constitutional jurisprudence might give [as to the limit of Congress'
extraterritorial authority], Congress has in fact respected the territorial limitations
imposed by international law, at least until recently. In that policy, I think Congress has
followed the lead of the framers." Lowenfeld, supra note 147, at 882.
218 Five theories of jurisdiction to prescribe were identified in the Harvard
Research, supra note 142. These theories are: territorial, nationality, protective,
universality, and passive. As explained in the introductory comment:
[The] five principles are: first, the territorial principle, determining jurisdiction
by reference to the place where the offense is committed; second, the nationality
principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the nationality or national
character of the person committing the offense; third, the protective principle,
determining jurisdiction by reference to the national interest injured by the
offense; fourth, the universality principle, determining jurisdiction by reference
to the custody of the person committing the offense; and fifth, the passive
personality principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the nationality or
national character of the person injured by the offense.
Id. at 445. These five theories of jurisdiction are incorporated in the Restatement as well.
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 145, § 402 cmts. c-g. In his paper prepared for the Eighth
Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law, Professor Rollin M.
Perkins suggested four theories of criminal jurisdiction: territorial, Roman, injured
forum, and cosmopolitan. Perkins, supra note 147, at 155. Under Professor Perkins'
construction, the "Roman" theory is, in essence, the same as the "nationality" theory, or
in other words,
The perpetrator rather than the place of perpetration, is the determinant under
the Roman theory. A nation, in this view, has jurisdiction over its national
wherever he may be and hence can hold him accountable for his criminal
misdeed wherever committed. It is the logical outgrowth of the conception of
law enforcement as a means of disciplining members of the tribe or clan.
Id. Similarly, Perkins' "injured forum" theory places emphasis upon the effect of the
crime (i.e., "[t]he injured forum theory places emphasis upon the effect of crime. A
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principle and the nationality principle predominate." 9 Congress
nation may take jurisdiction of any crime which has the effect of causing harm to it.").
Id. The "cosmopolitan" theory appears to be a synthesis of the "universality" and
"passive personality" theories (i.e., "this theory is drawn upon the extent necessary to
authorize any nation having actual control of a pirate, and evidence of his piracy, to
convict him no matter who he may be, wherever his acts of piracy were committed, and
without reference to the harm resulting therefrom."). Id. at 1156.
219 As HarvardResearch noted:
Of these five principles, the first is everywhere regarded as of primary
importance and of fundamental character. The second is universally accepted,
though there are striking differences in the context to which it is used in the
different national systems. The third is claimed by most States, regarded with
misgivings in a few, and generally ranked as the basis of an auxiliary
competence. The fourth is widely though by no means universally accepted as
the basis of an auxiliary competence, except for the offense of piracy, with
respect to which it is the generally recognized principle of jurisdiction. The
fifth, asserted in some form by a considerable number of States and contested
by others, is admittedly auxiliary in character and is probably not essential for
any State if the ends served are adequately provided for on other principles.
HarvardResearch, supra note 142, at 445. Prosecution of extraterritorial crime has been
upheld under each of five theories of jurisdiction, however. With regard to the "territorial
theory," see, for example, United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 276 (1927);
United States v. Pac. & Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87, 106 (1913).
With regard to the "nationality theory," see, for example, Kawakita v. United States,
343 U.S. 717, 732-36 (1952); Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 76-77 (1941); Blackmer
v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436-38 (1932); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94,
102 (1922); Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890); United States v. Juda, 46 F.3d
961, 966 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Harvey, 2 F.3d 1318, 1328-29 (3d Cir. 1993);
United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Goldberg, 830 F.2d 459,463-64 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. Walczak, 783 F.2d 852,
854 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Reeh, 780 F.2d 1541, 1543 n.2 (11th Cir. 1986);
United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 851 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Cotten, 471
F.2d 744, 750 (9th Cir. 1973); Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545, 548 (9th Cir. 1961);
Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 929-31 (1st Cir. 1948).
With regard to the "protective theory," see, for example, Ford v. United States, 273
U.S. 593, 619-20 (1927); Strassheim v. Dailey, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911); United States
v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Caicedo, 47
F.3d 370, 371 (9th Cir. 1995); Juda, 46 F.3d at 966; United States v. Vasquez-Velasco,
15 F.3d 833, 841 (9th Cir. 1994); Harvey, 2 F.3d at 1327; United States v. FelixGutierrez, 940 F.2d 1200, 1205 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245,
249 (9th Cir. 1990); Goldberg, 830 F.2d at 462; United States v. Wright-Palmer, 784
F.2d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 1986); Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir.
1984); In re Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 707 F.2d 663, 666 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v.
Gilboe, 684 F.2d 235, 238 (2d Cir. 1982); Cotten, 471 F.2d at 749; Stegman v. United
States, 425 F.2d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 9-10
(2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Braverman, 376 F.2d 249, 251 (2d Cir. 1967); Marin v.
United States, 352 F.2d 174, 177-78 (5th Cir. 1965); Rocha, 288 F.2d at 548-49; see also
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asserted both principles as bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction in
the 1998 amendments to the FCPA. In enlarging the FCPA's
jurisdiction to cover the acts of foreign individuals and entities,
Congress relied on its authority under the territorial principle. In
expanding the reach of the FCPA to include the acts of21 U.S.
persons abroad, Congress relied on the nationality principle.
However, even though consistent with established norms of
prescriptive jurisdiction, Congress' assertion of its jurisdiction is
nevertheless subject to a requirement of reasonableness, in
recognition of the interests of other states and the interests of
affected private parties that are implicated by the assertion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction.222 Neither the legislative history of the
1998 amendments nor the underlying provisions of the OECD
Convention provide clear guidance as to the circumstances in
which this broad jurisdiction should be exercised, particularly with
regard to an absent foreign national. Thus, the question posed by
the 1998 amendments is not whether congressional action can
reach extraterritorial conduct, but instead, the question in each
case is whether that authority should be exercised.223

Blakesley, supra note 147, at 1123-39; Podgor, supra note 147, at 342-43.
With regard to the "universal theory," see, for example, United States v. Yunis, 924
F.2d 1086, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also Abraham Abramovsky, Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction: The United States' UnwarrantedAttempt to Alter International Law in
United States v. Yunis, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 121, 136 (1990); Jordan J. Paust, Federal
Jurisdiction Over ExtraterritorialActs of Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Foreign
Violations of InternationalLaw Under FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J.
INT'L L. 191 (1983); Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International
Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785 (1988).
With regard to the "passive personality theory," see, for example, Vasquez-Velasco,
15 F.3d at 841; Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1090. See also Blakesley, supra note 147, 73 J. CRIM.
L. at 1139-41; Mason H. Drake, United States v. Yunis: The D.C. Circuit's Dubious
Approval of U.S. Long-Arm Jurisdiction Over ExtraterritorialCrimes, 87 Nw. U. L.
REV. 697, 704-13 (1993); Lowenfeld, supra note 147, at 886-91.
220 See infra notes 224-69 and accompanying text.
221 See infra notes 270-88 and accompanying text.
222

See

RESTATEMENT,

supra note 145, pt. IV, ch. 1, introductory note.

Cf Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1949) ("The question
before us is not the power of Congress to extend the eight hour law to work performed in
foreign countries. Petitioners concede that such power exists. The question is rather
whether Congress intended to make the law applicable to such work.").
223
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TerritorialJurisdictionOver ForeignNationals

Prior to the 1998 amendments, Congress had been circumspect
in the assertion of jurisdiction over foreign nationals for violation
of the FCPA when a basis for U.S. jurisdiction did not already
exist."' However, emboldened by the mandate of the OECD
Convention to aggressively assert territorial jurisdiction over acts
of foreign bribery,225 Congress abandoned its previous reticence
and instead broadly asserted U.S. jurisdiction over foreign
nationals, even those who may not have been physically present in
the United States.
Subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign national under the
amended FCPA requires a nexus between activity within the
territory of the United States and the furtherance of a violation of
the statute. 6 This nexus may result from use of the mails or means
of interstate commerce to further the violation or from the

commission of some other act within the territorial United States
that sufficiently implicates interests of the United States to warrant
the assertion of U.S. jurisdiction.2"
a. The "Territory" of the United States
Underscoring the intended breadth of its assertion of territorial
jurisdiction, both the House and the Senate made clear that the
territory of the United States "should be understood to encompass
all areas over which the United States asserts territorial
' This includes "all places and waters, continental or
jurisdiction."228
' the high
insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States;"229

224

See supra notes 199-207 and accompanying text.

With respect to territorial jurisdiction, the OECD Convention directs that "[e]ach
party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the
bribery of a foreign public official when the offense is committed in whole or in part in
its territory." Convention, supra note 5, § 1, 37 I.L.M. at 5.
225

The commentaries to the convention are equally emphatic: "The territorial basis for
jurisdiction should be interpreted broadly so that extensive physical connection to the
bribery act is not required." Id. at 10.
226 See § 78dd-3(a).
227

Id.

228

See H.R. REP. No. 105-802, at 10 (1998); S. REP. No. 105-277, at 6 (1998).

229

See H.R. REP. No. 105-802, at 10; S. REP. No. 105-277, at 6; 18 U.S.C. § 5

(1998).
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seas and the special maritime jurisdiction;23 ° and vehicles subject to
the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States. 3'
230 See H.R. REP. No. 105-802, at 10; S. REP. No. 105-277, at 6; 18 U.S.C. § 7
(1994). The "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States" includes:

(1) The high seas, any other waters within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular
State, and any vessel belonging in whole or in part to the United States or any
citizen thereof, or to any corporation created by or under the laws of the United
States, or of any State, Territory, District, or possession thereof, when such
vessel is within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and
out of the jurisdiction of any particular State.
(2) Any vessel registered, licensed, or enrolled under the laws of the United
States, and being on a voyage upon the waters of any of the Great Lakes, or any
of the waters connecting them, or upon the Saint Lawrence River where the
same constitutes the International Boundary Line.
(3) Any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under
the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or
otherwise acquired by the United States by consent of the legislature of the
State in which the same shall be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal,
dockyard, other needful building.
(4) Any island, rock, or key containing deposits of guano, which may, at the
discretion of the President, be considered as appertaining to the United States.
(5) Any aircraft belonging in whole or in part to the United States, or any citizen
thereof, or to any corporation created by or under the laws of the United States,
or any State, Territory, District, or possession thereof, while such aircraft is in
flight over the high seas, or over any other waters within the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any
particular State.
(6) Any vehicle used or designed for flight or navigation in space and on the
registry of the United States pursuant to the Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and the Convention on Registration of
Objects Launched into Outer Space, while that vehicle is in flight, which is
from the moment when all external doors are closed on Earth following
embarkation until the moment when one such door is opened on Earth for
disembarkation or in the case of a forced landing, until the competent
authorities take over the responsibility for the vehicle and for persons and
property aboard.
(7) Any place outside the jurisdiction of any nation with respect to an offense by
or against a national of the United States.
(8) To the extent permitted by international law, any foreign vessel during a
voyage having a scheduled departure from or arrival in the United States with
respect to an offense committed by or against a national of the United States.
Id.
231

See H.R. REP. No. 105-802, at 10; S. REP. No. 105-277, at 6; 49 U.S.C.
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b. Use of the Mails or Any Means of Interstate
Commerce
Jurisdiction over a foreign national may arise from the use of
the mails or other means of interstate or foreign commerce in
furtherance of a violation of the Act.232 The connection with
interstate commerce need not be a strong one, however. For
example, in prosecutions for money laundering,233 which require
234
proof of a transaction "affecting interstate or foreign commerce,
it has been held that "[a] minimal effect on interstate commerce is
sufficient to meet this requirement."2 "
Thus, subject matter jurisdiction in cases involving foreign
nationals requires evidence of the corrupt use of the mails or of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any
other act in furtherance of a violation. Although the contours of
§ 46501(2) (1994). The "special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States" includes the
following aircraft inflight:
(A) a civil aircraft of the Unites States.
(B) an aircraft of the armed forces of the United States.
(C) another aircraft in the United States.
(D) another aircraft outside the United States
(i) that has its next scheduled destination or last place of departure in the
United States, if the aircraft next lands in the United States;
(ii) on which an individual commits an offense (as defined in the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft), if the
aircraft lands in the United States with the individual still on the aircraft; or
(iii) against which an individual commits an offense (as defined in
subsection (d) or (e) of article I, section I of the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation) if the
aircraft lands in the United States with the individual still on the aircraft.
(E) any other aircraft leased without crew to a lessee whose principal place of
business is in the United States or, if the lessee does not have a principal place
of business, whose permanent residence is in the United States.
Id.
The Senate Report noted that "[i]t is the view of Congress that any act
committed by a foreign national within the United States that is in furtherance of a bribe
paid to a foreign official falls within the Congress' power to regulate 'Commerce with
foreign Nations.' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3." S. REP. No. 105-277, at 6.
233 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 (1998).
232

234

Id. § 1956(c)(4).

235 United States v. Kunzman, 54 F.3d 1522, 1527 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v.

Lovett, 964 F.2d 1029, 1038 (10th Cir. 1991).
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these jurisdictional acts are undefined in the statute and the
legislative history, reference to other statutes sheds some light on
what actions may constitute the involvement of interstate
commerce required to engender subject matter jurisdiction.
2. Use of the Mails
Like the FCPA, use of the mails in furtherance of the
execution of a fraudulent scheme gives rise to a violation of the
federal mail fraud statute. 236 The mail fraud statute has been
extensively litigated, and it has been observed that "much ink has
been spilled" in illuminating what is meant by "use of the mails in
furtherance of the fraudulent scheme. ' 237 Several instances have
emerged with respect to the conduct that would give rise to
jurisdiction over a foreign national.
First, it is not necessary that the use of the mails be an
"essential element" of the unlawful scheme.238 Instead, all that is
necessary to establish subject matter jurisdiction under the federal
mail fraud statute is that the use of the mail was "incident to an
essential part of the scheme" '39 or was "a step in the plot." ' "[T]he
scheme's completion must depend in some way on the charged
mailings. ' 2 ' The mailing may be the means by which the
fraudulent representations were conveyed 42 or by which the
236

18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994). § 1341 provides in substance:

Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud.., for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice ... places in
any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing
whatever to be sent or delivered by the postal service ... or knowingly causes
to be delivered by mail . . . any such matter or thing, shall be fined . . . or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Id.
237 United States v. Hickok, 77 F.3d 992, 1003-04 (7th Cir. 1996).
238

Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954).

239

Id.

240

Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916).

241

United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1244 (3d Cir. 1995).

242

See id. (as part of a scheme to conceal excess "administrative expenses," the

defendant prepared false cost schedules that were mailed by a health care provider to a
union welfare fund); see, e.g., United States v. Alanis, 945 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the defendant submitted a false claim to an insurer for a death benefit);
Hofstetter v. Fletcher, 905 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding that as part of a fraudulent
scheme to sell tax-sheltered insurance policies, invitations to informational seminars
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proceeds of the fraud were obtained." 3 Additionally, it is sufficient
if the mailing may have allowed the fraudulent scheme to continue
either by lulling the victims

24

or by otherwise concealing the fraud

were mailed to possible buyers); United States v. Curdy, 681 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1982)
(finding that as part of a scheme to steal funds given to a political action committee,
defendant filed false affidavits with state supervisory authorities).
243 See, e.g., United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438 (1986) (holding that defendants
received partial payments of fraudulent insurance claim by mail); Pereira,347 U.S. at 1
(finding that the victim sent check to defendant through the mail); United States v.
Hickok, 77 F.3d 992 (7th Cir. 1996) (determining that the commission checks obtained
by fraud were mailed to defendant); United States v. Pepper, 51 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 1995)
(holding that the victim of fraud mailed proceeds to defendant); United States v. Silvano,
812 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that defendant committed fraud by mailing
premium and commission payments to insurer where defendant received a fifty percent
share of the profits); United States v. Dick, 744 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1984) (explaining that
the mailing of reimbursement checks from the Small Business Administration to various
construction sureties completed defendant's fraudulent scheme).
244 The Supreme Court has held that mailings after the fraud has been completed do
not establish subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395
(1974) (holding that the processing of credit card invoices after food and lodging had
been fraudulently obtained would not sustain indictment for mail fraud); Kann v. United
States, 323 U.S. 88, 94 (1944) (finding that mailing of fraudulently obtained checks from
banks that had cashed the checks to the drawee bank occurred after the scheme "had
reached fruition" and accordingly would not support the charge of mail fraud); see also
Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370 (1960) (holding that the lawful use of the mails to
collect tax revenue subsequently converted by defendants was not in furtherance of the
scheme to defraud). The Court has recognized, however, that mailings which have the
effect of lulling the victim into a false sense of security and thereby allowing the scheme
to continue are in furtherance of an unlawful scheme and therefore will provide the
jurisdictional predicate for mail fraud. See, e.g., Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705
(1988). Thus, in Schmuck, the mailing of title applications by retail auto dealers to whom
defendant had sold cars in which the odometer had been altered "was essential to the
perpetuation of Schmuck's scheme" and therefore satisfied the mailing element of the
mail fraud offense. 489 U.S. at 712. The Court explained as follows:
The success of Schmuck's venture depended upon his continued harmonious
relations with, and good reputation among, retail dealers, which in turn required
the smooth flow of cars from the dealers to their ...customers ....Schmuck's
scheme would have come to an abrupt halt if the dealers either had lost faith in
Schmuck or had not been able to resell the cars obtained from him ....Thus,
although the registration form mailings may not have contributed directly to the
duping of either the retail dealers or the customers, they were necessary to the
passage of title, which in turn was essential to the perpetuation of Schmuck's
scheme.
Id. Similarly, in Lane, 479 U.S. at 438, the Court held that mailings of a proof of loss and
explanatory memoranda by an insurance adjuster to the insurer's headquarters would
support a mail fraud prosecution arising from defendant's arson-for-insurance scheme,
despite defendants havinf previously received the proceeds of their fraudulent claim.
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Commenting on the post hoc mailings, the Court stated as follows:
Mailings occurring after receipt of the goods obtained by fraud are within the
statute if they were "designed to lull the victims into a false sense of security,
postpone their ultimate compliant to authorities, and therefore make the
apprehension of the defendants less likely than if no mailings had taken place."
479 U.S. at 451 (quoting Maze, 414 U.S. at 403). In an earlier case decided after Parr
and Kann but prior to Maze, the Court held that mailings to the victims of a fraudulent
scheme, after the victim's money had been obtained, would support jurisdiction under
the mail fraud statute when the purpose of the mailings was to lull the victims into
believing that the falsely promised services were being performed. United States v.
Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962). The Court noted in this regard as follows:
The indictment specifically alleged that the signed copies of the accepted
applications and the covering letters were mailed by the defendants to the
victims for the purpose of lulling them by assurances that the promised provided
services would be performed. We cannot hold that such a deliberate and
planned use of the United States mails by defendants engaged in a nationwide,
fraudulent scheme in pursuance of a previously formulated plan could not, if
established by evidence, be found ... to be "for the purpose of executing" a
scheme within the meaning of the mail fraud statute.
371 U.S. at 80-81. Applying this line of authority, federal mail fraud jurisdiction has
been upheld in the circuits under a variety of circumstances in which mailings were used
to lull investors into believing the defendant's scheme was legitimate business activity.
See, e.g. , United States v. Lefkowitz, 125 F.3d 608, 615 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding letters
to investors in real estate limited partnerships that construction of projects were
underway to have "furthered the scheme to defraud by falsely assuring investors their
projects were proceeding"); United States v. Slevin, 106 F.3d 1086, 1089-90 (2d Cir.
1996) (holding that reimbursements for construction bonds, which defendant falsely
claimed to have arranged, after defendant had received payment from the contractors
furthered the ongoing scheme); United States v. Stein, 37 F.3d 1407, 1409 (9th Cir.
1994) (finding that the mailing of an SEC consent order which was based on false
representations by defendant to defendant's securities customers "falsely assured them
that repayment would be forthcoming, making them less likely to press either the
government for continued investigation or Stein for immediate repayment"); United
States v. Hubbard, 96 F.3d 1223, 1228-29 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the mailing of
title documents to the victim of an odometer modification scheme allowed the scheme to
continue even though defendant had received the proceeds); United States v. Ashman,
979 F.2d 469, 482 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that the mailing of account statements and
transaction confirmations to commodity trading customers "furthered the scheme by
lulling customers into believing that nothing was wrong with the execution of their
orders"). Similar mailings were also found to support mail fraud jurisdiction in United
States v. Biesiadecki, 933 F.2d 539, 545 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding "the mailing of the
customer account statements helped to lull customers into a sense of security by
furthering the impression that FCCB was a legitimate business enterprise, and that
without such statements, customers might have closed their accounts sooner, discerned
that they were victims of fraud, and taken action against FCCB"); see also Hofstetter,
905 F.2d at 903 (deciding that filing of a false tax return on behalf of the victim of a
insurance tax shelter scheme, together with the preparation of correspondence which the
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from detection.4 5
victim mailed to the IRS which occurred after plaintiff initially agreed to purchase the
life insurance policies were in furtherance of the scheme to defraud, since the defendants
continued to dupe the plaintiff into believing that she would not be liable for federal
income taxes and thereby lulled her into a false sense of security); United States v. Otto,
742 F.2d 104, 108 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding correspondence with a participant in a Ponzi
scheme assuring him that business was going well "was an attempt to buy time in order
to avoid or at least postpone detection"); United States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23, 36 (2d
Cir. 1981) (holding checks sent to judgement creditors purporting to be the proceeds of
judgment sales were "designed to lull the debtors and creditors into believing that the
defendants had duly sold the property at auction"); United States v. Tackett, 646 F.2d
1240, 1243 (8th Cir. 1981) (finding the defendants' agreement to execute an affidavit
attesting to the existence of an option to buy property, which was false, was for the
purpose of lulling the victims and their attorney because "even if we assume that
[defendant] did not intend to get any more money from [the victims] at this point, the
letter was still mailed for the purpose of executing the fraud. [Defendant] was clearly
trying to 'buy time' to allay [the attorney's] suspicions for a while by agreeing to put his
representations in writing").
245 Mailings for the purpose of concealing the fraudulent scheme will also support
mail fraud jurisdiction, even though the mailings occur after the defendant has received
the proceeds of the fraudulent scheme. Thus, for example, in Coyle, evidence of
defendant's submission of false financial statements on behalf of a healthcare provider
(HCA) to a union welfare fund, and ultimately to the IRS, the Department of Labor, and
Pension Benefits Guaranty Corporation, supported a finding that "but for the
mailings ... HCA would have been unable to carry out its scheme either because the true
figures would have prompted an investigation by the Department of Labor... or because
the [union] [f]und's accountants or consultant would have alerted the fund to the amount
of HCA's profit ....
63 F.3d at 1245. Similarly, in United States v. Frey, 42 F.3d 795
(3d Cir. 1994), fraudulent correspondence concerning the title to a non-existent boat for
purpose of securing a federal lien was necessary "in order to either further the scheme or
to facilitate the concealment of the scheme. If the fraud had been discovered, defendant's
scheme would have come to an abrupt halt." 42 F.3d at 799; see also United States v.
Morrow, 39 F.3d 1228, 1236 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that the mailing of title documents
relating to an automobile falsely reported as stolen was intended to and did serve to
forward and shield the fraudulent scheme by seeming to corroborate the story that
[defendant] had already told the police); United States v. Young, 955 F.2d 99, 108 (1st
Cir. 1992) (finding correspondence with the Veterans' Administration purporting to
explain the investment of veteran's trust funds concealed defendant's embezzlement);
United States v. Curry, 681 F.2d at 415-16 (holding the submission of affidavits to state
regulatory authority falsely understating the amount of contributions received from
candidates served to conceal defendant's fraud from the state authorities and from the
political action committee's members). Courts have also upheld mail fraud jurisdiction
where the purpose of the mailing was to lend an air of legitimacy to the scheme and
thereby avoid detection. See, e.g., United States v Massey, 48 F.3d 1560, 1567 (10th Cir.
1995) (holding correspondence sent to participants in a fee-for-loan program explaining
why loans were delayed was to "avoid detection and exposure of the fraudulent nature of
the European Loan Program"); Ashman, 979 F.2d at 481 (finding the mailing of trade
execution confirmations and accounts statements concealed fraudulent commodity
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Further, use of the mail need not have been made by the
46
person accused. Instead, if the accused caused the use of the mail
or use of the mail was reasonably foreseeable as a result of the
accused's actions 247 or in the ordinary course of business," 8 the
trading); United States v. Kuzniar, 881 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that the
correspondence concerning discovery in support of defendant's fraudulent insurance
claim concealed the scheme.); United States v. Wormick, 709 F.2d 454, 462 (7th Cir.
1983) (finding that the defendant's rental of a car, and thus the mailings incident thereto,
"was to give a fictitious accident an air of authenticity").
246 In regard to causation, the Supreme Court stated that "[w]here one does an act
with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course of business,
or where such use can reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually intended, then he
'causes' the mails to be used." Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1954). Where
one does an act with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary
course of business, or where such use can reasonably be foreseen, even though not
actually intended, then he "causes" the mails to be used. Id.
247 Courts have found the requirement of use of the mails in furtherance of the
scheme has been found to be satisfied in circumstances where the use of the mails was
the foreseeable result of defendant's actions. See, e.g., United States v. Pemberton, 121
F.3d 1157, 1171 (8th Cir. 1997) (the filing of a state sales tax return by the seller of a
boat purchased by defendant and the mailing of title documents by the state were
foreseeable consequences of defendant's action); Hubbard,96 F.3d at 1228 (the mailing
of title documents to automobile dealers who had purchased automobiles with altered
odometer readings was a foreseeable result of defendant's scheme); Morrow, 39 F.3d at
1237 (foreseeable that an insurer would mail claim forms to an insured in response to a
false claim that the insured's automobile had been stolen and stripped); United States v.
Koen, 982 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1992) (foreseeable that an insurer would engage an
investigator and an adjuster to assess a claim for fire loss); Kuzniar, 881 F.2d at 472
(foreseeable that an insurer would require support for a claim; United States v. Draiman,
784 F.2d 248, 250-51 (7th Cir. 1986) (foreseeable that an insurer would have its lawyers
inquire into the claim). Use of the mails incident to a commercial relationship is also
foreseeable. United States v. Griffith, 17 F.3d 865, 876-77 (6th Cir. 1994) (foreseeable
result of commercial activity that a vendor would check a retailer's credit references
before shipping goods); United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1195 (2d Cir. 1991)
(foreseeable result of commercial activity that a company operating in a regulated
industry would apply for permits to engage in regulated activity).
2A8 Mailings that occur in the ordinary course of business are considered foreseeable
and are therefore deemed to have been caused by the defendant. See, e.g., Carpenter v.
United States, 484 U.S. 19, 20 (1987) (holding that publication of defendant's "Heard on
the Street" column in the Wall Street Journal satisfied mailing requirement); Slevin, 106
F.3d at 1088 (upholding mail fraud charges based on reimbursement of construction
bond premiums by contract obligees to contractors in accordance with industry practice).
Thus, the use of the mails by a state's department of motor vehicles to convey title to a
purchaser of an automobile would be foreseeable because such mailings routinely occur
in the ordinary course of business. See, e.g., Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 705; Hubbard,96
F.3d at 1228. The use of the mails to facilitate inter-bank check clearing is also
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mailing element of the offense will be deemed to have been met,

even if °the mailing were by the victim24 9 or an uninvolved third
21
party.
In this connection, if the scheme involves multiple
participants, conspiracy principles are applied. Thus, one
participant in the scheme will be responsible for the use of the
mail by other participants."'
By analogy to federal mail fraud jurisdiction, use of the U.S.
mail by a foreign national, or one acting on behalf of the foreign
national, will give rise to U.S. jurisdiction so long as the mailing
was in furtherance of a violation. The violation does not have to
result from the mailing, however. Instead, what appears to be
required is that the mailing be incidental to an essential part of the
foreseeable. See, e.g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1954); Kann, 323 U.S. at
93. In addition, a bank's use of the mails to convey account statements and checks is
foreseeable. See, e.g., United States v. Reed, 47 F.3d 291 (8th Cir. 1995); United States
v. Freitag, 768 F.2d 240, 243 (8th Cir. 1985).
249 See, e.g., United States v. Hickok, 77 F.3d 992 (7th Cir. 1996) (fraudulently
procured commission from cellular telephone service provider); United States v. Alanis,
945 F.2d 1032, 1036 (8th Cir. 1991) (insurance company issued check in settlement of
fraudulent claim); United States v. Nelson, 988 F.2d at 804 (undervalued invoice
obtained from IBM by fraud); Hofstetter v. Fletcher, 905 F.2d 897, 902 (6th Cir. 1988)
(victim mailed correspondence and tax return to IRS); Otto, 742 F.2d at 109 (letter sent
to defendant by victim of insurance fraud).
250 See, e.g., Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705 (1988) (title documents sent
by state department of motor vehicles); Carpenter,484 U.S. at 19 (column published in
newspaper); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438 (1986) (correspondence between
adjuster and insurer); United States v. Manges, 110 F.3d 1162 (5th Cir. 1997)
(correspondence from state land authority); United States v. Slevin, 106 F.3d 1086, 1088
(2d Cir. 1996) (reimbursement of fraudulent performance bond premiums by third
party); United States v. Hubbard, 96 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1996) (mailing of title
documents by state department of transportation); Hickok, 77 F.3d at 992 (mailing of
commission checks by cellular telephone service provider); Reed, 47 F.3d at 298
(mailing of trust account statement by bank); Frey, 42 F.3d at 795 (inquiries mailed by
admiralty title analyst); Morrow, 39 F.3d at 1228 (acknowledgment by insurer of receipt
of claim); Koen, 982 F.2d at 1101 (retainer checks from insurer to investigator); Kuzniar,
881 F.2d at 466 (correspondence from insurer's lawyer); Draiman, 784 F.2d at 248
(same); Freitag,768 F.2d at 243 (checks and account statements mailed by bank).
251 See United States v. Lothian, 976 F.2d 1257, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[Jlust as
acts and statements of co-conspirators are admissible against other participants, we also
apply similar principles of vicarious liability... 'knowing participants in the scheme are
legally liable' for their co-schemers' use of the mails or wires"); accord United States v.
Dick, 744 F.2d 546, 552 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Wormick, 709 F.2d 454, 461
(7th Cir. 1983).
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scheme to violate the Act.
Furthermore, the use of the mail is not required to precede the
violation, so long as the mailing is directly related to the overall
success of the scheme. 252 Thus, use of the mail to conceal the
violation or to postpone discovery of the violation may be a
sufficient basis for FCPA jurisdiction.
It is not necessary that the foreign national personally use the
U.S. mail for any of these purposes. Rather, jurisdiction may be
predicated on a mailing by an agent of a foreign national or by a
co-participant in the FCPA violation, of which the foreign national
is unaware.253 Moreover, a mailing by a wholly uninvolved third
party, such as a bank, may provide a predicate for FCPA
jurisdiction if the mailing is in furtherance of the violation and was
reasonably foreseeable.
Accordingly, in specifying use of the mail, the FCPA appears
to contemplate a broad basis for the assertion of U.S. subject
matter jurisdiction over foreign nationals. Indeed, the use of the
mails is not the sole predicate for finding jurisdiction.
3. Use of Any Means or Instrumentalityof Interstate
Commerce
The FCPA also provides that jurisdiction can be based on the
use of "any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce" in
furtherance of a violation. 254 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
of which the FCPA is a part, establishes the same basis of
jurisdiction for actions brought under its Section 10.255 Thus,
252

See supra note 245 and accompanying text.

253 See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
254

§ 78dd-3(a).

255

Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 78j, provides as follows:

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange(a) To effect a short sale, or to use or employ any stop-loss order in
connection with the purchase or sale, of any security registered on a
national securities exchange, in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
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decisions under Section 10 may also be instructive as to the
jurisdictional reach of the FCPA.
Evidence of use of the mail is a prerequisite to establishing
federal subject matter jurisdiction under Section 10.256 However,
like the federal mail fraud statute, it is not necessary that the
violation be shown to have been effectuated through use of mails.
Instead, all that need be shown is that "the jurisdictional means are
' Thus, the use of
used in connection with a fraudulent scheme."257
mails in connection with the inter-bank clearance of checks,258 as
well as other communications in furtherance of the fraudulent
scheme, 259 are sufficient to establish federal jurisdiction under

256

registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
Id.

257 McLaury v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1090, 1095 (N.D. I11.
1988) ("It is
not necessary that the fraud be committed during and through the actual use of the
jurisdictional means; to be a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, it is sufficient if
the jurisdictional means are used in connection with the fraudulent scheme."); see also
United States v. DeVeau, 734 F.2d 1023, 1029 n.4 (5th Cir. 1984) ("In order to satisfy
section [10(b)], the fraud need only be employed in connection with the instruments of
interstate commerce."); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379 (10th Cir. 1965) ("All that
is required is that the manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance be used or
employed in connection with the use of the instruments of interstate commerce or the
mails."); Kline v. Henrie, 679 F. Supp. 464, 468 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (In order for the court
to have jurisdiction under the Securities Exchange Act, "all that need be shown is that
the mails have been used in furtherance of the alleged fraud.") (quoting United States v.
Pray, 452 F. Supp. 788, 794 (M.D. Pa. 1978)).
258 See e.g., United States v. Kunzman, 54 F.3d 1522, 1527 (10th Cir. 1995);
DeVeau, 734 F.2d at 1029 n.4; McLaury, 691 F. Supp at 1095; Starck v. Dewane, 364 F.
Supp. 466, 467 (N.D. Ill. 1973). Indeed, courts have suggested that the check clearance
system itself should be considered an instrumentality of interstate commerce. McLaury,
691 F. Supp. at 1095.

The system of clearing checks ... is highly automated and integrated into the
national banking system. Because our telephone system as a whole is integrated
and an integral part of interstate commerce, courts consistently have held that
even intrastate phone calls suffice to establish jurisdiction. For those same
reasons, use of our system for clearing checks also should be considered use of
an "instrumentality of interstate commerce" for purposes of Section 10(b).
Id.
259 See, e.g., Stevens, 343 F.2d at 379 (mails used to introduce the victim to the
scheme's perpetrators); Marks v. CDW Computer Ctrs., Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1302, 1312
(N.D. I11.
1995) (letter sent to plaintiff notifying him of his termination from employment
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Section 10. Indeed, so long as the instrumentality used was "an
integral part of an interstate system," intrastate use of mail or other
instrumentalities will satisfy the jurisdictional requirement.26 °
Use of the means of interstate telecommunications is also a
jurisdictional predicate for actions under Section 10 of the
Securities Exchange Act and under the federal wire fraud statute. 26 '
With regard to wire fraud, the principles governing the sufficiency
of the nexus with interstate commerce in cases of mail fraud apply
equally to establish subject matter jurisdiction.262
In like fashion, the means of interstate telecommunication are
also instrumentalities of interstate commerce, the use of which in
furtherance of an unlawful scheme will give rise to federal subject
matter jurisdiction over actions brought under Section 10. Like
federal mail fraud, Section 10b jurisdiction does not require that
the deception be effected directly through the telecommunication,
so long as the telecommunication is made in connection with the
fraudulent scheme.263 Also like the mail, the interstate
"set in action the defendants' right to exercise their option to repurchase CDW shares" at
an artificially, and fraudulently low price); Kline, 679 F. Supp. at 468 (finding that the
defendant mailed a letter to plaintiff describing the interest her investment could yield, a
prospectus of the fund in which she had invested, as well as, account statements and a
quarterly report); Harrison v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 435 F. Supp.
281, 284-85 (finding that a communication was sent from the defendant, either by mail
or by telephone, arranging meetings to complete the sale of securities).
260 As stated in Kunzman: "[A]s long as the instrumentality used is itself an intregral
part of an interstate system, Congress may regulate intrastate activities involving the use
of the instrumentality under the federal securities law." 54 F.3d at 1527; accord
Harrison,435 F. Supp. at 284-85.
261 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994) provides as follows:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by
means of wire, radio or television communication in interstate or foreign
commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of
executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both.
262 See United States v. Allen, 76 F.3d 1348, 1362 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Frey, 42 F.3d 795, 797 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Bentz, 21 F.3d 37, 40 (3d Cir.
1994); United States v. Bruno, 809 F.2d 1097, 1104 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Puckett, 692 F.2d 663, 669 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Giovengo, 637 F.2d 941,
944 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Tarnopol, 561 F.2d 466, 475 (3d Cir. 1977); United
States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895, 903 (8th Cir. 1975).
263 Thus, as explained in Gower v. Cohn, 643 F.2d 1146, 1152 (5th Cir, 1981):
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telecommunication network is considered to be an integrated
system, and accordingly, evidence of solely intrastate
communication will support federal jurisdiction.26"
Additionally, federal jurisdiction does not require the
defendant to engage in the telecommunication personally. Thus,
where there is more than one perpetrator of the scheme, each
participant will be held responsible for the telecommunications of
the other participants, and, therefore, jurisdiction will lie against a
defendant even though the defendant did not use the means of
interstate communication.26 Similarly, when a defendant causes a
[Tihe securities laws do not require that the deception occur in the use of
facilities [of] interstate commerce. The telephone call must only be made in
connection with a fraudulent scheme. Although a use of interstate commerce
facilities totally unrelated to the defendant and the transaction would not
support jurisdiction, the "subsequent use of interstate facilities in furthering the
scheme is sufficient to establish federal jurisdiction.
264 See, e.g., United States v. Kunzman, 54 F.3d 1522, 1527 (10th Cir. 1995);
Dupuy v. Dupuy, 511 F.2d 641,643-44 (5th Cir. 1975) ("[W]e align ourselves with the
great majority of courts which have considered this issue, and hold that intrastate use of
the telephone may confer federal jurisdiction over a private action alleging violation of §
10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule lOb-5."); Kerbs v. Fall River
Industries, Inc., 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974):
Both intrastate and interstate telephone communications are part of an aggregate
telephonic system as a whole and as long as the instrumentality itself is an
integral part of an interstate system, Congress has the power, when necessary
for the protection of interstate commerce, to include intrastate activities within
regulatory control. Accordingly, we hold that proof of intrastate telephonic
messages in connection with the employment of deceptive devices or
contrivances is sufficient to confer jurisdiction in a 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 action.
Id. at 738; Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 728 (8th Cir. 1967):
[W]e recognize that the telephone system and its voice transmission by wire is
an integrated system of both intrastate and interstate commerce. As such, proof
of the interstate telephonic message is not a prerequisite to jurisdiction over a
Section 10b action. As long as the instrumentality itself is an integral part of an
interstate system, nothing in the Constitution requires Congress to exclude
intrastate activities from its regulatory control.
Id.; see also Gower, 643 F.2d at 1151 ("The defendant, without question, placed an
intrastate telephone call that was received by his mother, and he admits that an intrastate
call can suffice.").
265 See, e.g., Kerbs, 502 F.2d at 737-38.
It is evident that throughout the course of their dealings with plaintiff, and in the
implementation of their scheme to defraud him, [defendants] acted for and on
behalf of each other, with a common purpose and with a common goal; each
played his respective role in the overall plan to induce plaintiff to enter into the
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third party to engage in the wire communication or when such a
for
telecommunication is reasonably foreseeable, the requirements
266
federal subject matter jurisdiction will have been met.
Thus, federal jurisdiction does not require the direct use of the
means of interstate communication in the accomplishment of the
fraud. Indeed, wire communications used simply to arrange a
meeting at which fraudulent representations were made have been
held sufficient to give rise to federal jurisdiction under Section 10b
of the Securities Exchange Act.267
Moreover, other means of interstate commerce, unrelated to
communication, have served as the basis of federal jurisdiction
under Section 10b. For example, interstate travel by air 6 ' and by
transaction herein involved. The fact is that a meeting at which defendants acted
in violation of § 10 and Rule lOb-5 was arranged by the telephonic
communication of one acting in concert and in conspiracy with them, and in
furtherance of their common unlawful scheme. The establishment of these facts,
we believe, is clearly enough to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the
statute and the rule that the proscribed deceptive device or contrivance used by
defendants be employed in connection with the use of an instrumentality of
interstate commerce; and we so hold.
Id. The same rule is applied in multi-party schemes prosecuted under the federal wire
fraud statute. Puckett, 692 F.2d at 669:
It is not necessary that the scheme contemplate the use of the wires as an
essential element of the transaction so long as the transmission is incident to the
accomplishment of an essential part of the scheme. Nor must the defendant
personally have made the offending communications if he participated in
devising the scheme to defraud in which use of interstate wires foreseeably
would follow.
United States v. Muni, 668 F.2d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 1981) ("[W]here an interstate
communication is made either by the defendant or by some other person for whose acts
the defendant is liable either as a coconspirator or an aider and abettor, the issue of
responsibility for causing the communication does not arise.").
266 See United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 585 n.8 ("Defendants need not personally
use the wires as long as such use was a reasonably foreseeable part of the scheme in
which they participated."); Muni, 668 F.2d at 89 ("While Muni did not personally make
an interstate communication, he caused such a communication to be made.").
267 Kerbs, 502 F.2d at 737; Becher v. Farkas, 717 F. Supp. 1327, 1330 (N.D. Ill.
1989); McLaury v. Duff& Phelps, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1090, 1095 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Miller
v. Affiliated Fin. Corp., 600 F. Supp. 987, 992 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Harrison v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 435 F. Supp. 281, 284 (W.D. Mich. 1977); Starck v.
Dewane, 364 F. Supp. 466, 467 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Nemitz v. Cunny, 221 F. Supp. 571,
573 (N.D. Ill. 1963); see also Richter v. Achs, 962 F. Supp. 31, 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
268 See, e.g., Kunzman, 54 F.3d at 1527; United States v. Deveau, 734 F.2d 1023,
1025 (5th Cir. 1984).
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automobile269 have been found to be sufficient uses of the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce in Section 10b actions.
Accordingly, jurisdiction predicated on the use of the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce is extremely broad, and it
comprehends the involvement of virtually any channel of interstate
commerce, including the means of communication and travel, so
long as that channel is used in furtherance of the violation. The
connection with the violation need not be direct. Use of the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce even by persons other
than the defendant will be deemed sufficient if use of the
instrumentality was reasonably foreseeable as a result of
defendant's actions or occurred in the ordinary course. Finally, use
of an instrumentality of interstate commerce to conceal the
violation will be considered to have been in furtherance of the
violation and will therefore support subject matter jurisdiction.
Thus, the mailing of a letter; the use of the telephone system,
the interbank clearing of a check, the wire transfer of funds, travel
by air, by train, or on the interstate highway system by a foreign
national or caused by a foreign national; if in furtherance of a
violation, can provide a basis for jurisdiction under the amended
FCPA.
B. ExtraterritorialJurisdictionOver U.S. Nationals
The 1998 Amendments prohibit an issuer or domestic concern
from committing "any act outside the United States in furtherance
'
of a violation of the anti-bribery provisions of the Act."27
U.S.
jurisdiction over these acts will attach "irrespective of whether
such United States person makes use of the mails or any means or
instrumentality

of

interstate

commerce ....",,27
In

short,

jurisdiction based on nationality is asserted over all U.S. persons
regardless of the situs of the acts in furtherance of the violation
and regardless of whether there is a nexus to interstate commerce
within the United States.
According to commentators, the United States is among "the
least aggressive proponents" of "nationality-based criminal
269 See, e.g., Kunzman, 54 F.3d at 1527; Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 376 (10th

Cir. 1965).
270 §§ 78dd-l(g)1, -2(i)(1).
271

Id.
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jurisdiction. '27 2 Nevertheless, the sovereign's exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction over its subjects abroad is well
established under international law, which recognizes that a state
has jurisdiction to prescribe "the activities, interests, status, or
relations of its nationals outside as well as within its
territory .... 273
', This principle of jurisdiction applies equally to
individuals and entities 24 and derives increasingly from domicile
or residence rather than strict nationality. 5
Nationality-based jurisdiction is also well-established under
U.S. law.276 As the Supreme Court has succinctly stated, "[t]he
jurisdiction of the United States over its absent citizen, so far as
the binding effect of its legislation is concerned, is a jurisdiction in
personam, as he is personally bound to take
notice of the laws that
277
them.
obey
to
and
him
to
applicable
are
272 Geoffrey R. Watson, Offenders Abroad: The Case for Nationality-Based

Criminal Jurisdiction,17 YALE J. INT'L L. 41, 42 (1992).
273 RESTATEMENT, supra note 145, § 402(2); see also Philip M. Nichols, Regulating
TransnationalBribery in Times of Globalizationand Fragmentation,24 YALE J. INT'LL.
257, 290-92 (1999):
[C]riminalization of transnational bribery is permissible under the rules of
international law. The nationality principle is accepted by all as a means of
asserting criminal jurisdiction, and its use to regulate the conduct of nationals
outside the territory of the home country does not constitute an affront to the
host country.
274 RESTATEMENT, supra note 145, § 402(2) cmt. e.
275

Id.

276 As early as 1807, Chief Justice Marshall observed that "it is conceded that the

legislation of every country is territorial; that beyond its own territory, it can only affect
its own subjects or citizens." Rose v. Himley, 8 U.S. 241, 279 (1808).
277 Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932). The Court also observed
that the exercise of congressional authority over absent citizens raised no issues of
international law or of legislative power, but rather was only a question of construction.
With respect to such an exercise of authority, there is no question of
international law, but solely of the purport of the municipal law which
establishes the duties of the citizen in relation to his own government. While the
legislation of the Congress, unless the contrary intent appears, is construed to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, the question of
its application, so far as citizens of the United States in foreign countries are
concerned, is one of construction, not of legislative power.
Id. at 437 (citations omitted); see also Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
[T]he United States is not debarred by any rule of international law from
governing the conduct of its own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign
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The jurisdiction of the United States over its absent nationals
has been upheld in a variety of settings, including crimes
committed by U.S. nationals on the high seas,27 treason,279
manufacture of a controlled substance in a foreign country with
the intent to import it into the United States,28 taking sexually
explicit photographs of a minor outside the United States," ' false
claims against the United States, 82 theft of U.S. government
property,283 trade-mark infringement,"' monopoly and unfair trade
practices,"' compulsory process issued to a U.S. national
overseas, 286 application of the automatic stay in bankruptcy,8 and
the application of a state statute
providing for the survival of a
2 88
right of action and recovery.
Although historically there has been a reluctance to assert

countries when the rights of other nations or their nationals are not infringed.
With respect to such an exercise of authority there is no question of
international law, but solely of the purport of the municipal law which
establishes the duty of the citizen in relation to his own government.
Id. at 73 (citations omitted).
278 See, e.g., Skiriotes, 313 U.S. at 69 (use of diving equipment in the taking of
sponges); United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933) (murder); United States v.
Kaeracher, 720 F.2d 5, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1983) (possession of contraband); United States v.
Smith, 680 F.2d 255, 258 (lst Cir. 1982) (possession of contraband); United States v.
Perez-Herrera, 610 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1980) (possession of contraband).
279 E.g., Iva Ikulo Toguri D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951);
Bourgman v. United States, 188 F.2d 637,639 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Gillars v. United States,
182 F.2d 962, 978-79 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 929-31
(lst Cir. 1948).
280 E.g., United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 850-52 (9th Cir. 1976).
281 E.g., United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 1990).
282

E.g., United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 96-103 (1922).

283E.g., United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744, 749-51 (9th Cir. 1973).
284

E.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).

E.g., Pac. Seafarers v. Pac. Far E. Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
Branch v. FIC, 141 F.2d 31, 35 (7th Cir. 1944). But cf Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (holding that "the general and almost universal rule is that
the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the
country where the act is done.").
286 E.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1932); see also United
States v. Lansky, 496 F.2d 1063, 1067 (5th Cir. 1974).
287 E.g., In re Rimsat, Ltd., 98 F.3d 956, 961 (7th Cir. 1996).
285

288

E.g., Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Gilmore, 207 U.S. 398, 402, 405-07 (1907).
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nationality-based jurisdiction over extraterritorial criminal acts,289
there is a recognized basis under international law and United
States law to do so. For that reason, virtually any act of a United
States national in furtherance of a violation of the FCPA could
result in federal subject matter jurisdiction.
C. Reasonableness of Jurisdiction
The jurisdictional provisions of the 1998 Amendments can be
construed as conferring federal subject matter jurisdiction over a
foreign national anytime the channels of U.S. interstate commerce
are implicated in a violation, and over a U.S. national based on
acts committed anywhere in the world. Principles of international
law and United States precedent counsel, however, that this
jurisdiction only be invoked when U.S. interests are directly
involved and when the assertion of U.S. jurisdiction is a
reasonable exercise of U.S. sovereignty. 9°
When the interests and sovereignty of other nations would be
implicated by the assertion of U.S. jurisdiction, principles of
international law dictate that the exercise of prescriptive
jurisdiction be tempered by reasonableness and fairness.29'
Determinations of reasonableness require an examination of the
various national interests involved rather than an application of
rigid rules.9 2
289

See generally Watson, supra note 272.

290 RESTATEMENT,

supra note 145, pt. IV, ch. 1, subch. A, introductory note.

291 Id. § 403 cmt. a. As Professor Steven R. Salbu observed, the assertion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction carries with it both moral peril and political peril." The moral
peril consists of the dangers of intrusiveness, paternalism, imperialism, and disrespect
that arise whenever one state imposes its discretionary values upon another state. The
political peril entails the ill will, as well as the potential conflict, that can result from the
imposition of alien values." Steven R. Salbu, ExtraterritorialRestriction of Bribery: A
PrematureEvocation of the Normative Global Village, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 223, 226-27
(1999).
292 RESTATEMENT, supra note 145, § 403(2). Thus, as the Restatement notes:

International law has long recognized limitations on the authority of states to
exercise jurisdiction to prescribe in circumstances affecting the interests of other
states. In the past, the jurisdiction of a state to make its law applicable in a
transactional context was determined by formal criteria supposedly derived
from concepts of state sovereignty and power. In principle, it was accepted that
a state had jurisdiction to exercise its authority within its territory and with
respect to its nationals abroad.
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There was international hostility toward the aggressive
assertion of jurisdiction over foreign nationals for acts committed
abroad, largely due to attempts by the United States and a few
other countries to construe territorial jurisdiction and nationalitybased jurisdiction broadly.293 In recognition of the complexities of
transnational commerce, international law has tempered the
assertion of extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction with principles
of reasonableness. 94
Thus, in order to accommodate potentially conflicting national
interests, reliance on strict rules and formal criteria for the exercise
of extraterritorial jurisdiction based on territoriality and nationality
has given way to concepts of reasonableness in which the interests
of involved states and parties are weighed in the search for a
' Accordingly, as provided in
jurisdictional "center of gravity."295
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, "even when one of the bases for jurisdiction ... is present,
a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect
to a person or activity having connections with another state when
Id. pt. IV, ch. 1, subch. A, introductory note.
293 Id. pt. IV, ch. 1, subch. A, introductory note. Thus the Restatement observes that
"attempts by some states-notably the United States-to apply their law on the basis of
very broad conceptions of territoriality or nationality bred resentment and brought forth
conflicting assertions of the rules of international law." Id.
294 Id. As the Restatement explains:
Increasingly, the practice of states has reflected conceptions better adapted to
the complexities of contemporary international intercourse. State sovereignty
was to be controlled by law, and its power tempered by reason and
reasonableness. States have not in fact regulated all the foreign activities of their
nationals (or affiliates of their nationals), nor every activity that could be said to
have some effect in their territory.
Id.
295

Id. In this regard, the Restatement provides:

Territoriality and nationality remain the principle bases of jurisdiction to
prescribe, but in determining their meaning rigid concepts have been replaced
by broader criteria embracing principles of reasonableness and fairness to
accommodate overlapping or conflicting interests of states, and affected private
interests. Courts and other decision makers, learning from the approach to
comparable problems in private international law, are increasingly inclined to
consider various interests, examine contacts and links, give effect to justified
expectations, search for the "center of gravity" of a given situation, and develop
priorities.
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'
the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable."296
The reasonableness of one nation's exercise of its prescriptive
jurisdiction over the nationality of another depends on a variety of
factors. Among these factors are the degree to which the act
resulting in the violation occurred within the territory of the nation
asserting jurisdiction and the degree to which any extraterritorial
conduct produces effects within the nation asserting jurisdiction. 97

296

Id.

297

Id. § 403(2). As set forth in the Restatement, these factors are:

(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent
to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct,
and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the
activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is
designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to
the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and
the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id. These factors are to be considered particularly when "one state exercises jurisdiction
over activity in its territory and the other [state's territory] on the basis of the effect of
that activity in its territory." Id. § 403 cmt. d. Accordingly, "[w]here regulation of
transnational activity is based on its effects in the territory of the regulating state, the
principal of reasonableness calls for limiting the exercise of jurisdiction so as to
minimize conflict with the jurisdiction of other states, particularly with the state where
the act takes place." Id. § 403 reporters' note 3. The requirement of reasonableness in the
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction is not simply a matter of comity but is a rule of
international law. See id. § 403 cmt. a:
Some United States courts have applied the principle of reasonableness as a
requirement of comity, that term being understood not merely as an act of
discretion and courtesy but as reflecting a sense of obligation among states. This
section states the principal of reasonableness as a rule of international law.
Application of territorial or nationality-based jurisdiction could support assertions of
worldwide jurisdiction in denigration of the sovereignty of nations. Thus, it has been
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Two generally recognized tests of whether the assertion of U.S.
subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign nation is reasonable
emerge from this analysis: the "conduct doctrine" and the "effects

doctrine."
1. The Conduct Doctrine
In cases decided under Section 10 of the Securities Exchange
Act, the courts have striven to define the contours of the domestic
conduct necessary for subject matter jurisdiction, particularly

where the victims of the fraudulent scheme, or the perpetrators, or
observed that "[tihe realization that the effects approach could potentially lead to
worldwide jurisdiction, coupled with the fact that jurisdiction has often not been exerted
over conduct within the United States or involving United States nationals, suggests that
states, in effect, temper the power of territoriality and citizenship with other
considerations." Note, Constructing the State Extraterritorially: Jurisdictional
Discourse, the National Interest, and TransnationalNorms, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1273,
1277 (1990) (footnotes omitted). The reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction has
been viewed as implicating due process, Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470,
474-75 (9th Cir. 1995), and courts consider the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction
in a particular setting when determining whether Congress intended a law to have
extraterritorial effect. See, e.g., United States v. Javino, 960 F.2d 1137, 1142-43 (2d Cir.
1992) (concluding that the requirements of the National Firearms Act did not apply to
destructive devices manufactured outside the United States); United States v. FelixGutierrez, 940 F.2d 1200, 1204-05 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the crime of "accessory
after the fact" gave rise to extraterritorial jurisdiction to the same extent as the
underlying offense); United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 1986)
(holding that extraterritorial jurisdiction over a conspiracy to import 23 tons of marijuana
was reasonable). In this connection, Restatement § 403(1) provides that "[e]ven when
one of the bases of jurisdiction ... is present, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to
prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections with another state
when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable." RESTATEMENT, supra note 145,
at § 403 cmt. a; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 145, pt. IV, introductory note. As
Judge Learned Hand observed in United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,
443 (2d Cir. 1945), "[wle should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its
courts can catch, for conduct which has no consequences in the United States." Thus,
comment a to Restatement § 403 explains:
There is wide international consensus that the links of territoriality or
nationality, while generally necessary, are not in all instances sufficient
conditions for the exercise of such jurisdiction. Legislatures and administrative
agencies, in the United States and in other states, have generally refrained from
exercising jurisdiction where it would be unreasonable to do so, and courts have
usually interpreted general language in a statute as not intended to exercise or
authorize the exercise of jurisdiction in circumstances where application of the
statute would be unreasonable.
RESTATEMENT,

supra note 145, at § 403 cmt. a

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

[Vol. 26

both, are foreign. Congress' intent to give extraterritorial effect is
clearer in the FCPA than it is in Section 10; therefore, courts may
not face, to the same extent, the task of "fill[ing] the void" created
by a combination of congressional silence and the growth of
international
commerce since the Exchange Act was passed in
8
1934. 9929
Nevertheless particularly where transactions are predominantly
foreign, it is incumbent upon a court "to determine whether
Congress would have wished the precious resources of United
States courts and law enforcement agencies to be devoted to these
foreign transactions rather than leave the problem to foreign
countries. '299 The "conduct doctrine" is an analytical framework
that courts have developed to make this determination.
The doctrine, also referred to as the "conduct test," focuses on
acts committed within the territorial United States and seeks to
vindicate the national interest by preventing the United States
from becoming a haven for criminality.300 Thus, the conduct
298 Robinson v. TCI/US W. Communications, Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 905 (5th Cir.
1997). The Fifth Circuit explained earlier:

The jurisdictional provisions of the federal securities laws furnished no specific
indications of when American federal courts have jurisdiction over securities
law claims arising from extraterritorial transactions. When Congress drafted the
securities laws, it did not consider the issue of extraterritorial applicability,
requiring that the federal courts fill the void.
MGC, Inc. v. Great W. Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir. 1990).
299 Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
300 As was stated in IlTv. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975), "[w]e
do not think Congress intended to allow the United States to be used as a base for
manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even when these are peddled only
to foreigners." Id. at 1017. This view was also expressed in SECv. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109,
114 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977):
We are, like the lIT court, skeptical that Congress wished to preclude all SEC
suits for injunctive relief where the victim of a fraudulent scheme happens to be
foreign or where there was insubstantial impact on the United States.
Consequently, we decline to immunize, for strictly jurisdictional reasons,
defendants who unleash from this country a pervasive scheme to defraud a
foreign corporation. This would appear to be especially appropriate where the
corporation is owned by a foreign governmental subdivision of a neighboring
nation.
The court in MGC, Inc., identified three policy considerations bearing on
whether Section 10b of the Exchange Act should be given extraterritorial effect under
the conduct doctrine, where the "effects test" is found not to apply:
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doctrine bears directly on the assertion of extraterritorial
jurisdiction based upon the territorial principle. Not surprisingly,
however, courts do not fully agree on the nature of conduct
required to engender subject matter jurisdiction, particularly where
a transaction or fraudulent scheme has not had a significant effect
in the United States. °'
The decisions applying the conduct doctrine to find
extraterritorial jurisdiction describe a range of activities. The most
stringent view recognizes extraterritoriality only when the conduct
in the United States constitutes all of the elements of the offense." 2
The least stringent construction of the conduct test would sustain
extraterritorial jurisdiction if "some activity" designed to further a

Courts have focused on three policy decisions in gauging whether to accord the
anti-fraud provisions extraterritorial application. The first is the desire to avoid
creating a haven within the United States for person who would defraud foreign
investors. The second involves international reciprocity with courts giving to
innocent foreign investors lured into allegedly fraudulent schemes by acts
occurring in this country, at least in part, the benefits of our securities laws, with
the expectation that their governments would reciprocate. Finally, courts have
emphasized that exercising jurisdiction may support Congress' intent, as
expressed in the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws, to "elevate the
standard of conduct" in securities transactions.
896 F.2d at 174.
301 Indeed, just as the United States is not to be a "haven for scoundrels," neither
should it be a harbor for the world's victims. As the Ninth Circuit observed in Butte
Mining PLC v. Smith, 76 F.3d 287, 291 (9th Cir. 1996):
We are not to be a haven for scoundrels; nor should we be a host for the world's
victims of securities fraud. Vigilant and mature as our securities laws are, they
are not to be invoked unless substantial steps in the perpetuation of the fraud
were taken here or the criminal conduct engaged in affected our securities
markets or American investors.
302 This was the construction given to the conduct test by the District of Columbia
Circuit in Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1987). There, the
court stated as follows:
[J]urisdiction
is appropriate when the fraudulent statements or
misrepresentations originate in the United States, are made with scienter and in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities, and "directly cause" the harm
to those who claim to be defrauded, even if reliance and damages occur
elsewhere. Indeed, we believe this test is only a slight recasting, if at all, of the
traditional view that jurisdiction will lie in American courts only over
proscribed acts done in this country.
Id. at 33.
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fraudulent scheme occurred within the United States.3"3 Other
courts have taken a moderate view in evaluating domestic conduct
for purposes of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Thus, some courts
require that the action in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme be
"significant with respect to its accomplishment."3 °4 Other courts,
notably the Second Circuit," ' require that the U.S. conduct be
This was the view of the Third Circuit expressed in Kasser, in which the court
opined, "[iln our view, the federal securities laws do grant jurisdiction in transnational
securities cases where at least some activity designed to further a fraudulent scheme
occurs within this country." 548 F.2d at 114.
304 This was the test applied by the Eighth Circuit in Cont'l Grain(Austl.) Pty. Ltd.
v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979). The court stated as follows:
303

[W]here the defendant's conduct in the United States was in furtherance of a
fraudulent scheme and was significant with respect to its accomplishment, and
moreover necessarily involved the use of the mails and other instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, the district court has subject matter jurisdiction."
Id. at 421. The Ninth Circuit in Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz adopted the Eighth
Circuit's formulation of the conduct test. 712 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1983) ("We
adopt the ContinentalGrain test and hold that defendant's conduct was sufficient to
establish subject mater jurisdiction. The misrepresentations that took place in this
country were 'significant with respect to the alleged violation[s],' and 'furthered the
fraudulent scheme."') (citations omitted).
305 Beginning with its decision in Schoenbaum v. FirstBrook, 405 F.2d 200, 209-10
(2d Cir. 1968), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which has been
described as the "mother court" in interpreting the federal securities laws, Blue Chip
Stamps v. ManorDrug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (Blackmun, J, dissenting), has
decided a number of cases concerning the applicability of Section 10 of the Exchange
Act to overseas transactions involving foreign nationals. In Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972), decided four years after
Schoenbaum, the Second Circuit recognized the applicability of the Exchange Act to a
transaction in the shares of a British company on the London Stock Exchange based on
conduct occurring in the United States:
Conduct within the territory alone would seem sufficient from the standpoint of
jurisdiction to prescribe a rule. It follows that when, as here, there has been
significant conduct within the territory, a statute cannot properly be held
inapplicable simply on the ground that, absent the clearest language, Congress
will not be assumed to have meant to go beyond the limits recognized by
foreign relations law.
468 F.2d at 1334. Following its decision in Leasco, the Second Circuit has decided a
series of cases applying and refining the "conduct test." E.g., Eur. & Overseas
Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d 118, 128-29 (2d Cir.
1998); Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995); Alfadda v. Fenn,
935 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir. 1991); AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. P'ship, 740 F.2d
148, 153-54 (2d Cir. 1984); Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1046 (2d
Cir. 1983); lIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 918-21 (2d Cir. 1980); Vencap, 519 F.2d at
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3 6 and that the conduct be
more than "mere preparation""

"substantial acts in furtherance of the scheme, ' 30 7 or acts that are
"material to the successful completion of the alleged [scheme], ''3 °0

or which "significantly contributed to" the success of the
°9 Also, the U.S. conduct must have "directly caused" the
scheme.
3 10
loss.

Accordingly, it is clear that jurisdictional acts, such as making
international telephone calls or sending mail into the United
States, are appropriate predicates to U.S. subject matter
jurisdiction.'
1017-18; Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975). Both the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit and
the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Seventh Circuit have adopted the Second Circuit's
formulation of the conduct test. Robinson v. TCI/US W. Communications, Inc., 117 F.3d
900, 906 (5th Cir. 1997); Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 667 (7th Cir.
1998).
306 Eur. & Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A., 147 F.3d at 129; see also Kauthar,
149 F.3d at 667; Robinson, 117 F.3d at 905; Itoba, 54 F.3d at 122; Alfadda, 935 F.2d at
478; Psimenos, 722 F.2d at 1045-46, Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1018; Bersch, 519 F.2d at 987.
307 Psimenos, 722 F.2d at 1045.
308 Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Leb.) S.A.L., 730 F.2d 1103, 1108; see also Kauthar,
149 F.3d at 666-67; Alfadda, 935 F.2d at 478; Psimenos, 722 F.2d at 1046.
309 E.g., Itoba, 54 F.3d at 122; Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993; see also Leasco, 468 F.2d at
1335.
310 Alfadda, 935 F.2d at 478 ("Under the 'conduct' test, a federal court has subject
matter jurisdiction if the defendant's conduct in the United States was more than merely
preparatory to the fraud, and particular acts or culpable failures to act within the United
States directly caused losses to foreign investors abroad."); see also Kauthar, 149 F.3d at
667. The court in Kauthar stated as follows:
We believe.., that federal courts have jurisdiction over an alleged violation of
the antifraud provisions of the securities laws when the conduct occurring in the
United States directly causes the plaintiff's alleged loss in that the conduct
forms a substantial part of the alleged fraud and is material to its success.

Id.; see also Psimenos, 722 F.2d at 1046 ("[O]nly where conduct 'within the United
States directly caused' the loss will a district court have jurisdiction over suits by
foreigners who have lost money through sales abroad."); Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993 ("We
have.., concluded that the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws ... do not
apply to losses from sales of securities to foreigners outside the United States unless acts
(or culpable failures to act) within the United States directly caused such losses.").
31 E.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp.v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1335 (2d
Cir. 1972) ("[W]e see no reason why, for purposes of jurisdiction to impose a rule,
making telephone calls and sending mail to the United States should not be deemed to
constitute conduct within it.").
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However, those acts alone should not be sufficient to establish
jurisdiction under the FCPA over an absent foreign national who
otherwise had no contact with the United States."2 Indeed, as one
court noted," the line has to be drawn somewhere if the securities
laws are not to apply in every instance where something has
happened in the United States ....
""'
The conduct doctrine should be employed as it is in cases
under Section 10 of the Exchange Act. Those cases apply the
doctrine to determine whether conduct in the United States in
furtherance of the violation is of sufficient materiality reasonably
to assert extraterritorial subject matter jurisdiction.
Thus, the use of the mail or of an instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or the commission of any other act in the United States
in furtherance of a violation would be sufficient to warrant the
assertion of subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign national
under the FCPA if: (1) the action was more than mere preparation;
(2) the action was material to the perpetration of the violation; and
(3) it could fairly be said that the action directly caused the
violation.
2. The Effects Doctrine
Unlike the conduct doctrine which focuses on conduct that
takes place within the United States in furtherance of a violation,
the effects doctrine evaluates the extraterritorial applicability of
U.S. law to foreign conduct that directly implicates U.S. interests.
312 Eur. & Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d
118, 129 (2d Cir. 1998):
Although phone calls (or any other communications into the United States)
soliciting or conveying an offer to sell securities ordinarily would be sufficient
to support jurisdiction, it would be inconsistent with the law of this circuit to
accept jurisdiction over this dispute, because the surrounding circumstances
show that no relevant interest of the United States was implicated. In other
words, a series of calls to a transient foreign national in the United States is not
enough to establish jurisdiction under the conduct test without some additional
factor tipping the scales in favor of our jurisdiction.

Id.
313 IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[Tlhe line has to be
drawn somewhere if the securities laws are not to apply in every instance where
something has happened in the United States, however large the gap between the
something and a consummated fraud and however negligible the effect in the United
States or on its citizens.").
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Under the effects doctrine, "courts have looked to whether conduct
occurring in foreign countries had caused foreseeable and
3 ' For this
substantial harm to interests in the United States.""
reason, the effects doctrine analysis has relevance in determining
the reasonableness of asserting U.S. jurisdiction over the
extraterritorial acts of foreign nationals under the "objective
territoriality" principle315 and the acts of U.S. nationals overseas
314

Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Leb.) S.A.L., 730 F.2d 1103, 1108 (7th Cir. 1984).

315With respect to the "objective territoriality" principle of jurisdiction, it has been
said that "American law has traditionally allowed the assertion of jurisdiction over
offenses when the conduct giving rise to the offense has occurred extra-territorially, as
long as the harmful effect(s) or result(s) take place within the jurisdiction's territorial
boundaries ....
" Blakesley, supra note 147, at 1123. Thus, in Strassheim v. Daly, 221
U.S. 280, (1911), Mr. Justice Holmes stated as follows:
Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing
detrimental effects within it, justify a state in punishing the cause of the harm as
if he had been present at the effect, if the state should succeed in getting him
within its power.
221 U.S. at 285. Mr. Chief Justice Taft made a similar observation in Ford v. United
States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927).
The principle that a man who outside of a country willfully puts in motion a
force to take effect in it is answerable at the place where the evil is done, is
recognized in the criminal jurisprudence of all countries. And the methods
which modem invention has furnished for the performance of criminal acts in
that manner has made this principle one of constantly growing importance and
of increasing frequency of application.

273 U.S. at 623.
The effects doctrine is rooted in the jurisprudence of the "objective territoriality
principle." A.D. NEALE & M.L. STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND NATIONAL
JURISDICrION 167 (1988) ("The mainstream view in the United States, however, is that
the 'effects doctrine' derives from the 'objective' territorial principle under which a state
may exercise jurisdiction over a crime completed or consummated in its territory but
initiated or set in train elsewhere."). Beginning with Judge Learned Hand's decision in
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), in which he stated
that "any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for
conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its boarders which the state
apprehends." Id. at 443. The courts of the United States abandoned the apparently strict
rule of territoriality applied by Justice Holmes in Am. Banana Co. v. United States, 213
U.S. 347, 356 (1909), and fashioned an effects-based analysis, applying the federal
antitrust laws to conduct outside the United States. The effects analysis is consistent with
the view expressed in the Restatement that "the link of the activity to the territory of the
regulating state, i.e., the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or
has substantial, direct and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory" is one of the factors
considered when determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 145, § 403(2)(a).
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under the nationality principle.
The effects doctrine has developed primarily in the context of
the extraterritorial application of federal antitrust laws, where it is
' Jurisdictional analysis under the
now deeply entrenched. 16
effects
doctrine generally requires that the foreign conduct have a
substantial effect on U.S. commerce." 7 The interests of foreign
nations, however, are also to be taken into consideration." 8
The effects doctrine is also an established test or jurisdiction
under federal securities laws." 9 Similar to the analysis under the
316 For example, the Supreme Court observed in HarfordFire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509
U.S. 764 (1993), that "[a]lthough the proposition was perhaps not always free from
doubt, it is well established by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that
was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United
States." Id. at 795-96 (citations omitted); see also Donald I. Baker, Antitrust and World
Trade: Tempest in an InternationalTeapot?, 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 16, 37 (1974):

Suffice it to say, however, that it is no longer the place of the act that is key.
When the act or agreement can be shown to have a direct effect on the markets
within the United States, our law should reach it-and this is especially so
where the act was clearly intended to affect our market.
317 In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.
1976), the Ninth Circuit held that extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction required: 1) that
there be an affect on, or an intent to effect, U.S. commerce; 2) that the effect be
substantial; and 3) that the exercise ofjurisdiction not offend principles of international
comity and fairness. Id. at 615. Three years later, the Third Circuit held that a
"substantial effect" on U.S. commerce was required to sustain antirust jurisdiction over
foreign acts. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1292 (3d Cir.
1979). The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994), was subsequently amended by the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 401, 96 Stat.
1233, 1246, to include the requirement that in order to invoke the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts, the alleged extraterritorial monopolistic conduct must have had "a direct,
substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect" on domestic commerce. 15 U.S.C. §
6a(l)(A).
318 As U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz stated in his 1984 address to the South
Carolina Bar Association:
The United States... will continue to maintain that it is entitled under
international law to exercise its jurisdiction over conduct outside the United
States in certain situations. We will continue to preserve the statutory authority
to do so. But we will exercise the authority with discretion and restraint,
balancing all the important interests involved, American and foreign, immediate
and long-term, economic and political.
NEALE & STEPHENS, supra note 315, at 166. The necessity of balancing of foreign
interests had also been recognized by the Ninth Circuit in Timberlane Lumber Co., 549
F.2d at 614-15; and by the Third Circuit in Mannington Mills, Inc., 595 F.2d at 1297-98.
319 An "effects test" under the federal securities laws was first articulated by the
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antitrust laws, extraterritorial jurisdiction under the federal
securities laws requires that the foreign conduct have a direct (not
general) and substantial (not theoretical) effect on persons whom
the law is intended to protect.32 °
Second Circuit in Schoenbaum v. FirstBrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), in which the
court stated that "[w]e believe that Congress intended the Exchange Act to have
extraterritorial application in order to protect domestic investors who have purchased
foreign securities on American exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market
from the effects of improper foreign transactions in American securities." Id. at 206. As
the Seventh Circuit more recently explained in Tamari, 730 F.2d at 1108, the
"underlying theory" of the effects doctrine in the context of securities and commodities
trading "is that Congress would have wished domestic markets and domestic investors to
be protected from improper foreign transactions." The effects doctrine is now a well
established test for extraterritorial jurisdiction in securities and commodities cases. Itoba
Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 1983); Consol. Gold Fields PLC v.
Minorco, S.A., 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989); Tamari, 730 F.2d at 1108; Psimenos v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983); Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 549
F.2d 133, 135-36 (9th Cir. 1977); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 989 (2d
Cir. 1975); SEC v. United Fin. Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354, 356-57 (9th Cir. 1973); Roth
v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., 405 F.2d 421, 422 (2d Cir. 1968); Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 208.
See also John D. Kelly, Let There Be Fraud Abroad: A Proposalfor a New U.S.
Jurisprudence with Regard to the ExtraterritorialApplication of the Anti-Fraud
Provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 477
(1997); Russell E. Brooks, The ExtraterritorialReach of the Securities ExchangeAct, 24
SEC. REG. L.J. 306, 310-13 (1996); Steven Boatwright, Reversing the Trend of
ExtraterritorialSubject MatterJurisdictionOver Bad Conduct UnderRule lOb-5 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 487, 504 (1988); Donald H.J.
Hermann, ExtraterritorialCriminal Jurisdiction in Securities Laws Regulation, 16
CUMB. L. Rv. 207, 213-22 (1988); Louis Loss, Extra-Territorialityin the Federal
Securities Code, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 305, 313-19 (1979); Note, American Adjudication
of TransnationalSecuritiesFraud,89 HARV. L. REv. 553, 556-63 (1976).
320 For example, in Mak v. Wocom Commodities Ltd., 112 F.3d 287 (7th Cir. 1997),
the court observed as follows:
Our courts cannot assume jurisdiction of foreign actors whose foreign
fraudulent activities might only be theorized to have had some vague and
immeasurable effect on our markets. Those foreign traders who want the
protection afforded by our investment laws must either show contact with
American exchanges or show particularized harm to our domestic markets.
Id. at 291. Similarly, in Bersch, the court rejected plaintiffs' expert testimony concerning
the generalized effects on the U.S. capital markets caused by the collapse of Investors
Overseas Services Fund as insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction. 519 F.2d at
989. The court concluded as follows:
[T]here is subject matter jurisdiction of fraudulent acts relating to securities
which are committed abroad only when these result in injury to purchasers or
sellers of those securities in whom the United States has an interest, not where
acts simply have an adverse affect on the American economy or American
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Congress has exercised its effects-based jurisdiction by
enacting a variety of criminal statutes.3"' Criminal jurisdiction over
extraterritorial acts has also been grounded in the effects
doctrine. 2
investors generally.
Id.
321 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 37 (1994) (violence at international airports); Animal
Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, Id. § 43; Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of
1989, 18 U.S.C §§ 175-78, 2516(l)(c) (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 470 (1994) (counterfeiting
outside the United States); 18 U.S.C. § 546 (1994) (smuggling goods into foreign
countries); 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-94 (1994) (espionage); 18 U.S.C. § 875 (1994) (interstate
communication of ransom demands); 18 U.S.C. § 877 (1994) (mailing threatening
communications from foreign countries); 18 U.S.C. § 878 (1994) (threats against foreign
officials); 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994) (unlicensed transportation of firearms in foreign
commerce); 18 U.S.C. § 1119 (1994) (murder of U.S. nationals in foreign countries); 18
U.S.C. § 1203 (1994) (hostage-taking outside the United States); 18 U.S.C. § 1204
(1994) (international parental kidnapping); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1651-61 (1994) (piracy); 18
U.S.C. § 1751 (1994) (assassination of the President or Presidential staff); 18 U.S.C. §
1952 (1994) (foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises); 18
U.S.C. § 1956 (1994) (money laundering); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1994) (racketeering);
18 U.S.C. §§ 2271-79 (1994); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2271-79 (1994) (destruction of vessels); 18
U.S.C. § 2312 (1994) (transportation of stolen property); Antiterrorism Act of 1990, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2331-38 (1994); 21 U.S.C. § 955 (1994); 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1994) (arms
exports and imports); 50 U.S.C. § 1702, app. § 3 (1994) (trading with the enemy).
322 The courts have often recognized the effects doctrine as justifying jurisdiction
over extraterritorial conspiracies to violate the contraband laws of the United States. E.g.,
Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 621-22 (1927); United States v. MacAllister, 160
F.3d 1304, 1307-08 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Klimavicos-Viloria, 144 F.3d
1249, 1257 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Palella, 846 F.2d 977, 980 (5th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Alomia-Riascos, 825 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Wright-Baker, 784 F.2d 161, 167-68 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Gonzales, 776 F.2d
931, 934-35 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Lozlza-Vasquez, 735 F.2d 153, 156 (5th
Cir. 1984); United States v. Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d 1076, 1087-88 (2d Cir. 1984); Mow
v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d
836, 840 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124, 1128-29 (5th Cir.
1980); United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1257 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
King, 552 F.2d 833, 850-52 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975,98083 (5th Cir. 1975); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885-86 (5th Cir. 1967).
The effects doctrine has also supported jurisdiction over extraterritorial frauds. E.g.,
United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922); Strassheim v. Daly, 221 U.S. 280,
284-85 (1911); United States v. Goldberg, 830 F.2d 459, 463-64 (3d Cir. 1987); In re
Marc Rich & Co., A.G. v. United States, 707 F.2d 663, 664 (2d Cir. 1983); United States
v. Gilboe, 684 F.2d 235, 237-38 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744,
749-50 (9th Cir. 1973); Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545, 548-49 (9th Cir. 1961).

The doctrine also applies in the following situations. See, e.g., United States v.
Woodward, 149 F.3d 46, 67 (1st Cir. 1998) (bribery); Stegemen v. United States, 425
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Courts have exercised a fair degree of flexibility in applying
the effects doctrine to find subject matter jurisdiction.3 23 However,
where U.S. interests have not been demonstrably affected, courts
have not hesitated to reject extraterritorial subject matter
jurisdiction under an effects analysis.324
F.2d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 1970) (concealment of assets); United States v. Pizzarusso, 388
F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1968) (false statements); United States v. Braverman, 376 F.2d 249,
251 (2d Cir. 1967) (forgery); United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., Ltd., 109 F.3d 1,
9 (1st Cir. 1997) (extraterritorial antitrust conspiracy); United States v. Inco Bank &
Trust Corp., 845 F.2d 919, 920 (1lth Cir. 1988) (money laundering); United States v.
Endicott, 803 F.2d 506, 514 (9th Cir. 1986) (importation of fire arms); Jones v. United
States, 137 U.S. 202, 216 (1890) (murder); United States v. Georgescu, 723 F. Supp.
912, 918 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (sexual abuse of a minor).
323 For example, in Lawrence v. SEC, 398 F.2d 276, 278 (1st Cir. 1968), the court
observed as well established the principal "[tihat the jurisdictional hook need not be
large to fish for securities law violations."
324 E.g., Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d, 659, 665 (7th Cir. 1998)
(finding that the Malaysian corporation's investment in a satellite communications
company incorporated in Nevis, with its principle place of business in Indiana did not
effect U.S. interests); Eur. & Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas
London, 147 F.3d 118, 128 (2d Cir. 1998):
If evaluated as an effect, the U.S. interest affected by this transaction is
indiscernible... the plaintiff is a Panamanian corporation; the individual who
placed the purchase orders, and who ultimately suffered any losses, is a
Canadian citizen; the securities are not traded on a U.S. exchange; and no effect
on a U.S. affiliated company is alleged by EOC. There is, thus, no U.S. entity
that Congress could have wished to protect from the machinations of swindlers.

Id.; Mak, 112 F.3d at 290 (explaining that there was no U.S. jurisdiction where investor
and broker were both located in Hong Kong and the omission resulting in the losses--the
"bucketing" of orders to trade commodity futures contracts on U.S. exchanges occurred
in Hong Kong); Butte Mining PLC v. Smith, 76 F.3d 287, 290 (9th Cir. 1996).
The sale occurred outside the United States. Neither the purchaser nor the
sellers were United States entities. The securities markets were neither used nor
affected. The fraud alleged was a fraud committed by foreign individuals on a
foreign corporation in a foreign country. [Plaintiffs] failed to allege any effect
on United States citizens or on United States securities markets ....
Id.; MGC, Inc. v. Great W. Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170, 174 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding
that no U.S. jurisdiction under effects test because defendant's stock was not traded on a
U.S. exchange and no American individual or entity invested in the foreign offering);
Cont'l Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979).
The only victim of the alleged fraud was a foreign corporation, Continental; the
securities involved are those of a foreign corporation, PacSeeds, and were never
registered or listed on a national securities exchange; and the financial loss to
Continental Grain Corp., the American corporate parent is not direct. In the
present case ...

it is questionable whether any effect in the United States was
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When a foreign national or a U.S. national overseas commits
acts in furtherance of a corrupt payment on behalf of a U.S.
company or a company subject to U.S. jurisdiction, that action
would directly and substantially affect U.S. interests sufficient to
engender federal subject matter jurisdiction under the effects
doctrine. Similarly, where overseas acts in furtherance of a corrupt
payment harms a U.S. company-that is, a corrupt payment by a
foreign competitor that has the effect of preventing a U.S.
company from obtaining or retaining business-the effect on the
U.S. company would provide at least an arguable basis for
jurisdiction over the extraterritorial acts under an effects analysis.
In contrast, however, where a U.S. company is not affected by a
corrupt transaction-either because the U.S. company was not a
participant in the corrupt payment or because the U.S. company
was not a competitor in the procurement influenced by the corrupt
payment-no substantial U.S. interests would be implicated and
the assertion of U.S. jurisdiction over the participants in the
transaction would therefore be unreasonable under international
law.
Accordingly, even though a basis exists for asserting
jurisdiction under the amended FCPA over a foreign national or
over an absent U.S. national, international law counsels
forbearance from asserting jurisdiction unless the exercise of
jurisdiction would be reasonable. 25 This, in turn, requires an
appraisal of the U.S. interests that may be affected.
When actions taken within United States territory directly and
substantially further a violation of the FCPA, the United States
may assert jurisdiction consistent with the conduct doctrine. In like
fashion, actions taken outside the United States that directly and
substantially affect U.S. interests would give rise to U.S.
jurisdiction under the effects doctrine. However, where U.S.
interests are not implicated, the assertion of subject matter
wrought by the alleged fraudulent activity of the defendant(s).
Id. at 417; liT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975) (explaining that
American investors held only a half precent of fund thus losses occurring from the
alleged fraud "is not the 'substantial' effect within the territory" to which the
Restatement referred); cf United Fin. Group, Inc., 474 F.2d at 356 ("The relative
number of American citizen shareholders vis-A-vis alien shareholders is not
determinative of whether United States courts may assert jurisdiction.").
325 See supra notes 199-210 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction would be unreasonable even though acts in furtherance
of corrupt payment were committed by a U.S. national or by a
foreign national within the territory of the United States.
Additionally, the assertion of U.S. jurisdiction is subject to the
limitation of due process. Thus, before a United States court may
adjudicate an alleged violation of the FCPA, there must be in
personam jurisdiction over the foreign national or the absent U.S.
national.
D. Due Process Considerations
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment limits the
assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction. In the first instance, an
exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction that exceeds Congress'
authority under the Commerce Clause would be invalid as
violating due process.326 In enacting the 1998 amendments to the
FCPA, however, Congress plainly intended to exercise its full
authority under the Commerce Clause, as it had in enacting the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 .327 Further, enforcement of the
FCPA against an absent defendant requires that the court have in
personam jurisdiction, which is also subject to the strictures of due
process. 328
1. In PersonamJurisdictionOver ForeignNationals
Due process requires that personal jurisdiction over an absent
defendant comport with "traditional notions of fair play and
' Thus, before a U.S. court may subject an
substantial justice."329
absent defendant to its judgment, the "constitutional touchstone" is
"whether the defendant purposefully established minimum
contacts" with "the territory of the forum."33
326 Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie Des Bauxities de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701-02
(1982); CFTC v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
327 SEC v. Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1990); Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 998 (2d Cir. 1975); Leasco Data Processing Equip. v.
Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1339 (2d Cir. 1972).
328 Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932).
329 McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957); Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
330 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewick, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985); Int'l Shoe Co. v.

State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). As the Court explained in InternationalShoe:
Due process requires ... that in order to subject a defendant to a judgement in
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What constitutes sufficient "minimum contacts" within the
territory of the forum has been extensively litigated largely in the
context of private civil litigation,33' in which courts have wrestled
with the qualitative and quantitative contacts with a specific forum
necessary for general or specific jurisdiction.33 In contrast, when
determining whether there is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction in
cases arising under federal law, it is the defendant's contacts with
the United States, rather than any one state, that are relevant to
determining whether extraterritorial in personam jurisdiction
comports with due process.333
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
326 U.S. at 316.
331 E.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of California, 480 U.S. 102
(1987) (product liability tort action); Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 462 (breach of
franchise agreement); Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408
(1984) (wrongful death tort action); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980) (product liability tort action); Kulko v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84
(1978) (action for child support); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (shareholder
derivative action); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (division of property under a
trust); Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310 (suit to recover unpaid contributions to a state
unemployment compensation fund).
332 In their seminal study on adjudicatory jurisdiction, Professors Arthur T. Von
Mehren and Donald T. Trautman distinguished between "specific jurisdiction,"
adjudicatory authority that arises from and is restricted to the controversy or the
"affiliating circumstances" upon which jurisdiction is based, and "general jurisdiction,"
adjudicatory authority that is based upon the relationship between the forum and the
person whose legal rights are to be affected by the judgment. Arthur T. Von Mehren &
Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L.
REV. 1121, 1136-37 (1966). The Supreme Court has contrasted a court's general
jurisdiction with its specific jurisdiction over a defendant, which arises when an absent
defendant purposefully directs her activities at residents of the forum and the cause of
action arises from those activities. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 472. Where the
defendant's contacts with the jurisdiction are sufficient to give rise to a court's general
jurisdiction over the defendant (for example, where a corporation conducts continuous
systematic business in the jurisdiction, as in Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342
U.S. 437, 438 (1952)), the court's in personam jurisdiction is not dependent upon.the
claim arising from or being related to the defendant's contacts with the forum. Burger
King Corp., 471 U.S. at 473 n.15; HelicopterosNacionales de Columbia, S.A., 466 U.S.
at 414-15; see generally Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction,101 HARV.
L. REV. 610 (1988).
333 In re Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 707 F.2d 663, 667 (2d Cir. 1983); Mariash v.
Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters
945 F. Supp. 609, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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In any event, in order for personal jurisdiction to lie against an
absent defendant, the defendant's conduct and connection with the
forum state must have been "such that he should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there."33' The "[absent] defendant
has acted in such a way as to have caused consequences" in the
United States.335 Thus, the conduct doctrine and the effects doctrine
are also instructive in analyzing whether in personam jurisdiction
over an absent defendant is reasonable.
It has long been settled that under the territorial principal of
jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction will lie over a foreign defendant
who commits a criminal act within the territory of the forum.336
Therefore, in personam jurisdiction over foreign nationals in
prosecutions under the amended FCPA for actions committed in
the United States would be sustainable under the conduct doctrine
and the territorial principle.
In personam jurisdiction over an absent foreign national who
caused such action to be taken in the territory is somewhat more
problematic. A requirement of strict territoriality, however, has
been relaxed in recognition of the expansion in the geographic
scope of commerce, 337 such that now, in personam jurisdiction can
extend to foreign nationals whose conduct caused a violation of
U.S. law, even though that conduct occurred outside the United
States.338 In order for jurisdiction to lie, however, the violation
334World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 ("[Tlhe foreseeability that is critical to
due process analysis is not mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum
state. Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state are
such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.").
335SEC v. Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1990); Leasco Data
Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1340 (2d Cir. 1972).
336 E.g., The Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10.
337As the Supreme Court observed in Hanson v. Denckla:

As technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between States,
the need for jurisdiction over non residents has undergone a similar increase. At
the same time, progress in communications and transportation has made the
defense of a suit in a foreign tribunal less burdensome. In response to these
changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over non residents have
evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff... to the flexible standard of
InternationalShoe Co. v. State of Washington ....
357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958) (citations omitted); see also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 202-04 (1977).
338 E.g., United States v. MacAllister, 160 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding that
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must have been a "direct foreseeable result" of the extraterritorial
conduct and the defendant must have known, or had good reason
to know, that the conduct would have that effect in the United
States."'
Canadian national conspired to purchase cocaine in the United States); United States v.
Medjuk, 156 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining that Canadian national arrested in
international waters conspired to import hashish into the United States), cert. denied,527
U.S. 1006 (1999); Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternburg, 149 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1998)
(arguing that Malaysian corporation fraudulently obtained funding from U.S.
corporation); United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., Ltd., 109 F.3d 1 (1stCir. 1997)
(explaining that Japanese paper manufacturers conspired to fix prices of thermal fax
paper in the United States); Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that
the Austrian bank is sued for participation in a Ponzi scheme); Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d at
1028 (finding that Lebanese and Panamanian investment companies enjoined from
violating securities law as a result of insider trading); Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475 (2d
Cir. 1991) (holding that foreign corporations defrauded foreign investors through
fraudulent sale of stock to U.S. corporation); United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245 (9th
Cir. 1990) (holding that foreign national arrested on high seas for conspiracy to possess
marijuana); United States v. Alomia-Riascos, 825 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that
foreign nationals possessed marijuana in international waters with intent to import into
the United States), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1013 (1988); United States v. Wright-Baker,
784 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1986) (explaining that the foreign national arrested in international
waters conspired to import marijuana); AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. P'ship, 740
F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding that the Dutch citizens engaged in fraudulent scheme in
the U.S.); Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1983) (explaining that
Malaysian national conspired to import controlled substances into the United States);
Grunenthal GmbH v. Holtz, 712 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1983) (deciding that Mexican and
Bahamian corporations made false representations in the U.S. concerning an agreement
to sell stock); United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that
Canadian citizen made false statements on an application for a U.S. visa); cf. Asahi
Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. V. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (finding that U.S.
jurisdiction over Japanese manufacturer in products liability suit was unreasonable in
light of the burdens on defendant and the relatively slight interest of the plaintiff and the
forum in California); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408
(1984) (holding that U.S. jurisdiction over Colombian corporation for wrongful death
which occurred in Peru was unreasonable because defendant's contacts with Texas were
insufficient to satisfy due process); Omeluk v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d
267 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the court had neither general nor specific jurisdiction
over Norwegian company in a personal injury action which occurred in international
waters); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding that
Canadian securities trader's contacts with the United States were insufficient to find
either specific or general jurisdiction).
339 In Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1341, the court held as follows:
At a minimum the conduct must have met the tests laid down in § 18 of the
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law, including the important
requirement that the effect "occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the
conduct outside the territory." We believe, moreover, that attaining the rather
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This assertion of both subject matter and in personam
jurisdiction over absent foreign nationals based on the domestic
effects of their extraterritorial conduct has been criticized. ' The
criticism has been in the form of diplomatic notes of concern and
protest,34 1 which have given way to the adoption of counterlegislation including secrecy laws,4 2 blocking statutes,343 and "claw

low floor of foreseeability necessary to support a find of tort liability is not
enough to support in personam jurisdiction. The person sought to be charged
must know, or have good reason to know, that his conduct will have effects in
the state seeking to assert jurisdiction over him.
Id. See also United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 945 F. Supp. 609, 623 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) ("Labbatt [a Canadian corporation] has sufficient aggregate minimum contacts
with the United States to satisfy constitutional notions of due process because Labatt's
refusal to permit limited, campaign access to its premises in Canada causes effects
[violation of a consent decree] in the United States.").
340 As the Reporter for the American Law Institute noted with regard to limitation
on the jurisdiction to prescribe, "[s]ome states, particularly the United Kingdom, have
questioned various applications of United States laws as 'exorbitant' . . . in particular,
some states have questioned the lawfulness of applying the 'effects doctrine' ... to
economic effects." RESTATEMENT, supra note 145, § 403, reporter's note 1.
Commentators have also noted the adverse international reaction to the U.S. assertion of
effects-based jurisdiction. Russell J. Weintraub, The ExtraterritorialApplicationof AntiTrust and Securities Laws: An Inquiry Into the Utility of a "Choice-of-Law" Approach,
70 TEX. L. REv. 1799, 1807 (1992) ("It is the 'effects' basis for jurisdiction to
prescribe... that creates the most problems and controversy, particularly when asserted
to apply United States antitrust or securities laws to activities abroad."); Jeffery A.
Brown, Extraterritoriality:CurrentPolicy of the United States, 12 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L.
& COM. 493, 494 (1986) ("[T]he extraterritorial application of U.S. domestic laws has
elicited ever increasing responses from the U.S. allies in the form of retaliatory action,
threats and a barrage of criticism"); David J. Gerber, Beyond Balancing: International
Law Restraints on the Reach of National Laws, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 195, 197 (1984)
("[Tihe assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the United States has created, and
continues to create, significant international conflicts. These conflicts often have
damaged U.S. foreign relations, especially with its allies, and they have even been held
responsible for weakening the western alliance.").
341 Brown, supra note 340, at 503-04. A U.S. antitrust enforcement official was
quoted as having remarked that "there have been five diplomatic protests of U.S.
antitrust cases for every instance of express diplomatic support, and three blocking
statutes for every cooperation agreement." Joseph P. Griffin, Possible Resolutions of
InternationalDisputes Over Enforcement of U.S. Antitrust Laws, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L.
279, 281-82 (1983). Some of these expressions have been less than diplomatic. Brown,
supra note 340, at 504-05 (noting that in response to U.S. pipeline controls, the
government of Italy suggested that the national airline might not be able to complete the
purchase of thirty DC-9 jets until the pipeline sanctions were lifted).
342 See Brown, supra note 340, at 506-07; Griffin, supra note 341, at 280-81.
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back" acts."'
Nevertheless, the amended FCPA appears to contemplate this
effects-based jurisdiction over foreign nationals as well. As the
legislative history makes clear, jurisdiction over acts in
furtherance of a violation committed by a foreign national in the
United States is not limited just to the foreign national who
commits the act; instead, both the Senate and the House committee
reports stated that "established principles" of vicarious liability
would apply to "foreign businesses for acts taken on their
' Whether viewed as being based on agency principles or
behalf."345
on the effects doctrine, this enlargement of jurisdiction over absent
foreign nationals is dramatic.
For almost a century the law has held a corporation vicariously
responsible for crimes committed by its directors, officers,
employees, and agents if those criminal acts were committed
within the scope of employment and were intended, at least to
some degree, to benefit the corporation.4 6 Under this rule of
343 Brown, supra note 340 at 508-09; Gerber, supra note 340, at 188-89; Griffin,
supra note 341, at 280-81.
344 Griffin, supra note 341, at 280-81. As an example of a "claw back" act, Griffin
cites the provision of the Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980 which created a
cause of action for British nationals to recover damages awarded to a plaintiff by a
foreign court "as exceeds the part attributable to compensation," which in the case of an
award under the Sherman Act would be two thirds of the judgement. Id.
341 Both SENATE REPORT 277 and HOUSE REPORT 802 provided:

The new offense complies with [the OECD convention's territorial jurisdiction
provision] by providing for criminal jurisdiction in this country over bribery by
foreign nationals of foreign officials when the foreign national takes some act in
furtherance of the bribery within the territory of the United States. It is expected
that the established principles of liability, including principles of vicarious
liability, that apply under the current version of the FCPA shall apply to the
liability of foreign businesses for acts taken on their behalf by their officers,
directors, employees, agents or stockholders in the territory of the United States,
regardless of the nationality of the officer, director, employee, agent, or
stockholder.
S. REP. No. 105-277, at 5-6; H.R. REP. No. 105-802, at 19.
346 As Professor William S. Laufer has observed, "[flor nearly a century, during
many shifts of liability risk, courts and legislatures have embraced enforcement
strategies, both implicit and explicit, but only one liability rule: vicarious liability."
William S. Laufer, CorporateLiability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradoxof Compliance,
52 VAND. L. REv. 1343, 1357 (1999). Thus, in N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v.
United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909), the Supreme Court held that the railroad was liable
for violating the Elkins Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 41-43 (1976), repealed in Pub. L. 95-473, 92
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vicarious liability, the criminal intent of those acting on behalf of
the corporation will be imputed to the corporation,7' as will the
Stat. 1466, 1467-70 (1978), as a result of the payment of illegal rebates by one of the
railroad's employees. In reaching this decision, the Court borrowed respondeat superior
principles from tort law and concluded that the employee's criminal intent should be
imputed to the railroad. As the Court explained:
We see no valid objection in law and every reason in public policy, why the
corporation, which profits by the transaction, and can only act through its agents
and officers, shall be held punishable by fine because of the knowledge and
intent of its agents to whom it has entrusted authority to act in the subject matter
• . . and whose knowledge and purposes may well be attributed to the
corporation for which the agents act.
212 U.S. at 495. See generally Cynthea E. Carrasco & Michael K. Dupee, Corporate
Criminal Liability, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 445 (1999). The principle of corporate
vicarious criminal liability has been criticized. See, e.g., Shayne Kennedy, Probationand
the Failureto Optimally Deter CorporationMisconduct, 71 S.CAL. L. REv. 1075, 108891 (1998); Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319
(1996); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1477 (1996); John T. Byam, The Economic Inefficiency of Corporate
Criminal Liability, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 582 (1982). This is especially
because vicarious criminal liability represents a departure from the "basic premise of
criminal jurisprudence that guilt requires personal fault." Samuel R. Miller, Corporate
CriminalLiability: A PrincipleExtended to its Limits, 38 FED. B.J. 49, 49 n.3 (1979);
William S. Laufer, CorporateBodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 648, 663 (1994);
Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal
Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1572
(1990); Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate CriminalLaw: Deterrence,Retribution,
Fault and Sanctions, 56 S.CAL. L. REv. 1141, 1183 (1983); Note, Criminal Liability of
Corporationsfor Acts of theirAgents, 60 HARV.L. REv. 283, 285 (1946). Nevertheless,
decisions since New York Central have been almost uniformly to the effect that the
criminal acts of an employee or agent within the scope of employment, for the benefit of
the corporation, will result in criminal liability on the part of the corporate employer.
See, e.g., Joseph S. Hall, Corporate Criminal Liability, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 549
(1998); H. Lowell Brown, Vicarious Criminal Liability of Corporationsfor the Acts of
their Officers, Employees and Agents, 41 Loy. L. REv. 279 (1995); Pamela H. Bucy,
Corporate Ethos: A Standardfor Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L.
REv. 1095 (1991); Michael E. Tigar, It Does the Crime But Not the Time: Corporate
CriminalLiability in FederalLaw, 17 AM. J. CRIM. L. 211 (1990); Kathleen F. Brickey,
CorporateCriminalAccountability: A BriefHistory and Observation,60 WASH. U. L.Q.
393 (1982); Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation,19 U. PITT.L. REv.
21(1957).
347The Supreme Court made this clear in United States v. Union Supply Co., 215
U.S. 50 (1909), upholding the conviction of a corporation for willful failure to maintain
the books and records required of wholesale dealers of oleo margarine. Writing for the
Court, Justice Holmes remarked that "it is impossible to believe that corporations were
intentionally excluded [from the requirements of the statute]. They are as much within
the mischief aimed at as a private person, as capable of a 'willful' breach of the law."
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215 U.S. at 54-55. Consistent with this view, Judge Learned Hand later observed in
Nearing v. United States, 252 F. 223, 231 (S.D.N.Y 1918), "there is no distinction in
essence between the civil and criminal liability of corporations based upon the element
of intent or wrongful purpose. Each is merely an imputation to the corporation of the
mental condition of its agents." Similar observations were made in United States v.
Ingredient Tech. Corp., 698 F.2d 88, 99 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[W]hile a corporation has no
independent state of mind, the acts of individuals on its behalf may be properly
chargeable to it."), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1311 (1983), and in United States v. Inv.
Enter., Inc., 10 F.3d 263, 266 (5th Cir. 1993):
a corporation is criminally liable for the unlawful acts of its agents, provided
that the conduct is within the scope of the agent's authority, whether actual or
apparent. Thus, while Great Western cannot possess the requisite intent to
conspire or aid and abet, Michael Warren-its president and undisputedly
authorized agent at all times-can. His unlawful acts are the basis for Great
Western's criminal liability.
Thus, in a prosecution for willfully and knowingly making false claims for government
subsidies, the court explained:
[The corporate employee] here acted not as an individual, but in the role of
president and representative of the corporation within the scope of his capacity
both actual and apparent. His illegal activities were carried on as an incident to
the carrying on of the corporation's business and were made possible only
through the corporate authority with which he was clothed .... His guilty intent
is imputable to the corporation for the purpose of proving guilt of the
corporation.
United States v. Empire Packing Co., 174 F.2d 16, 20 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337
U.S. 959 (1949). The imputation of "intent" to an otherwise mindless and soul-less legal
creature, the corporation, has been criticized by scholars and commentators. As Professor
Pamela Bucy has observed, "traditionally, the criminal law has been reserved for
intentional violations of the law. Yet our prosecutions of corporations have been marked
by floundering efforts to identify the intent of intangible, fictional entities." Bucy, supra
note 346, at 1097; see also V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault a Faulty
Notion?: The Case of CorporateMens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REv. 355, 359 (1999) ("[E]ven
though mens rea standards for individuals may prove desirable for many reasons,
corporate mens rea standards are generally undesirable."); Ann Foerschler, Corporate
Criminal Intent: Toward a Better Understandingof CorporateMisconduct, 78 CAL. L.
REv. 1287, 1296-97 (1990):
[T]he idea of "intent," a troublesome concept at best, is even more formidable
when applied to corporate criminal prosecutions. A number of courts have
concluded that the criminal conduct of officers and employees could be imputed
to the corporation because they were the "hands" of the corporation. But courts
have had a much harder time deciding if there was a "mind" in a corporation,
and if so, who could possibly represent this mind in the context of forming
criminal intent.
Id.; Developments in the Law, CorporateCrime: Regulating Behavior Through Criminal
Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1227, 1241 (1979):
[T]here is no single, broadly accepted theory of corporate blameworthiness
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collective knowledge of the corporation's employees or agents." 8
which justifies the imposition of criminal penalties on corporations. For an
individual defendant, the mental state with which he committed the illegal act
determines his moral culpability. But mental state has no meaning when applied
to a corporate defendant, since an organization possesses no mental state.
Id.; Note, Criminal Liability of Corporationsfor Acts of Their Agents, supra note 346, at
284 ("[I]nstead of regarding the problem as one of vicarious liability, however, the
courts have stumbled over the theoretical difficulties of ascribing criminal intent to a
corporation."). This has led Professor Gerhard Mueller to observe that:
Many weeds have grown on the acre of jurisprudence which has been allotted to
the criminal law. Among these weeds is a hybrid of vicarious liability, absolute
liability, an inkling of mens rea-though a rather degenerated mens rea-a few
genes from tort law and a few from the law of business associations. This weed
is called corporate criminal liability ... nobody bred it, nobody cultivated it,
nobody planted it, it just grew.
Mueller, supra note 346, at 21. Despite the flaws and criticism of corporate "willfulness"
and "intent," courts have not hesitated to impute the mental state of employees and
agents to the corporation in order to find willful and knowing violations of law. E.g.,
United States v. Shortt Accounting Corp., 785 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1986) (attributing to
the corporation the chief operating officer's willful intent in providing false information
to a tax preparer), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1007 (1986); Boise Dodge, Inc. v. United
States, 406 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1969) (convicting corporation of willful violation of the
Automobile Information Disclosure Act by removing labeling); United States v. Knox
Coal Co., 347 F.2d 33 (3d Cir. 1965) (affirming conviction of corporation that willfully
attempting to evade federal taxes based on actions by the president and the treasurer),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 904 (1965); Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 330 F.2d 719
(5th Cir. 1963) (finding that corporation knowingly and willfully failed to require drivers
to maintain logs required by the Motor Carrier Safety Regulations); United States v.
Carter, 311 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1963) (holding that a corporation knowingly and willfully
violated the Taft-Hartley Act), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 915 (1963); Inland Freight Lines v.
United States, 141 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1951) (finding that corporation knowingly and
willfully maintained false drivers' logs); United States v. John Kelso Co., 86 F. 304, 306
(N.D. Cal. 1898) (determining that corporation intentionally violated limits on hours of
labor). Thus, it has been observed that:
Under New York Central's respondeat superior approach to corporate crime,
both the criminal act and the required state of mind are imputed from the agent
to the corporation. Since this method of imposing criminal liability dispenses
with the need to demonstrate the criminal intent of the corporation qua
corporation, it divorces criminal liability from culpability. Despite the serious
questions that have been raised about the conceptual basis of corporate liability
under federal law, to date neither Congress nor the federal courts have
overridden the rule of respondeat superior.
SARAH N. WELLING ET AL.,

1 FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND RELATED ACTIONS 145-46

(1998).
A corporation can be held liable for a knowing violation of law based on the
knowledge of its employees. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 964 F.
348
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Supp. 486, 491 n. 10 (D.D.C. 1997) (holding that knowledge obtained by corporate agent
acting within the scope of his employment is imputed to the corporation). As was
observed in Steere Tank Lines, 330 F.2d at 723 n.3, "knowledge affecting the
corporation, which has been gained by any officer, agent or employee thereof in the
course of his work for the company is attributed to the corporation, and this includes
subordinate employees ... "Thus, in United States v. Bank of New Eng., 821 F.2d 844
(1st Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987), the bank was convicted of multiple
counts of violating the Currency Reporting Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5322 (1982),
resulting from the failure to report cash withdrawals by one of its customers effected by
means of the presentation of a series of checks, each less than the reportable amount of
$10,000, to a single teller. Rejecting the bank's argument that no part of the bank had
complete knowledge of the transactions, the court stated:
Corporations compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the elements of specific
duties and operations into smaller components. The aggregate of those
components constitutes the corporation's knowledge of a particular operation. It
is irrelevant whether employees administering one component of an operation
know the specific activities of employees administering another aspect of the
operation ....
821 F.2d at 856. This concept of "collective knowledge" has been applied in a variety of
other cases. United States v. LBS Bank-N.Y., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 496, 501 n.7 (E.D. Pa.
1990) ("[K]nowledge possessed by employees is aggregated so that a corporate
defendant is considered to have acquired the collective knowledge of its employees.");
United States v. Miller, 676 F.2d 359, 362 (9th Cir. 1982) (imputing to lender its
employees' knowledge of a fraudulent real estate financing scheme); Apex Oil Co. v.
United States, 530 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that employee's knowledge of oil
spill was attributed to corporation); United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp.
730, 738 (W.D. Va. 1974):
[A] corporation can only act through its employees and, consequently, the acts
of its employees, within the scope of their employment, constitute acts of the
corporation. Likewise, knowledge acquired by employees within the scope of
their employment is imputed to the corporation. In consequence, a corporation
cannot plead innocence by asserting that the information obtained by several
employees was not acquired by any one individual employee who then would
have comprehended its full import. Rather, the corporation is considered to have
acquired the collective knowledge of its employees and is held responsible for
their failure to act accordingly.
Id.; United States v. Sawyer Transp., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 29 (D. Minn. 1971), aff'd, 463
F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1972) (finding collective knowledge of falsified motor carrier logs);
Inland Freight Lines, 191 F.2d at 313 ("One agent or representative had knowledge of
the material contents of the logs and another had knowledge of the material contents of
the reports. The knowledge of both agents or representatives was attributed to the
company."); see generally Thomas A. Hagemann & Joseph Grinstein, The Mythology of
Aggregate Corporate Knowledge: A Deconstruction, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 210
(1997); Martin J. Weinstein & Patricia Bennett Ball, Criminal Law's Greatest Mystery
Thriller: Corporate Guilt Through Collective Knowledge, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 65
(1994). Professor Brickey points out that as a result of collective knowledge, a
corporation may be held criminally liable in circumstances in which no individual
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The corporation's vicarious liability is not restricted to the
3 49
criminal actions of its directors, officers or "control group.
Instead, vicarious criminal liability may result from the acts of
mid-level 35" and lower level 5t employees.
employee could be convicted. Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Liability; A
Primerfor CorporateCounsel, 40 Bus. LAw. 129, 133 (1984). However, the knowledge
must have been gained by the employee within the scope of employment and not merely
because the agent was employed by the corporation or was on the corporation's
premises. United States v. Route 2, Box 472, 60 F.3d 1523, 1527 (1st Cir. 1995)
("[K]nowledge of an illegal activity may be attributed to a corporation only when the
knowledge was obtained by an agent acting within the scope of his or her employment
and for the benefit of the corporation.").
349 It is common that the acts of senior management will subject their corporate
employers to criminal liability. Sun-Diamond Growers, 964 F. Supp. at 491 (holding that
the second highest ranking officer arranged for corporate funds to be illegally
contributed to retire the debt of a congressional campaign); Inv. Enter., 10 F.3d at 263
(explaining attribution to the company of its president's participation in conspiracy to
ship obscene material); Shortt, 785 F.2d at 1448, (deciding that the chief operating
officer of accounting firm provided false information to a tax preparer on behalf of a
client resulting in the making of a false tax return); United States v. Richmond, 700 F.2d
1183 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that the officers and management of family owned
construction company made false statements regarding time charged to federally funded
construction projects); Ingredient Tech. Corp., 698 F.2d at 88 (explaining that president
overstated value of inventory resulting in tax fraud), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1131 (1983);
United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1979) (vice president of currency
exchange dealer failed to report cash currency transactions); United States v. Griffin, 401
F. Supp. 1222 (S.D. Ind. 1975) (deciding that president of real estate brokerage under
contract with H.U.D. solicited bribes and kickbacks), aff'd without opinion, 541 F.2d 284
(7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Am. Radiator & Std. Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174 (3d
Cir. 1970) (finding that sales manager, who was also a member of the board of directors,
participated in price fixing with competing companies), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948
(1971); Carter,311 F.2d at 934 (arguing that president and CEO made illegal payments
in the form of "loans" to president of a labor union), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 959 (1969);
Empire Packing, 174 F.2d at 16 (holding that president of slaughter house caused false
claims for subsidies to be filed); Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 905 (4th
Cir. 1945) (finding that president of liquor distributor sold whiskey to black marketeers
in violation of price controls), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945); Mininsohn v. United
States, 101 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1939) (holding that officers of lumber company conspired
to defraud the United States by supplying underweight bags of cement).
350 The criminal acts of mid-level managers are also attributed to their corporate
employers. United States v. I11.
Cent. R.R., 303 U.S. 239 (1938) (yardmaster); N.Y.
Cent., 212 U.S. at 481 (freight manager and assistant manager); United States v. Hughes
Aircraft Co., Inc., 20 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 1994) (mid-level quality supervisor); United
States v. Jakeway, 783 F. Supp. 592 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (regional manager); United States
v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1989) (regional distribution
manager); United States v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1985)
(manager of subsidiary); United States v. Phelps Dodge Indus., Inc., 589 F. Supp. 1340

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

[Vol. 26

Like the law of agency from which the principle derives, the
vicarious criminal liability of a corporation results from the
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (product manager); United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238 (1st Cir.
1982) (treasurer and dispatcher), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 991 (1982); United States v.
Koppers Co., Inc., 652 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1981) (district sales manager), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1083 (1981); United States v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir.
1978) (state sales manager), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 903 (1978); United States v. Gibson
Prod. Co., 426 F. Supp. 768 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (department manager); United States v.
Dye Constr. Co., 510 F.2d 78 (10th Cir. 1975) (general foreman); United States v. Hilton
Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972) (hotel purchasing agent), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1125 (1973); Am. Radiator, 433 F.2d at 174 (sales manager); United States v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (branch manager); Cont'l Baking Co. v.
United States, 281 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1960) (plant manager); United States v. Milton
Marks Corp., 240 F.2d 838 (3d Cir. 1957); (general foreman); United States v. Steiner
Plastics Mfg. Co., 231 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1956) (production manager); United States v.
Van Riper, 154 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1946) (manager of gasoline station); C.I.T. Corp. v.
United States, 150 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1945) (branch manager); United States v. Wilson, 59
F.2d 97 (W.D. Wash. 1932) (district manager). In this connection, Professor John Coffee
has observed that "the locus of corporate crime is predominately at the lower to middle
management level." John C. Coffee, No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick: An
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV.
386, 397 (1981).
"I Corporations have been vicariously liable for the crimes of non-managerial
employees as well. See, e.g., Bank of New Eng., 821 F.2d at 844 (bank teller), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987); Automated Med. Labs., 770 F.2d at 399 (lab employees);
United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800 (11 th Cir. 1984) (optometrist's employees), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1217 (1985); United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570 (4th Cir.
1983) (relatively minor officials), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983); United States v.
Demauro, 581 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1978) (bank employees); Gibson Prods., 426 F. Supp, at
768 (salesman); Apex Oil, 530 F.2d at 1291 (oil facility employee); T.LM.E.-D.C., 381 F.
Supp. at 730 (dispatcher); United States v. Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc., 464 F.2d 1295
(10th Cir. 1972) (truck drivers); Tex.-Okla. Express, Inc. v. United States, 429 F.2d 100
(10th Cir. 1970) (truck stop workers); Boise Dodge, 406 F.2d at 771 (automobile dealer
employees); Uniroyal, Inc., 300 F. Supp. at 84 (salesmen); Steere Tank Lines, 330 F.2d
at 719 (truck drivers); Std. Oil Co. of Tex. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962)
(clerk); United States v. Chi. Express, Inc., 273 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1960) (truck driver);
Riss & Co., Inc. v. United States, 262 F.2d 245 (8th Cir. 1958) (clerk); United States v.
E. Brooke Matlack, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 814 (D. Md. 1957) (truck driver); St. Johnsbury
Trucking Co. v. United States, 220 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1955) (clerk); Inland Freight
Lines, 191 F.2d at 313 (truck drivers); United States v. Armour & Co., 168 F.2d 342 (3d
Cir. 1948) (salesmen); United States v. George F. Fish, Inc., 154 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1946)
(salesman), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 869 (1946); Dollar S.S. Co. v. United States, 101 F.2d
638 (9th Cir. 1939) (deck hand); Zito v. United States, 64 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1933)
(salesman); John Gund Brewing Co. v. United States, 204 F. 17 (8th Cir. 1913)
(salesman). Indeed, in at least one instance, liability resulted from the acts of an
independent contractor engaged by the corporation. See United States v. Parfait Powder
Puff Co., 163 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1948).
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authority that the corporation confers upon its employee or agent
to act on the corporation's behalf. As the Supreme Court stated in
the New York Cent. decision:
A corporation is held responsible for acts not within the agent's

corporate powers strictly construed, but which the agent has
assumed to perform for the corporation when employing the
corporate powers actually authorized, and in such cases there
need be no written authority under seal or vote of the
corporation in order to constitute the agency or to authorize the
act. 352
Thus, it has been said that, "[i]t is the function delegated to the
corporate officer or agent which determines his power to engage
the corporation in a criminal transaction. '53 This authority may be
352

N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481,493-94 (1909).

353 C.LT. Corp., 150 F.2d at 89. Judge Hand made a similar observation in United
States v. Nearing:
That the criminal liability of a corporation is to be determined by the kinship of
the act to the powers of the officials who commit it, is true enough, but neither
the doctrine of ultra vires, nor the difficulty of imputing intent or motive, should
be regarded any longer to determine the result.

252 F. 223, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1918). Indeed, it has been held that all that is required is that
the employee or agent be performing the type of act he or she is authorized to perform.
Cincotta, 689 F.2d at 241-42:
A corporation may be convicted for the criminal acts of its agents, under a
theory of respondeat superior. But criminal liability may be imposed on the
corporation only where the agent is acting within the scope of employment.
That, in turn, requires that the agent be performing acts of the kind that he is
authorized to perform.
Accord Automated Med. Labs., 770 F.2d at 407 (defining scope of employment to
include acts on the corporation's behalf "in performance of the agent's general line of
work"). In this regard, Dean Prosser has observed that "in general, the servant's conduct
is within the scope of his employment if it is of the kind he is employed to perform,
occurs of time and space, and is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the
master." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 70 at
461 (4th ed. 1971). Corporations have been held liable where there was no evidence of
corporate authorization. See United States v. Carter, 311 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 373 U.S. 915 (1963); Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1943).
Corporations are also subject to criminal liability even though the act was contrary to the
corporation's instructions. As the court in Egan stated, if an act was done within the
scope of employment, "it will be imputed to the corporation whether covered by the
agent or officer's instructions, whether contrary to his instructions, and whether lawful or
unlawful." Thus, for example, in Hilton Hotels, the corporation was held liable for an
employee's participation in an illegal boycott despite the employee's admission that he
had been instructed to make purchases "solely on the basis of price, quality and service."

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

[Vol. 26

apparent as well as actual.3"' Similarly, some courts have viewed
vicarious criminal liability as resulting from the non-performance
467 F.2d at 1004. As the court explained, "as a general rule, a corporation is liable under
the Sherman Act for the acts of its agents in the scope of their employment, even though
contrary to general corporate policy and express instructions to the agent." 467 F.2d at
1007; see also United States v. Portac, 869 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 845 (1990); Automated Med. Labs., 770 F.2d at 406; Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d at
570; CadillacOverall Supply, 568 F.2d at 1078; Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc., 464 F.2d
at 1295; Std. Oil, 307 F.2d at 120; St. Johnsbury Trucking Co., 220 F.2d at 398
(concurring opinion); Dollar S.S. Co., 101 F.2d at 638. Thus, the rule of vicarious
liability relieves the court of having to determine whether the corporation acted
reasonably in circumscribing the acts of its agent and instead, the burden of controlling
its agents, on pain of strict liability, is placed on the corporation. See Deborah A.
DeMott, OrganizationalIncentives to CareAbout the Law, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
39, 54 (1997) ("A rule of vicarious liability obviates the need for courts to make difficult
fact-specific assessments of whether the employee acted reasonably, leaving it to the
employer to determine how best to control its employees' conduct").
114 WELLING ET AL., supra note 347, at 152 ("[Tjhe federal cases hold that a
corporation may be held criminally liable not only for actions within the authority
expressly granted to a particular agent but also within that agent's apparent authority.");
Kevin B. Huff, Note, The Role of Corporate Compliance Programs in Determining
Corporate Criminal Liability: A Suggested Approach, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1252, 1258
(1996) ("In the context of vicarious criminal liability for corporations, the federal courts
have expansively interpreted the requirement that the employee be acting within the
'scope of authority.' The scope of authority includes both actual and apparent
authority."). This apparent authority is said to be "the authority which outsiders would
normally assume the agent to have, judging from his position with the company and the
circumstances surrounding his past conduct." United States v. Bi-Co Pavers, Inc., 741
F.2d 730, 737 (5th Cir. 1984); Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d at 572; Hilton Hotels, 467
F.2d at 1004; Am. Radiator, 433 F.2d at 205; Cont'l Baking Co., 281 F.2d at 151. In
essence, it is the agent's authority to act, as perceived by others, in which, impliedly at
least, the corporation has acquiesced. E.g., United States v. Tri-State Home Improvement
Co., 446 F. Supp. 14,16 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (holding that corporation had violated an FTC
cease-and-desist order as a result of representations made by salesmen: "[D]efendant's
salesmen and representatives were acting within the apparentscope of their authority
when the representations took place, [thus] liability is imposed upon the defendant.")
(emphasis in original); Am. Radiator, 433 F.2d at 204 (convicting corporation of price
fixing conspiracy on the basis of agreements made by a sales manager whom the
corporation claimed was not authorized to set prices but whom the court noted that at
least one meeting claimed "he was speaking for the company"). Thus, Professor Welling
and her colleagues have suggested that "[t]he critical inquiry is directed not at the
specific responsibilities a corporate agent may have been granted, but at whether a third
party might reasonably infer that the agent, was capable of acting on the corporation's
behalf in a particular matter." WELLING ET AL., supra note 347, at 153. It has also been
suggested that the agent's "authority" to commit a criminal act may result from the
incentives provided or the pressures imposed by the corporate employer. DeMott, supra
note 353, at 45.
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of the corporation's duty "to ensure that those conducting the
corporation's business do so lawfully.""3 '
As originally enacted in 1977, the FCPA provided for
vicarious liability for the acts of third parties.356 The 1998
Amendments made this same vicarious liability principle
applicable to foreign nationals whose employees or agents commit
acts in the United States that are in furtherance of a corrupt
payment to a foreign official. 7
This vicarious responsibility for the acts of employees and
agents not only establishes a U.S. court's subject matter
jurisdiction over a violation of the FCPA, but also serves as the
basis for personal jurisdiction over an absent foreign corporate
defendant. As the Supreme Court has explained:
Since the corporate personality is a fiction, although a fiction
intended to be acted upon as though it were fact, it is clear that
"I Armour, 168 F.2d at 344;

see also Uniroyal, Inc., 300 F. Supp. at 95:
This is not an instance of respondeat superior; it is one of the non-performance
of a non-delegable duty. A corporation has a responsibility to eliminate
unlawful practices by its salesmen and branch managers in the course of their
routine labors ...[e]ven if the extent of its business precludes the personal
supervision of high level officers who, as a result, rely upon written and oral
instructions to their subordinates to ensure that their policies will be carried out.
As one court commented:
While the primary responsibility for conducting the operations of the
corporation lay with its principal officers, it was their duty in delegating
authority to lesser agents to take effective measures to supervise and assure
performance of the affirmative duty imposed upon the corporation. Thus, the
corporation cannot avoid responsibility by merely saying that a subordinate
agent neglected his duty.
E. Brooke Matlack, Inc., 149 F. Supp. at 820. Thus, it has been said that "[t]he federal
cases imposing liability based on the actions of subordinate employees begin with the
premise that corporations must exercise care in selecting and supervising the agents to
whom they delegate authority." WELLING ET AL., supra note 347, at 149. Professor
Jennifer Arlen suggests, however, that the vicarious liability standard under current law
does not necessarily result in greater corporate self-enforcement. Jennifer Arlen, The
Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833
(1994). Professor Michael Tigar has also suggested that the expansive criminalization of
corporate conduct may have the effect of breeding contempt for the law: "Criminalizing
a broad range of otherwise marginally acceptable business conduct trivializes the
criminal sanction and breeds contempt for it, at least among rational actors, which most
white collar offenders are." Tigar, supra note 346, at 213.
356 See supra note 20.
357 § 78

dd-3(a)(3).
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unlike an individual its "presence" without, as well as within,
the state of its origin can be manifested only by activities carried
on in its behalf by those who are authorized to act for it. To say
that the corporation is so far "present" there as to satisfy due
process requirements, for purposes of taxation or the
maintenance of suits against it in the courts of the state, is to beg
the question to be decided. For the terms "present" or
"presence" are used merely to symbolize those activities of the
corporation's agent within the state which courts will deem to be
sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process.

Thus, it is the contacts of the corporation's employee or agent
with the United States that will determine whether the
requirements of due process have been met such that a court can
exercise in personam jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.359
A foreign jurisdiction may also be subject to the in personam
jurisdiction of a U.S. court as the result of the activities of a
358 Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); see also David James
Homsey, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations: The Application of a
Minimum Contacts Theory, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 429, 439-48 (1980).
359 E.g., Panavision Int'l L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998)
(registration by corporation's principal, and alter ego, of plaintiff's registered trademarks
as domain names for the corporation were sufficient forum-related activities to create
personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants in California); Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d
1445, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995) (business trips to the U.S. by officials of an Austrian bank
were not sufficient to create personal jurisdiction because the claim did not arise
therefrom, but establishment of correspondent banking relationship and the creation of
"numerous ongoing obligations to the U.S. residents" was sufficient); SEC v. Unifund
SAL, 910 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1990) (securities trading based on inside information
by foreign investment funds deliberately caused effects in the U.S. and was sufficient to
find personal jurisdiction); Retail Software Serv., Inc. v. Lashlee, 854 F.2d 18, 21-22 (2d
Cir. 1988) (sales by corporation's officers of franchises which were the subject of
litigation were sufficient to create jurisdiction under the New York long arm statute);
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 998-1000 (2d Cir. 1975) (trading in U.S.
securities on Canadian exchanges for Canadian customers was not "doing business" in
the U.S. for purposes of general jurisdiction nor were two breakfast meetings during
which a public offering was discussed sufficiently related to a harmful effect in the U.S.
to ground specific jurisdiction.); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468
F.2d 1326, 1339-43 (2d Cir. 1972) (attendance at meetings in U.S. at which false
representations were made by agents was sufficient to subject foreign corporation to in
personam jurisdiction); Consol. Gold Fields, PLC v. Anglo Am. Corp. of S. Aft. Ltd.,
698 F. Supp. 487, 493-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that, although contacts with U.S.
were not sufficient to constitute a basis for general jurisdiction, meetings with
investment bankers and lawyers in anticipation of a hostile takeover of plaintiff were
sufficient to give rise to specific personal jurisdiction for antitrust injunctive relief).
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subsidiary located in the United States. Of course, as a general
rule, a foreign parent corporation does not become subject to in
personam jurisdiction simply because its subsidiary is located in
the United States.3" However, jurisdiction may arise from the
parent-subsidiary relationship if the subsidiary is so dominated by
the parent that "they do not in reality constitute separate and
distinct corporate entities but are one and the same corporation for
purposes of jurisdiction."36 ' In essence, 362 courts will look to
160

For example, it was observed in Hargravev. FireboardCorp.:

Generally, a foreign parent corporation is not subject to the jurisdiction of a
forum state merely because its subsidiary is present or doing business there; the
mere existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship is not sufficient to warrant the
assertion of jurisdiction over the foreign parent. It has long been recognized,
however, that in some circumstances a close relationship between a parent and
its subsidiary may justify a finding that the parent does business in a jurisdiction
through the local activities of its subsidiaries.
710 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1983). The parent-subsidiary relationship alone will not
defeat the general rule of corporate separateness, even if the subsidiary is wholly-owned
by the parent corporation. United Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers of Am. v. 163
Pleasant Street Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1093 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Jon-T
Chems., Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 1985); Am. Bell, Inc. v. Fed'n of Tel. Workers
of Pa., 736 F.2d 879, 887 (3d Cir. 1984); Ohio Tank Car Co. v. Keith RV Equip. Co.,
148 F.2d 4, 6 (7th Cir. 1945), cert denied, 326 U.S. 730 (1945). The Supreme Court has
observed that "[l]imited liability is the rule, not the exception; and it is on that
assumption large undertakings are rested, vast enterprises are launched, and huge sums
of capital attracted." Anderson v. Abbot, 321 U.S. 249, 362 (1944); accord First Nat'l
City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 626 (1983);
NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 399, 403 (1960).
361

2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE,

4.25[6], at 4-273

(2d ed. 1982). As subsequently explained:
Because a parent corporation and a subsidiary are separate legal entities,
minimum contacts with the parent does not necessarily ensure personal
jurisdiction over the subsidiary nor does minimum contacts with the subsidiary
ensure personal jurisdiction over the parent. Only when the parent has sufficient
control over the subsidiary, or when the appearance of separateness is actually a
sham, may the contacts [of] one be imputed to the other.
16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 108.42[3][D] at 108-66.1
to 108-66.2 (3d ed. 1999).
362 Courts have made it clear that there is no "litmus test" for determining whether a
subsidiary is merely the "alter ego" of the parent. United Steel Workers of Am. v.
Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1499, 1506 (1
lth Cir. 1988); Alman v. Danin, 801 F.2d 1, 3
(1st Cir. 1986); Jon-T Chems., Inc., 768 F.2d at 694. Instead, courts look to the totality of
the circumstances of the parent-subsidiary relationship, an analysis that is "heavily fact
specific." United Steel Workers of Am., 855 F.2d at 1506; Jon-T Chems., Inc., 768 F.2d
at 694. Before the corporate veil separating the parent and subsidiary will be disregarded,
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whether the formalities of corporate separateness were respected,3 63
three things must be shown: (1) that the parent dominated the affairs of the subsidiary;
(2) that there was an intent to avoid contractual or statutory obligations; and (3) that
injustice would result from the continued recognition of the corporate separateness of
parent and subsidiary. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., 960 F.2d at 1093:
[A] court using the federal standard should consider 1) whether the parent and
the subsidiary ignored the independence of their separate operations, 2) whether
some fraudulent intent existed on the principal's part, and 3) whether a
substantial injustice would be visited on the proponents of veil piercing should
the court validate the corporate shield.
Accord Ministry of Def. of the Islamic Repub. of Iran v. Gould, Inc., 969 F.2d 764, 769
(9th Cir. 1992); Bumpkin v. Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 933 F.2d 449, 461 (7th Cir. 1991);
United Steel Workers of Am., 855 F.2d at 1507; Alman, 801 F.2d at 4; Contractors,
Laborers, Teamsters and Eng'r Health and Welfare Plan v. Hroch, 757 F.2d 184, 190
(8th Cir. 1985); Laborers Clean-up Contract Admin. Trust Fund v. Uriate Clean-Up
Serv., Inc., 736 F.2d 516, 524 (9th Cir. 1984); Operating Eng'r Pension Trust v. Reed,
726 F.2d 513, 515 (9th Cir. 1983); Seymour v. Hull & Moreland Eng'g, 605 F.2d 1105,
1111 (9th Cir. 1979). See generally, BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS, §
6.03 (1987); BRODSKY & ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS, §§
20.2, 20.14 (1986).
363 The respect accorded the corporate formalities is a significant indicia of the

independence of the subsidiary. Thus, courts have declined to pierce a subsidiary's
corporate veil where it has been shown that the subsidiary was governed by its own
officers and directors, maintained separate books, and records and conducted its own
financial affairs (i.e., the subsidiary was adequately capitalized, maintained separate
bank accounts and financial accounts, and paid its own taxes). Ministry of Def of the
Islamic Repub. of Iran, 969 F.2d at 769; Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 744 F. Supp. 53
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); United States v. Van Diviner, 822 F.2d 960, 965 (10th Cir. 1987)
(finding that although there was evidence that the sole shareholder "did not always
scrupulously maintain the distinction between himself and the corporation," alter ego
liability was not found, "there is no evidence he commingled the corporation's funds
with his own, distributed to himself corporate assets, misled the government or anyone,
or otherwise misused or abused the corporate form in any way that would threaten
injustice to the government"). It has been observed in this regard that "the concept of
complete domination by the parent is decisive." Phoenix Can. Oil Co., Ltd. v. Texaco,
Inc., 842 F.2d 1466, 1477 (3d Cir. 1988); accord United Steel Workers of Am., 855 F.2d
at 1507; Culbreth v. Amosa (Pty) Ltd., 898 F.2d 13, 14-15 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying New
Jersey and Pennsylvania law); Celi v. Canadian Occidental Petroleum, Ltd., 804 F. Supp.
988, 100 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (applying Missouri law); A.M. Kashfi v. Philbro-Salamon,
Inc., 628 F. Supp. 727, 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (applying New York law); see also
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 43, at 490 (1983)
(holding that the control warranting the piercing of the corporate veil is "complete
domination, not only of finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the
transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no
separate mind, will or existence of its own"); Note, Piercingthe Corporate Veil: The
Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal Common Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 853, 854 (1982)
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or whether the parent and subsidiary were, in fact, a single
enterprise.?4 In making this determination, courts have looked to a
(explaining the alter ego liability requirement):
[There must be] such unity of interest and ownership that the separate
personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist .... [This
requirement] may be satisfied by a showing of domination and control of the
corporation which occurs most often in the context of a parent-subsidiary
relationship or of a closely held corporation.
State law cases have also looked to the parent's complete domination of the subsidiary as
a basis for disregarding the corporate form. See Win. Passalaqua Builders v. Resnick
Developers S., Inc., 933 F.2d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1991) (New York law) ("Liability
therefore may be predicated either upon a showing of fraud or upon complete control by
the dominating corporation that leads to a wrong against third parties.").
[I]t is nevertheless plain that Pennsylvania, like New Jersey, does not allow
recovery unless the party seeking to pierce the corporate veil on an alter ego
theory establishes that the controlling corporation wholly ignored the separate
status of the controlled corporation and so dominated and controlled its affairs
that its separate existence was a mere sham.... In other words, both
Pennsylvania and New Jersey require a threshold showing that the controlled
corporation acted robot or puppet-like in mechanical response to the controller's
tugs on its strings or pressure on its buttons.
Culbreth, 898 F.2d at 14-15 (Pennsylvania law); Craig v. Lake Asbestos Quebec, Ltd.,
843 F.2d 145, 148 (3d Cir. 1988) (New Jersey law) ("Under New Jersey law the
corporate veil of a parent corporation may not be pierced unless the parent so dominated
the subsidiary that it had no separate existence but was merely a conduit for the
parent."); Quarles v. Fugua Indus., Inc., 504 F.2d 1358, 1364 (10th Cir. 1974) (Kansas
law) (denying the "domination of the day-to-day business decisions").
364 E.g., Deena Artware, 361 U.S. at 402-04; Laborers Clean-Up Contract Admin.
Trust Fund,736 F.2d at 523; Casanova Guns, Inc. v. Connally, 454 F.2d 1320, 1323 (7th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972); Local 397, Int'l Union of Elec., Elec.,
Salaried Mach. & Furniture Workers v. Midwest Fasteners, 779 F. Supp. 788 (D.N.J.
1992); United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 24 (D. R.I. 1989), aff'd, 910
F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990), cert denied, 498 U.S. 1084 (1991); United States v. JohnsManville Corp., 231 F. Supp. 690, 698 (E.D. Pa. 1963); United States v. Watchmakers of
Switz. Info. Ctr., 134 F. Supp. 710, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The same unity of interest has
also served as the basis for holding the principal shareholder liable for corporate
misconduct. E.g., Hroch, 757 F.2d at 184; United States v. Pisani, 646 F.2d 83 (3d Cir.
1981); Sebastopol Meat Co. v. Sec'y of Agric., 440 F.2d 983 (9th Cir. 1971). Courts will
also look to the substance of a particular transaction rather than simply relying on
corporate form. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., 417
U.S. 703, 713 (1974) ("[C]ourts of equity, piercing all fictions and disguises, will deal
with the substance of the action and not blindly adhere to the corporate form."); Chi.,
Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic & Com. Ass'n, 247 U.S. 490
(1918):
[W]here stock ownership has been resorted to . . . for the purpose . . . of
controlling a subsidiary company so that it may be used as a mere agency or
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variety of factors,365 including whether the parent dominated the
366
operation of the subsidiary through common management,367
establishment of the subsidiary's policies and procedures,
performance of management functions, 368 or through control of the
subsidiary's financial affairs.369
instrumentality of the owning company or companies.... [T]he courts will not
permit themselves to be blinded or deceived by mere forms of law but,
regardless of fictions, will deal with the substance of the transaction involved as
if the corporate agency did not exist and as the justice of the case may require.
Id. at 501.
365 For example, courts have considered the following factors: common stock
ownership, common directors and officers, common business departments, consolidated
financial statements and tax returns, incorporation of the subsidiary by the parent,
financing of the subsidiary by the parent; gross under capitalization of the subsidiary,
siphoning of funds from the subsidiary by the parent; payment of the subsidiary's
salaries and other expenses by the parent, the parent is the only source of the subsidiary's
business; common use of property by the parent and subsidiary, lack of separation of
operations between the parent and the subsidiary, policies and procedures directed by the
parent, and failure to observe corporate formalities (e.g., separate books and records,
regular shareholder and board of directors meetings). United Steel Workers ofAm., 855
F.2d at 1507; Van Diviner, 822 F.2d at 965; Jon-TChems., Inc., 768 F.2d at 691-92; Am.
Bell, Inc., 736 F.2d at 886; Midwest Fasteners,Inc., 779 F. Supp. at 793-95; DiMauro,
744 F. Supp. at 57; Kayser-Roth, 724 F. Supp. at 20; United States v. Arkwright, Inc.,
690 F. Supp. 1133, 1139 (D. N.H. 1988); In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor,
675 F. Supp. 22, 33 (D. Mass. 1987); United States v. Advance Mach. Co., 547 F. Supp.
1085, 1093 (D. Minn. 1982). A number of decisions construing state laws rely on the
same factors as well. PassalaquaBuilders, 933 F.2d at 139 (New York law); Key v.
Liquid Energy Corp., 906 F.2d 500,503 (10th Cir. 1990) (Oklahoma law); Lowell Staats
Mining Co. v. Pioneer Uravan, Inc, 878 F.2d 1259, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1989) (Colorado
law); Craig, 843 F.2d at 150 (New Jersey law); Luckett v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 618
F.2d 1373, 1378 n.4 (10th Cir. 1980) (Oklahoma law); Dewitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W.
Ray Femming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 685-86 (4th Cir. 1976) (South Carolina law);
Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Harvey Fund-Raising Mgmt., Inc., 519 F.2d 634, 638
(8th Cir. 1975) (Iowa law); United States v. Daugherty, 599 F. Supp. 671, 673 (E.D.
Tenn. 1984) (Kentucky law); Schmid v. Roehm GmbH, 544 F. Supp. 272, 274-75 (D.
Kan. 1982) (Kansas law).
366 E.g., Taylor v. Std. Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307, 310-11 (1939); United States
v. Jon-T Chems., Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 695 (5th Cir. 1985); P.F. Collier & Son Corp. v.
FTC, 427 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1970); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Linear Films, Inc., 718 F. Supp.
260, 267 (D. Del. 1989).
367 E.g., Jackam v. Hosp. Corp. of Am. Mideast, Ltd., 800 F.2d 1577, 1580 (11th
Cir. 1986); Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp. v. United States, 350 F.2d 321, 326 (8th Cir. 1965),
vacated on other grounds, 384 U.S. 883 (1996).
368 E.g., United States v. ACB Sales & Serv., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 561 (D. Ariz. 1984)
(finding parent served as "front office" for subsidiary debt collection agencies).
369 Courts will look particularly to whether the subsidiary was operated in an under
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Jurisdiction may also arise over the parent as a result of the
acts of a subsidiary--even a subsidiary that is separate and distinct
from the parent-if it is found that the subsidiary acted as the
agent of the parent in committing the offense or in committing an
act in furtherance of an offense within the territory of the United
States. Agency principles have served as the basis for parental
liability for the acts of subsidiaries.37 °
Once again, however, the ability of the parent corporation to
control the actions of the subsidiary is the predicate for liability
and jurisdiction based on agency. 7' Thus, it has been said that
capitalized condition. See, e.g., Taylor, 306 U.S. at 310-11; Laborers Clean-Up Contract
Admin. Trust Fund v. Uriate Clean-Up Serv., Inc., 736 F.2d 516, 523 (9th Cir. 1984);
Pisani, 649 F.2d at 85; Casanova Guns, 454 F.2d at 1323; Arkwright, 690 F. Supp. at
1139-40. In essence, this is a question of whether the subsidiary could function
independently of the parent. See, e.g., Jon-T Chems., Inc., 768 F.2d at 694 (holding that
"the underlying question is whether [the subsidiary] was an economically viable,
independent entity or whether it operated merely as the adjunct or alter ego of [the
parent]"). Cf In re Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. 22 (holding that the court declined to
pierce the corporate veil of a subsidiary in view of the subsidiary's profitability and the
independence of its business operations).
370 A parent corporation's liability for the crimes of a subsidiary is generally
recognized based on agency principles. E.g., United States v. NYNEX Corp., 788 F.
Supp. 16, 18 n.3 (D.D.C. 1992) ("A corporation can of course be held criminally liable
for the acts of its agents."); see also BRICKEY, supra note 5 1, § 3.06 ("[S]ubsidiaries may
act as agents of the parent company just as their human agents act as subagents."). For
example, in the prosecution of Exxon Corporation (Exxon) following the grounding of
the Exxon Valdez, the district court rejected Exxon's argument that it should not be
liable for the actions of its subsidiary, Exxon Shipping Company, under a theory of
respondeat superior and held that Exxon "may be held liable for the acts of its agent."
United States v. Exxon Corp. and Exxon Shipping Co., No. A90-015-lCR (D. Ala.),
Order filed Oct. 29, 1990, at 6; see also In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 20 ERC
(BNA) 2041 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd as to "liability," 954 F.2d 1279 (11th Cir. 1992).
Thus, in United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 231 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Pa. 1963), which
was relied upon in the Exxon case, the district court found the separate existence of the
subsidiaries was "mere form" and that the parent and subsidiaries were "one unitary
enterprise." Accordingly, the court concluded that "the subsidiaries were agents of the
parent, and the employees of the subsidiaries acted as sub-agents of the parent." Id. at
698.
371 See generally BLUMBERG, supra note 362, § 6.06. For example, in upholding
Exxon's liability, the district court noted particularly that the subsidiary's sole director
and president reported to the parent and that the parent provided all of the administrative
services (e.g., data processing, medical, legal and accounting services) for the subsidiary.
The subsidiary's operating policies and procedures (e.g., capital expenditure, personnel
and contracting policies) had been established by Exxon as well. Equally significantly,
the parent exerted control over the subsidiary's financial affairs. Exxon Corp., No. A90-
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"[w]here one corporation is controlled by another, the former acts
not for itself but as directed by the latter, the same as an agent, and
the principal is liable for
the acts of its agents within the scope of
372
the agent's authority."
015-1CR, Order at 3. In like fashion, in Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 350 F.2d at 321, the
parent corporation was held liable for the crimes of the subsidiary. Noting that the parent
approved the subsidiary's board of directors, established the subsidiary's policies,
exercised control over capital investments, and could override decisions of the
subsidiary's president, the court found that the subsidiary's independence from the
parent was "in form only." Id. at 327. As a result, the court concluded that "[s]ince [the
subsidiary] was merely an operating division of [the parent] in corporate form, the jury
was entitled to find [the parent] liable for any conspiratorial conduct in which [the
subsidiary] might have engaged with its distributor prior to the formal merger of [the
subsidiary] with [the parent]." Id. The ability of the parent to control the actions of the
subsidiary has long been viewed as the essential test of agency liability in civil litigation.
See, e.g., In re Ky Wagon Mfg., 3 F. Supp. 958, 963 (W.D. Ky. 1932) (holding that the
test of parental control for purposes of agency "is whether the [principal] corporation
[actually] controls the action of the [subordinate corporation]"). Complete control is not
necessary, however. Where the parent has exercised control over the sphere of activity
giving rise to the cause of action, the subsidiary has been considered as having acted as
the parent's agent. See e.g., Phoenix Can. Oil Co., Ltd. v. Texaco:
[O]ne corporation whose shares are owned by a second corporation does not, by
that fact alone, become the agent of the second company. However, one
corporation ... may assume the role of the second corporation's agent in the
course of one or more specific transactions .... Under this [agency] theory, total
domination or general alter ego criteria need not be proven .... [u]nlike the
alter ego/piercing the corporate veil theory, when customary agency is alleged
the proponent must demonstrate a relationship between the corporations and the
cause of action. Not only must an arrangement exist between the two
corporations so that one acts on behalf of the other and within usual agency
principles, but the arrangement must be relevant to the plaintiff's claim of
wrongdoing.
842 F.2d 1466, 1477 (3d Cir. 1988); cf United States v. Carter, 311 F.2d 934 (6th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 915 (1963) (despite the fact that the maker of an illegal
payment to a union official, in the guise of a loan, was president of both the parent and
subsidiary, the parent was not criminally liable because the only involvement of the
parent in the transaction was to approve the "loan" which appeared to be bona fide);
United States v. Little Rock Sewer Comm., 460 F. Supp. 6 (D. Ark. 1978) (finding that a
municipal government which appointed the members of the sewer committee, a separate
municipal corporation, was insufficient to find the municipality liable on an agency
theory for the filing of a false report by an employee of the sewer committee); E. Indus.,
Inc. v. Traffic Controls, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 381 (D. Del. 1956) (denying injunctive relief
in patent infringement case where it was shown that the parent had no interest in the
patent and had no control over the patent except for equitable ownership of the
subsidiary which had an interest in the patent).
372 Pac. Can. Co. v. Hewes, 95 F.2d 42, 46 (9th Cir. 1938). At least one
commentator has suggested that agency principles would result in liability under the
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In sum, personal jurisdiction over an absent foreign defendant
is subject to the requirements of due process. However, the due
process requirement with regard to personal jurisdiction that the
accused have "minimum contacts" with the forum is deemed to be
satisfied when the accused commits a criminal act within the
territory. Thus, due process would appear to be no bar to personal
jurisdiction over an absent foreign national who had committed an
act in furtherance of a violation of the FCPA while in the United
States.
Similarly, an accused may be deemed to have had the requisite
minimum contacts with the United States by doing or causing acts
which are intended to have a direct effect in the United States.
Thus, a foreign national outside the United States who authorizes
or directs an agent, including a subsidiary, in the United States to
commit an act in violation of the FCPA, or in furtherance of a
violation, may thereby be subjected to the in personam jurisdiction
of a U.S. court.
2. In PersonamJurisdiction Over Absent U.S. Nationals
The same due process considerations that bear on whether a
court should exercise in personam jurisdiction over an absent
foreign national do not apply when the jurisdiction of a U.S. court
is invoked in regard to an absent U.S. citizen.373 Following this
rule, U.S. courts have not hesitated to exercise personal
jurisdiction over citizens in proceedings arising from their
FCPA for the parent:
[A] subsidiary is considered the agent of its parent, as for example, when it
enters into a contract on the parent's account. If a foreign subsidiary is the agent
of the parent corporation, the parent would be liable for all questionable
payments made by the subsidiary in the exercise of its agency authority. In
some cases, even though a subsidiary is not technically an agent, the parent is
held liable for the actions of its subsidiary. This view is commonly referred to
as 'piercing the corporate veil'; the separate corporate existence of the
subsidiary is disregarded because it is so dominated by the parent as to be only
its instrument. If therefore, a foreign subsidiary's activities are substantially
under the control of the parent corporation, the parent corporation would be
chargeable with the subsidiary's wrongs.
Id. (emphasis original). Jennifer L. Miller, Note, Accounting for CorporateMisconduct
Abroad: The Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct of 1977, 12 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 293, 303304 (1979); accord Brown, supra note 60, at 1.
373 Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1932).
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activities outside the United States,374 so long as the accused has
been afforded adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard, as
required by due process. 7
The amended FCPA specifically prohibits U.S. issuers and
domestic concerns from corruptly doing any act outside the United
States in furtherance of a violation.376 All U.S. nationals are
therefore charged with knowledge of what is prohibited. 77
Accordingly, a U. S. national may be subject to the in personam
jurisdiction of a U.S. court based on prohibited acts committed
overseas, even if the U.S. national is a resident outside of the
United States.
V. Conclusion
The 1998 Amendments greatly enlarged the assertion of U.S.
jurisdiction over U.S. nationals who commit prohibited acts
abroad and over foreign nationals who commit an act in
furtherance of violations of the FCPA in the territorial United
States. Read in light of judicial construction of similar provisions
in analogous statutes, the jurisdictional reach of the amended
FCPA with regard to foreign nationals extends to virtually any
174 See, e.g., United States v. Juda, 46 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 1994) (U.S. citizen arrested
on a stateless vessel on the high seas for possession of drugs with the intent to
distribute), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1090 (1995); United States v. Layton, 855 F.2d 1388
(9th Cir. 1988) (U.S. citizen arrested in Guyana for conspiracy to murder a U.S.
Congressman), cert. denied, 489 U.S, 1046 (1989); United States v. Kaercher, 720 F.2d
5 (1st Cir. 1983) (discussing arrest of a U.S. citizen on a foreign vessel in international
waters for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute); In re Marc Rich
& Co., A.G., 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1983) (explaining why a foreign corporation's
wholly-owned subsidiary and two of its directors, who were U.S. citizens, were within
U.S. jurisdiction), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215 (1983); United States v. King, 552 F.2d
833 (9th Cir. 1976) (discussing a U.S. citizen's arrest in Japan and subsequent charge of
distribution of heroin in Japan intended for importation into the United States), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977).
375 Blackmer, 284 U.S. at 438 ("For the exercise of judicial jurisdiction in personam,
there must be due process, which requires appropriate notice of the judicial action and an
opportunity to be heard."); accord Juda, 46 F.3d at 967; In re Marc Rich, 707 F.2d at
666.
376 §§ 78 dd-l(g)(l), 78 dd-2 (i)(1).

377 As the Supreme Court made clear in Blackmer, "[t]he jurisdiction of the United
States over its absent citizens, so far as the binding effect of its legislation is concerned,
is a jurisdiction in personam, as he is personally bound to take notice of the laws that are
applicable to him and to obey them." 284 U.S. at 438.

2001]

EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND THE

FCPA

359

contact with the United States, however glancing. A telephone call
to the United States, a letter mailed to the United States, the use of
air or road travel, or the clearing of a check or wire transfer of
funds through a financial institution in the United States
apparently are sufficient predicates for jurisdiction, so long as the
act in some way furthers a violation of the FCPA. The
jurisdictional reach is even broader with respect to U.S. nationals,
encompassing any act in furtherance of a violation, committed
anywhere in the world.
The effects doctrine extends even farther the potential reach of
U.S. jurisdiction over foreign nationals. Even though due process
requires that an accused have "minimum contacts" with the forum,
under an effects analysis, evidence that a foreign national caused a
prohibited action to be taken in the United States by a third party
could be the predicate for U.S. subject matter and in personam
jurisdiction over a foreign national, even one who was never
physically present in the United States.
The possibility of jurisdictional overreaching is compounded
by the failure of the FCPA to specifically include a requirement
that U.S. interests be affected directly by the corrupt acts of a
foreign national. For example, a foreign national who causes the
transfer of funds from a U.S. depository in order to pay a bribe to a
foreign official for the purpose of gaining an "improper
advantage" in obtaining business would appear to have violated
the FCPA. Therefore, he would be subject to prosecution in the
United States, regardless of whether a U.S. national, an issuer or
domestic concern, was harmed as a result of the corrupt payment.
By failing to link a violation of U.S. law to a demonstrable
prejudice of national interest, the jurisdictional reach of the FCPA
exceeds the legitimate grasp of U.S. legislative and enforcement
authorities. Indeed, taken to its apparent limits, the amended
FCPA would in effect be a general warrant against international
bribery.
Fortunately, the proscriptive zeal of the FCPA is restrained by
international law which imposes a requirement of reasonableness
on the exercise of both proscriptive and enforcement jurisdiction.
Under this standard, the interests of the foreign sovereign in which
the foreign national resides must be weighed against the interest of
the United States in enforcing its laws. Additionally, the burdens
imposed on the foreign national of having to defend against

360

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

[Vol. 26

charges in the United States, and the availability of another forum
whose interests may be equal to or greater than those of the United
States, must be considered.
Unfortunately, in enacting the 1998 Amendments, Congress
did consider these sovereignty and comity concerns. In the
absence of congressional guidance, it must rest, therefore, on the
prosecutors in the first instance and ultimately on the judiciary to
ensure that the jurisdictional reach of the FCPA does not exceed
the legitimate grasp of the United States, in accordance with due
process and the law of nations.

